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Purpose and Scope 
The purpose of this dissertation isr firstr to examine 
the doctrines o£ the will in the thought o£ "(l) Plater 
{2) Aristotler (3) Augustine and (4) Rant, and, secondly 
to relate their conceptions of freedom as applied to their 
doctrine o£ will. To achieve this purpose, the procedure 
will involve two aspects. (l) An attempt will be made to 
give a clear and explicit definition of the nature and 
function of the will in the thought of these four thinkers. 
(2) stress will be given to a careful and systematic ex-
amination and development of the problems involved in each 
case with the map of the way in which the philosophical 
j ourneys.~have been organized. 
The doctrine of a free will has been subjected to a 
line of reasoning which, through the ages, has been tied 
into complex and intricate knots. These knots have been 
debated with varying results. To give consideration to 
several of the basic formulations of the problem may help 
to disentangle some of the difficulties and misunder$tandings 
which have arisen. 
1 
2 
The need for clear definition is emphasized by the £act 
that the vocabulary pertaining to the will has undergone 
numerous variations the reasons for which are not perfectly 
clear. The Oxford English Dictionary lists almost ten full 
pages of definitions of "will". Such diffusiveness tends 
to make the project of clear definition either an uphill 
struggle, or~ if oversimplified, a mere scratching of the 
surface. 
Philosophical self-preservation demands the limiting 
of the scope of this·study to the thinkers named and to 
whatever problems their insights may rightfully raifBe. 
Because of the abundance of speculative activity taking 
place in the general consideration of free will, it may be 
of importance to note the related work being done and to 
distinguish it from the subject matter of this dissertation. 
Related Research 
Many serious studies have been made of the problem of 
free will. At the present time there seems to have devel-
oped a favorable climate for such endeavors. The first 
gathering of the New York University Institute of Philosophy 
in February, 1957, was devoted in all its sessions to the 
3 
subject of determinism and freedom. 1 In 1958 Austin Farrer 
devoted his Gifford Lectures entirely to the subject of 
freedom o£ the will as contrasted with the doctrine of 
determinism and neces~ity. 2 Though Crane Brinton in an 
imposing volume( A History o£ Western Morals~ refers to the 
freedom of the will as an old chestnut 1 he yet admits that 
for the modern Westerner it is impossible not to believe 
in some sort o£ freedom of the wi11. 3 
It is of importance to note certain aspects of what 
has peen done in the special areas related to the primary 
concerns of this study: 
{1) On Plato the discussions and studies of the prob-
lem of the will as free have been meager and sporadic. Al-
though Plato}·s doctrine of political freedom is given some 
consideration4 specific treatment of free will seems not to 
exist and there are no references to such a treatment in any 
lsidney Hook~' ed.( Determinism and Freedom in the Age 
of Modern Science {New York: New York University Press, 
1958 .) .• 
2Austin Farrer, The Freedom of the Will (London: Adam 
and Charles Black, 1958 ):. 
3 (New York: Harcourt Brace and Co. 1 1959) 1 p. ~. 
4see Winson Colemanrs dissertation: "Knowledge and 
Freedom in the Political Philosophies of Plato and Aristotle." 
(University of Chicago, 1951)~ 
4' 
of the works on Plato. The relevance of the discussion of 
the soul must be left to the more detailed examination as 
it appears in the chapter on Plato, except to note that 
other limited examinations of the will in Plato (such as in 
Taylor and Shorey) leave without answer the question of its 
freedom and only vaguely suggest that the discussion of free 
will is to be left to others later in the history of thought. 
In this dissertation a vigorous attempt will be made to dis-
cover .·what Plato said on the subjec~ and to see if the cate-
gory of freedom may apply to his doctrine of what may right-
fully be called a will. 
(2) Aristotle has been treated more extensively than 
Plato on the subject in spite of the fact that interpreters 
such as Ross and Voegelin suggest that Aristotle has not 
given to the subject the thoroughness deserved. Writers like 
Zeller, Taylor, Jaeger, Wild, and Grube apply the doctrine 
of free will to Aristotle in order to provide for a doctrine 
making man responsible for his actions. How much deeper 
than this it is possible to go is one of the purposes of 
this dissertation to determine. 
(3) Augustine has been given more consideration than 
both P~ato and Aristotle partly because he wrote a treatise 
-,-....... ;' .... "' 
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on the subject of Free Will. The only specific treatment 
l h' of Augustinets views of free will and freedom severs J.S 
relationship to the upagan philosophers 11 from the early 
Greeks to Plotinus. Augustine is then made the founder of 
the doctrine of freedom developed by Anselror Aquinas 1 and 
Maritain. Biblical narratives and texts and the church 
fathers are carefully interpreted to support AugustineJs 
conclusions and are shown to be the basis of Augustine's 
thought. Although such a work is not to be treated lightly, 
it is important for this dissertation to give the rational 
sequence of Augustiners views and to evaluate them not only 
on the grounds of their inner consistency with the data he 
proposesr but to evaluate the data themselves and to relate 
his doctrine to the thought of Plato and Aristotle. 
(4) The study o£ Kant poses an entirely different 
problem because his doctrine of free will has been the 
subject of considerable discussion. 2 Lewis White Beck 
lsee Mother Mary T. Clark's dissertation: 11Augustine,. 
First :Philosopher of Freedom.". (Fordham Universityr l955). 
2Two dissertations appear on the subject: William T. 
Jones, 11Kant's Theory of Moral Freedom." (Princeton Univer-
sity, l937), published as Morality and Freedom in the Phil-
osophy of lmmanuel Kant. (London: The OXford University Press, 
1940.); and Mary-Barbara K- Zeldin, "Kant•s Doctrine of .Moral 
Freedom." (Radcliffe College r l95Q ) .• 
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has a chapter on free will in his book on Kantrl and writers 
such as Hartmann 1 Paulsen 1 Caird 1 and Ward do great service 
in discussing freedom of the will as autonomous causality 
acting in accordance with~ priori laws. Considerable dis-
cussion of this problem appears in the text. This disserta-
tion will attempt to show a meaning and importance to the 
doctrine of free will in Kant•s system not so emphasized in 
any of the interpretations of Kant and to relate such con-
elusions to what has been previously ascertained in the 
course of this study. The full discussion of the remaining 
aspects of relevance must be left to the text of the 
dissertation. 
Limitations 
The fact that the Stoics¥ the Epicureans 1 Aquinasr 
Descartes, Spinoza 1 Hume 1 Hegel, Schopenhauer, and many 
others have been largely omitted from consideration is not 
so much a reflection on their importance as it is a recog-
nition of the immensity of the subject and the necessary 
limitations which are required in any interpretation of an 
important problem. 
l,A .. Commentary on Kantf s Critique of Practical Reason, 
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press 1 1960). 
7 
The meaning o£ the will as applied to a theological 
interpretation o£ the will o£ God is not within the main 
interests o£ this study although at some points such as in 
Augustine and Kant the notion may arise. 
CHAPTER I 
THE ORIGIN OF THE pOCTRINE OF WILL 
LAT.ENT IN GR.EEK THOUGHT 
Alfred North Whitehead has summed up the status of 
man's thinking in·his observation that nmankind never 
quite knows what it is after." 1 In such a situation he 
notes that progress may be achieved by.systematizing thought 
in the adventure of trying out ideas 1 defining limitations 
and eliciting the rem~ining core of truth. 1 Thilly suggests 
that this adventure in thinking is to be carried out by 
inserting neach world-view in its proper setting 1 11 under-
standing it as part of an organic whole, and then connecting 
it with nthe intellectual, political, moral., social and re-
ligious factors of its present, past, and future." 2 
bProcess and Reality, (New York: The Macmillan Company, 
1929) t p. 21. 
2Frank Thilly and Led~Wood, A History of Philosophy~ 
(3d ed. rev., New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1957) 1 p. 1. 
8 
9 
The· Problem to Be Explored 
Man's tmeerta1,nty as described above by Whitehead is 
.. 
cl.early eyident in the·· discussion . of the . problem of free 
will. John Rospars points out that the l.ack of clarity is 
the result of the numerolts definitions given to free will-
and the extensive data which tend to indicate that human 
behavior is determined by compelling forces. A free Will 
1 
is thus defined as ... eithe:z:t ill'!lsoey. oro gl:*eatly liinited. 
Insight into the problem is not improved much in the 
doctrine called indifferentism by which is me~t a fortu-
2 
itous will -- haphazard, l'andom, causeless and aimless. 
Indifferentism would be another name for ehaos in the 
discussion of mB.n• s behavior, nature, and destiny. When 
- ' 
the doc. trine of fl'e e will is related to the idea of 
choice, a working definition begins t~ appeal'. -Austin 
Farrer defines a free will as willing o:t;~.e's ehoice, energy 
3 
or interest in the performance .·· of one 1:s action. 
Paul Edwards defines it . a.s the . ability . to · 
}~!.!Fr~e Will and- Psycho~nalysis,tt. Read. s in Ethical 
TheO!s!, · e d. Wilfrid Sellars and John Hospers New York: 
Apple~()n..-aentUl:'y-Oro:f.'ts, Inc., 1952), PP• 560,. 574-575. 
2see Percy w. Bridgman, "Determinism in Modern 
Science," l)ete~nism and Freedem, ed. Sidney Hook (New 
York:. New York. University Press-, 1958), P• 47. 
3The Free dan of' .. the. Will (London& .• Adam and Oharles 
Black, l958), W• 109-110. 
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act according to one 1 s choices or desires.l A. K. Stout 
represents this concept in the basic formulation that a free 
will is one which "proceeds from the self which is said to 
will, and is not imposed upon it by conditions external to 
it."2 
These definitions are not widely different from one 
which may point the direction of this study. Nicolai 
Hartmann asserts that a free will is that which 11 gives 
direction to real conduct, in so far as it lies in the 
power of man to decide for or against a felt value." 3 
H. J. Paton simplifies the definition in his statement that 
an elementary will is rra response to the object apprehended."4 
A Working Definition of Free Will 
It is thus to a degree clear that the problem to be 
systematically interpreted in the discussion of free will is 
1 11 Hard and Soft Determinism 1 11 Determinism and Freedom, 
ed. Sidney Hookr p. 106. 
2 11 Free Will and Responsibility 1 11 Readings in Ethical 
Theory, ed. Wilfrid Sellars and John Hospers (New York: 
Appleton-Century-crofts, Inc. 1 1952) 1 p. 538. 
3Ethics, Vol. III: Moral Freedom trans. Stanton Coit 
(New York: The Macmillan Company, 1932) 1 p. 19. 
4The Good Will (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1927), 
p. 101. 
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that of the exploration of the pow.er or pow.ers in man which 
enable him to determine or choose his direction. To uncover 
the nature and structure of the will so conceived it becomes 
necessary to investigate the beginnings of what was to de-
velop into man's deepest insights into human nature. 
The Significance of Greek Thought 
Ancient Greek philosophy need not apologize to any . 
period in philosophic historyi for as Warbeke puts it, 
"ancient philosophy is involVed in the most comprehensive 
and searching thought of which the human mind is capable; 
Greek language~ art and thought defy comparison."l 
The men responsible for the remarkable qualities of 
Greek philos~phy have achieved considerable recognition 
in the history of the race. They are all the more unique 
and extraordinary~ because they did not give the impression 
.. - --- ---
that they owned the truth but rather shared it openly and 
freely_. It is perhaps because of this climate of the give-
.......... 
and-take of ideas~ of the open quest for truth~ and of the 
thoughtful examination of data that the golden age of Greek 
thought developed. Of no small importance was the Greek 
lJohn M. Warbeke, The Searching Mind of Greece {New 
York; E. s. Crofts and Company, 1934}, p. ix. 
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language which lent itself readily to the expression of pro-
found ideas. 
From The Greek·Myths to Socrates 
As with the history of other peoples, the beginning of 
Greek thought in its most primitive forms is theogonicJ i.e., 
concerned with the genealogy of the gods. The myths des-
cribing the nlivesn of the gods and their effect on human 
life and destiny played no small part in man 1 s earliest 
though-ts. Homer I Hesiodl J?herecydes of syros I Epimenides I. 
Acusilaus, and Hermotimus are all reported as achieving 
prominence in immortalizing the myths of the gods in poetry1 
song1 and literature.l However, for the purposes of the 
present study, it is important to note only that the 
theogonies placed human destiny in the hands o;E capricious 
deities. The theogonies were full of contradictions,2 arbi-
trary, whimsical; and sometimes bruta1.4 
~Cf. Friedrich Ueberweg, History of Philosophy, trans. 
o. s. Morris (2 vols.i New York: Scribner, Armstrong and 
Co., 1877) 1 Vol. I, chap. i~ 
2L. R. Farnell and H. J. Rose, "Greek Religion" 
Encyclopedia Britannica, X (1958) 1 849. 
3Homer, Odyssey .. .I, 32-34. See R. ,H. Pfieffer 1 "Greek 
Religion," An Encyclopedia of Religion, ed. Vergilius Ferro 
(1935) l p. 311. 
4see ncronus," Encyclopedia Britannica, VI (1958), 
746-747. See also "Titans," Encyclopedia Britannica, 
XXII (1958) 1 ~5~. 
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The Ionian Physicists 
The Ionian physicists began ·their attempt to construct 
a better interpretation with the doctrine of hylo~oism 1 1 
by which was meant "the immediate unity of matter and life 
according to which matter is by nature endowed with·life, 
2 
and life is inseparably connected with matter. 11 Matter was 
not something the gods threw at each other and at men as in 
the great Titanomachy. 3 Matter is a unity which man can 
control, if he understands it. The Milesian 1 Thales, (~. 
624-546 B.C.), expressed the unity of matter in a single 
sentence. Ueberweg describes it in the statement, nwater 
is the original sources of all things."4 His view is that 
5 
all things are full of gods.·· Similarly 1 Anaximines (588-
524 B.C.) suggests that the single cosmic unity is...ai-r-.-
lcf. William Turner, History of Philosophy (Boston: 
Ginn and Company 1 1903) 1 p. 33. 
2 Ueberweg 1 I, 32. 
3An interesting account of this event is found (besides 
in the cla~sical distio~aries) in Israel Smith Clare, Library 
of Universal History (New York: Union Book Company, 190B), 
lil, 723-749. Cf. also "Dionysus 1 " Encyclopedia Britannica, 
VII (1958), 398. 
4ueberweg, I, 32. 
5w. Windelband, A History of Philosophy,trans. James H. 
Tufts, (New York: The· Macmillan Company, 1893), p. 32, n. 4. 
See Aristotle, De Anima, trans W. D. Ross, The Basic Works 
of Aristotle~ed. Richard Mc~on (New York: Random Housel 
1941) 1 4lla: "Thales came to the opinion that all things 
are full of gods." 
14 
This was an improvement over water, because it has the ad-
ditional quality of infinity. 1 Anaximander (ca~ 611-547 B.C.) 
made the notion of infinity the originating principle of 
..,...'II. )I 
all things .1 calling it I D Oj'f!(.5t/Jot/, "the unlimited. " Within 
7 
the unlimited were elementary contraries >f>1hich separated 
from the unlimited, whereas homogeneous elements were 
brought together. From this notion one of the only two 
sentences in existence from his work On Nature is clarified. 
He says, "All things must in equity again decline into that 
whence they have their origin, for they must give satisfaction 
and atonement for injustice.~ each in order of time."2 Thus, 
the injustice of life was thought to be caused not by hu-
man effort hut by separations from the original infinite, 
and the only way that justice could he restored was for 
everything to return to the whole. 
The Milesians, in affirming a unifying princi~l§~~ch 
·- ·-·-··----- ---------- - . ---~-~-- ... ·-------·-
was orderly and, if properly understood, controllable, 
- ~ ---- -~­_______ ___.-- . -- -------------
-------····---·----
weakened the doctrine which put human destiny in the hands 
of warring deities. As a unity, the univ~rse was just and 
----------------- --·-- --·-----
would not interfere with man•s striving for justice. 
lihid., 1>· 33. 
2cf. Turner, p. 35; Ueherweg,I, 35; Windelhand, p. 28. 
15 
Pythagoreanism 
Pythagoras (582-507 B.C.) 1 supposedly a pupil of 
Pherecydes and Anaximander 1 took the latter's doctrine of 
separation which accounted for the disorder in nature and 
systematized it into a theory of ten pairs of opposites re-
lated by numbers. :Pythagoras agreed with the conceptions 
of unity and harmony but affirmed that the unity came not 
from matter and things but from thoughts and relations 
which constituted the fundamental principles of all reality. 
Man's destiny also was determined not by things but by re-
lations which could be thought as numbers. Because the 
c--------· 
universe was a harmony 1 man had no reason to expect inter-
ference from the universe. Rather his destiny lay in 
harmonizing his numerical relations with those of the uni-
verse. Whether the :Pythagorean numbers were entities 
(Thilly) or forms (Windelband) may be debatedJ' because 
Pythagoras left no explicit statement on the matter. But 
the harmonizing of the worid and man in numerical relations 
is unquestioned. HoweverJ' the soul as a harmony was chained 
• 
to the body similar to the life of one who dwells in a 
prison.l By achieving knowledge in terms of asceticism1 
lueberweg, I 1 42ff. See also :Plato 1 PhaedoJ' trans. 
B. Jowett (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1897) 1 61-67. 
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music, and gymnastics, harmony results 1 and the soul may 
move from its body to a future life among the stars where 
the soul expresses its own nature as harmony. In this way, 
the soul achieves its freedom or escape from the "wheel of 
birthJ<"l a notion which was encountered in the Orphic 
doctrine of the ncircle of blirth 1 11 i~e. the fate of being 
born to a body until purification made escape possible. 
It is, thus, vaguely affirmed in .Eythagorean doctrine 
that man escapes from his suffering in the disorder and 
chaos of life, not as a reward for, but as the product or 
essence of, his virtue and goodness. If he did not know 
enough to become virtuous he remained chained to the nwheel 
of btrth'' in a continuous process of reincarnation.. He 
could learn to move in the right direction, if he would 
achieve knowledge. 
Heraclitus 
Hereclitus (535-475 B.C.) regarded the original dis-
order of the Eythagorean•s view as inadequate, stating that 
2 
the universe made no sense on a number theory. To make 
sense change must be properly understood. The concept of 
lsee T .. L. Heath and A.C. Lloyd, "Eythagoras,n 
Encyclopedia Britanniea, XVIII ·(1958) 1 803-805 .. 
2Heraclitus, 15, 40 1 129, Bakewell 1 pp. 30ff. 
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change as basic to the universe subjected human destiny to 
that change. Man must shape his destiny in response to the 
shifting course of reality. 
Change does not :mean disorder, "The ordered universe 
which is the same for all~ was not created by any one of 
_the gods or of mankind~ but it was ever and is and shall 
be ever-living-Fire~ kindle¢1. in measure and quenched in 
measure."1 The only way man can understand himself or the 
universe is by the logos or law ..... -fixed measure. God is not 
the creatort but the description of the primal unity of 
things constantly changing into their opposite. 2 The uni-
verse is orderly and just and constantly changing according 
to an immanent law in which harmony is the union of oppo-
sites( the product of strife. 
The Eleatics 
A reaction against the elusiveness of change takes 
place in the E1eatics~ Xenophanes (570-480 )3.C.), 
Parmenides (ca. 515-470 B.C.), Zeno (~. 490-430 B.C.)~ and 
Melissus of Sames (fl. 442 B.C.). They were so preoccupied 
with their notion of the eternal unchanging Being that-they: 
.LHeraclitus 1 30 1 Kathleen Freeman~ Ancilla to the Pre-
Socratic Philosophers (Cruabridge: Harvard University Press, 
- 1948) 1 p • 26 • 
2Heraclitus, 67 1 ibid. 1 p. 29. 
18 
overlooked human destiny except to note that all wh~eh man 
perceived by his senses was an illusion. Human nature is 
interpreted in terms of man's contemplation of the truth of 
the One in rational thought. This is truth. Error arises. 
from misunderstanding or from the testimony of the senses, 
"for it is the same thing to think and to be." 1 
~mpedoclesr Anaxagoras, and the,Atomists 
Empedocles 1 Anaxagoras, Leucippus, and Democritus rep-
resent interesting and important philosophic positions. 
Empedocles posits four elements organized by love and hate. 
Anaxagoras 1 however( takes the agglomerate of substance out 
of which he claims all things were formed and organizes them 
with the moving power of Nous. This power is regarded by 
Cleve as a mechanical mover.2 The name of those motions 
or functions is called 11psyche"--breathing.3 A most impor- , 
tant factor in this concept is that Nous is a 11 self upon 
itself. n4 It is self-ruled. 5 lts will is mechanical in ·t.he 
sense that it cannot create or destroy the elementsi it can 
·only push or pull them about in accordance with their given 
2see Felix M. Cleve, The Philosophy of Anaxagoras, (New 
Yorkr King•s Crown press~" 1949)~ pp. 19-21. 
3Ibid., pp. 80~83. 4Ibid. 1 pp. 19-21. 
5Anaxagoras( 12 1 Freeman, P~ 84. 
- --
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possibilities~l Nous is a person who sees and works con-
sciously~2 Anaxagoras imparts to Nous elements which become 
central to Plato 1 s notion of psyche especially the notion of 
self-rule. 
Leucippus and Democritus take the Being of Parmenides 
and make of the universe an infinite plurality consisting of 
atoms each of which is a miniature of Parmenides 1 Being. 
Each is independently moved and together they account for 
all of reality. For Democritusr perhaps as a result of the 
influence of Anaxagoras psyche and nous are ident.ified and 
the destiny of man is reached by "uprightness and wisdom. 113 
"Instruction transforms the man, and in transforming, creates 
his nature. 114 For 1 11 most things in life can be set in order. 
by an intelligent sharpsightedriess. 115 In this respect the 
study of man's destiny begins to turn from the study of the 
world of nature to the ordering of the psyche. 
l Cleve, p. 25. 2 Cleve 1pp. 26 and 96. 
3nemocritus, 40, Freeman, p .. 99. 
4Democritu~ 33, Freeman, p. 99. 
5nemocritus, 119; Freeman 1 p.l04. 
20 
The Sophists 
The Sophists reflect the breaking down of philosophic 
morale. So many ideas about what nature consisted of had 
developed, and so little of it could be substantiatedr that 
it was not surprising that a doctrine of the relativity of 
all knowledge should arise and gain wide acceptance.l Any 
attempt at reconciling the differences would lead to fur-
ther confusion. The most sensible solution, to the Sophistr 
was the rejection of the objective reference of thought and 
the exhortation to man to say what he believes and believe 
what he says/ regardless of what he says or believes. 
Thus, "of all things the measure is Man, of the things that 
are, that they are, and of the things that are not 1 that 
they are not. 11 2 
Man, thusr·measures both truth and falsehood 1 not by 
the rules o·f evidence 1 but by proclamation, exhortation, ;:~.nd 
rhetoric depending on which Sophist is being considered. It 
lJohann Eduard Erdmann/ A History of Philosophy, trans. 
W. s. Hough (London: swan s·onnenschein and Company, 1893) , 
pp. 75-76 1 points out that Sophists, like Protagoras and 
Gorgias, postulatedviews such as that everything is equally 
true·1 and everything is equally false~ Gorgias goes so far 
as to say that nothing exists; if it existed, it couldn't be 
known; and 1 if it were known,_it couldn't be communicated. 
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is impossible to determine Whether the gods exist or not, 
.because man does not have time in this life to investigate 
so vast a problem~ 1 Man measures the good or evil of life 
only to persuade men to a "belief about the just and the 
.unjust." But he is in no position to give "instruction-
about them_rr2 
The greatest good of man, on this view, is "that which 
gives men freedom in their own persons, and to rulers the 
power of ruling over others in their several States."3 By 
affording freedom he means "the word.which persuades" jud-
ges, senators 1 citizens, ·and, in fact!' anyone, and by this 
power the physician and trainer become slaves to him who can 
persuade the multitude. Thus.- the Sophist achieves freedom 
by gaining power over others, and this is the highest good 
and is the product of rhetori.c ~ Whatever a man wants out of 
life is conditioned only by his ability to persuade. His 
success is limited only by his power of persuasion. 
libid.r p. 126'" Protagoras was banished from Athens 
for holding this· view. 
2Plato 1 Gorgias. trans. B.Jowett (New York! Charles 
Scribner 1 s Sons, 1897), 455. 
3 Ibid. 1 452. 
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That the Sophists had powerful influence is clearly evi~ 
dent in the extent of Platols consideration of their artful 
rationalization. Plato's defense of the powers of reason 
against Thrasymachus in the Republic underlines his opposi-
tion to the Sophist's methods and conclusions. The valuing 
of justice as opportunism, or as mere convention, or as·a 
system of rewards and punishments, is, for Plato, the im-
moral consequence of Sophist.relativism and doubt. Not a 
few of the Platonic wr~tings are attempted answers to the 
sophist 1 s claim of "wisdom. 11 l 
The Sophist's -Relativism 
That the Sophist reduced the philosophy of nature to a 
mere relativism whe:t:"eby a minimum of objective validity was 
attributed to statements about nature was serious in itself. 
The Sophist's doubt and ridicule had penetrated theology and 
metaphysics. With equal effect he applied his subjectivism 
to moral problems and _the whole field of ethics. If truth 
was relative, it followed that ethical propositions must also 
lA clear understanding of Sophism is hard to come by. 
Eduard Zeller points out that Anaxagoras; Socrates, and even 
-Plato were considered Sophists by their contemporaries~ See 
his work Outlines of the History of Greek Philosophy, trans. 
L. R. Palmer (New York: ~he Humanities Press; Inc., 1931), 
pp. 97-111. 
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be relative. For the Sophist the good was what a man measured 
good. The measure was purely subjective. The art of rhetoric 
and persuasion was more useful to convince men than were logic 
and coherence. The-Sophist measured his own happiness in 
accordance with his own prerogatives and taught men the skills 
needed to influence others. In answer to the question 
What determines human destiny: the Sophist replied that 
man determined his own destiny. 
When the Sophist went to the extreme and stated that 
all things were both true and false and that nothing existed, 
he had in principle (perhaps unwittingly) ascribed:to man 
complete power over his own destiny. 
The doctrine of the will at this stage of its embryonic 
development centered on.the nature of the determinants of or 
powers controlling human destiny. As described, prior to 
Anaxagoras 1 these determinants had been attributed to vari-
ous forces in nature or to the gods. Beginning with 
Anaxagoras man was visualized as having .among other powers, 
the power to determinei in some measure, his own fate. For 
'the Sophist all the determinants outside of man himself were 
denied. The ~mbryonic will as found in the Sophist 1 s phil-
osophy was given sole power over the destiny of man long 
before it had matured enough even to be called a will. For 
the early Greek philosophers up to and including the Sophists, 
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the doctrine of what may be regarded as an embryonic will 
revolved around the question of what forces were at work 
to determine man•s destiny~ 
On the assumption that man did determine. his own destiny 
to a significant degree the next question to be applied to 
the problem of human destiny in the history of Greek thought 
was that of the right destiny~ Thus the question posed for 
the embryonic will in the next stage of its develo~ment was 
What determines the highest human destiny? Without ignoring 
the determinants, Greek thought began in Socrates to concern 
itself with the factors involved in the principles of right 
and wrong. 
Thusr the period in Greek thought beginning with Homer 
and ending with the Sophists for;m.ed the background of what 
was to become the greatest age in the history of philosophy--
the age of Socrates 1 Plato and Aristotle. socrates initiated 
this age with his challenge to the contentions of the Sophists 
and his search for what was most noble in man. He was prin-
cipally devoted to the task of arousing in men ":the.love of 
t:ruth and virtue,n and of helping them "think right in order 
that they might live right."l The exploration of the doctrine 
of the will in its prenatal state warrants consideration of 
the observatien that"the philosophers themselves, who began 
with speculations on the origin of the universe 1. the nature 
of the gods 1 the operation of the mind, and the laws of matter 
lThilly, p. 51. 
25 
ended at last with ethical inquiries ·and injutJ.ctions. ,.l 
Socrates• Inquiry Regarding Human Nature 
Philosophy may be viewed as based both on speculative 
theory and.on experience. On the side of speculative theory 
the emphasis is on consistency and inclusiveness in the shap-
ing of ideals. on the side of experience as ~udson points 
out 1 the emphasis is on explaining concrete facts and conditions 
to which the ideals may rightfully apply.2 For this reason 1 
Socrates 1 speculative insights are best understood when con-
sideration is given both to his thought and to his life. Be-
cause he was identified with the search for truth 1 socrates 
inspired the thinking of his age. His influence on .Plato is 
evidence of his inspiring greatness. After describing the 
circumstances of socrates' trial and execution1 Plato reports 
Phaedo as saying of socrates that "of all men of our time 1 the 
best, the wisest, and the most just.n3 
Xenophon says, 
No one ever heard or saw any·t.hing wrong in Sacra tes i 
lJohn Lord, Beacon Lights of History (15 voJ.s.; New York: 
James ·a:tarkJ.and: ·company*. J.883), I • p. 13J.. 
2see Albert c. ~udson, The .Principles of Christian Eth-
~ (New York: Abingdon-Cokesbury Press 1 1943) 1 pp. 57-58. 
3Plato, Phaedo 1 trans. F. J. Church (rev. Robert D. 





so pious was he that he never did anything without first 
consu~ting the;Godsi so just that he never injured anyone 
in the ~east; ·so master of himself that he never preferred 
p~easure to goodness; so sensible that he never erred in 
his choice between what was better and what was worse~ 
In a word, he was of all men the best and the happiest~i 
Breasted mirrors an identical appraisal. Ha describes Plato 1 s 
idea~ized version of Socrates' last hours as np:qe of the most 
precious possessions o£ humanity. He was the greatest Greek, 
and in him Greek civilization reached its highest level~"2 
In addition to this, he points out that the "glorified figure 
of Socrates as he appears in the writings of hi~ pupils was 
to prove more powerful even than the living teacher~ 113 
That a man so highly esteemed should be put to death by 
his fellowmen raised a number of t[Uestions regarding the char-
acter of the forces at .work in human nature. IS human nature 
riddled with evil powers? Wh,at is the-power of justice in 
the determination of hUman destiny? Can man reason about the 
moral inplications of life? 
In order to answer these questipns among others, Plato 
lxenophon 1 The Memorabilia of Socrates 1 trans~ Rev~ J. s. 
Watsonr (Philadelphia: David McKay, 1899) 1 Bkr iv, .Chap. viii, 
sp. 11. See also A. E. Taylor, Socrates, chap. 3. 
2James ~enry Breasted, Ancient Times (2d. ed; Boston: 
Ginn and Company, '1935), p. 481. 
3Ibid., pp. 481-482. 
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submitted Socrates • ii£~ and thought for consideration. As 
a result several important factors, emphasized by Socrates, 
appear. 
Sophistic Relativism 
and the Objective Reference of Truth 
The Sophists had made philosophy into an art in which 
truth and morality were based on sheer power or the power of 
persuasion. If a man could persuade, first, himself, then, 
power over others. 
'---------""'"'-·' 
Socrates himself did not wholly reject the Sophists' 
views, for he even sent pupils to them. But with reference 
to the art of persuasion, the sharp contrast of his position 
is seen in his statement: 11 I will be persuaded by the good 
rather than you. 111 
This affirmation of an external frame of reference to 
the art of persuasion was matched in Socrates by his interest 
in human excellence. 2 For, says he, "I spend my wh~~~~- _ :t,_~_:l;e ... ---
r---
in going about ang .. p.ersu9,g:i,p.g you all to give your first 
_ ___...~-·-•__,,.,•:••_.~ •" • ~·, ,_., .. -- -·•· •v 
and greatest care to the improvement of yq_ur _souls r aE:9: __ got 
lPlato, Apology, ·trans. F. J. Church (rev. Robert )) • 
Cumming 1 New York: Liberal:Arts Press 1 1956), 29. 
. .. . .· ) 
. ( 
2Ibid. r ·. 31. Jowett translates reT_?, "virtue. 11 
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till you have done that to think of your bodies or your wealth. 111 
r-...o.------·--····-~-----··········-.. --···-········ ..• .-·· . .. . .. / 
The improve~:~"t::_()_f_c:>n,e's so'l,ll·:<J/~_1:/J_)2 mean~ the improve-
- ·-·----•••"'··· ·-·· .... -~··---- . . ,. ... . . 
ment of the whole of oneself. __ Th~ _ _complete improvement resulted 
-· ,_. ~h~ ...... -'···---··" --- •• :1•·-- .·--··- ·-~. '• 
in virtue or excellence which meant knowledge of the good . 
.... • ·.• •·--''-'- !.· ,.,,,._,._,_., =•· --~.:,.. ., .. ,,.-•,_·' ,r···-.·•·· ·~··.·•·"• ,. 
11 lf a man has this knowledge, he will always act on it~ 
'. -. . -···- .. ,. 
since to do c:>"t::f.l~.:l::'Wi$e :woul¢1.. ):>e. to pr.efe:r known misery to 
· ... ----·· · .... 
kn()Wn hCI,.J?;J?~;r}~_f?.P.t··· an,q ·t::Jl;i,f?._ .. i,.e ... imJ??.;:>,p_il;>;l,.~,f.. ~~.: 
... -. ... -.---.·--~ .. _, . 
. Socrates 1 whole phL!,9J3_Q_p:P.,y_ was based on the premise 
...___ __________ .,..,......,._.__.- .... , ......... , .... .--.,_.,.~--~--""-'~-...., . . ·-· '· .-- ,..,.,~---..· .-... -::·,.··--':'"~---·-··.•-.-.--- -~-- ------- .. 
that knowledge is possible~ Using the method of clear defi-
,.., ...... ··· 
nition of terms and of'the faC.¢:$ of experience, he depended 
,.~- ----~-;· ._,..._-... -~·-"'·'"• ··-·- -·- .. ' 
on insight and self-examination (the orderly arrangement of 
onels thoughts and-ideas) to establish the nature of the 
subject being discussed~ 
·socrates' Ethics 
ln the field of ethics 1 Socrates posited three articles 
or principles. 4 A. ;m. Taylor summarized them as follows: 
1 . Ibid. I 30. 
2J?erhaps best "translated here as "life. 11 Cf. A Greek-
English Lexicon 1 comp. Henry George Liddell and Robert Scott 
(9th ed.i London: Oxford University Pressr 1958) pp. 2026-2027• 
3Taylor, ~~ p. 999. 
4These are found in Plato's Protagoras, Xenophon's 
Memorabilia 1 and Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics. J. Burnet 
has excellently stated Socrates' ethical v.iew in 11 Socrates," 
Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics, ed. James Hastings, 
XI (1921) • 
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(a) vir,tue, .moral excellence, is. identical with know-
ledge, and for that reason; all tlie conunonly discrimina-
ted virtues are one thing1 (b) 'Yi-9e..t.:-.1:?4\d_mor~-~---c~nqy_qt,. 
is, thereforer . .5-:A. e.ll cases, __ ;i,.gnorance 1 intellectual----··· · 
eri()]:-]~--I~[~~?!E~~~"-:'9:<?=!-.~~-~-is ther~~'?.r~ .<:i,'l.W;tYE.t in.Y2;L11ntary 1 
and there is really no ·s-uch.Eifate of soul as.· that which 
Aristotle himsel!_, C~J.S:.:..~..m.QJ::.~J... ..• Wg_eJC:tl~f?€.~. (acrasia) 1 
1 knowing 'E:Ele~good and yet do:tl1Sf. the __ evil .. ll·" .. -
-~__, ______ ..,_ .. -.-,....._ .... ,,.._j.,~ ..... ~--~----;, .. ~ --~·., .. , - -·''·----~- ... - . . . -
Taylor explains . that for Socrates l ''the attempt to 
define one virtue ends-in s.omething which is no more a defi-
nition of that virtue thanof another, for the reason that 
in principle all virtue is one.n 2 The knowledge of virtue 
.------~--,·--·-·"""'!·-···~'·"·--~--=· .. -·=---,.·-····.······· 
is achieved by "a process of 'recollectiont or •recognition• 
(anamnesis) in which particular sensible facts prompt or 
suggest the assertion of a universal principle which trans-
cend.s the ;facts themselves.n3 In this respect the mind will 
produce the right conciusion from within 1 by its own action, 
as though £rom a store of truth ·which it already possesses 
uncop.sciously. 4 Thus, true virtue is the personal knowledge 
of the "one singie principle 'behind ~l:;:L, _;Lts diverse manifes-· 
tations in the varied Situations of life, 115 not a principle 
_,..._,...,_ __ ......,..,....,~._......w;o,.,,._....,-._ . --.-.o-..-.~-.---·--~-.....,~-··--··•..,.,.,..._: ,__-,·c-.- - • .:..·· ., ·-----,· .•• ,~ -
~ 1Taylor, Socrates., pp. 141.;...153. 
on Aristotle 1 .s'description of what is 
in the field of ethics. 
This summary is based 
distinctively Socratic 
. 2Ibid. I p. 145"' 
4Ibid., P~ 149* 
3I'bid .. 1 p. 148 • 
5Ibid., p. 144. 
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applicable in some situations but not in others, but the 
"exhibition of one excellence, steady and assured ceietainty 
---~----'-~·- .. 
of the true 1 scale of good 1 ul displa;ing a right attit~d~-~-t~· 
--~-·--··"·-~·-·~·•·•>·-·· .... --. ·- - .. -----~:. 
all the situations of life. 
The second point cited above that all vice or bad 
moral conduct is ignorance or intellectual error is founded 
on the abqve statement that there is a universal principle. 
A man who achieves the knowl~~e of this universal principle 
cannot possibly err. To err would mean that he did not have 
the universal principle •... 'l'P.u.s 1 n~vil-doing always rests upon 
.... ., . _, 
a false estimate of goods, 112 a miscalculation of values of 
'• ~ •• •,.: •• :. .•. •'L..-._~,,,' :•• _,•o··~,,,.,/"_., •' 
~--·-"""' ... -:.--· 
good. A man cannot both know the highest or universal prin-
ciple and yet deny it. For, to deny_it means he does not 
know it •. 
To approach the problem in another way, it may be said 
that no man does an evil because he recognizes it as evil. 
He does an evil (rationalized into a good) because he believes 
he can achieve some good as an end 1 using the rationalized 
evil or evils as means to that good. Thus, he may murder to 
satisfy jealousy or wrath, if the satisfaction is considered 
worth the price (even for a moment). An neviP' is always 
done in order to achieve a good. In so doing, the individual 
libid., p. 145. 2Ibid. 1 p. 143. 
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may confess the evil act as wrong:r even knowing that he will 
be punished; but he prefers to do the evil he_has rational-
ized in spite of the consequences. ·He may even risk life 
or limb to do iti for ''a ma:h. has temporarily to sophisticate 
himself into reg~ding evil as good before he will choose 
to do it~ul 
In.the third sense, wrongdoing is always involuntary, 
because the wicked man does not know any better. There are 
two aspects to this ignorance. In the first place, what the 
evil man finally realizes is not what he knowingly willed. 
In committing murder, he may.have willed ·(not merely inten-
ded) satisfactio~ but he achieves ~isery. Thus, what he 
achieves is not what he willed.2 Therefore, evil results 
are involuntary. In another sense, evil is involuntary be-
cause a man may claim that he is "compelled" to do the evil 
in order to achieve the good anticipated. Thus, according 
to Socrates' opponents, in order to keep the youth from 
being corrupted, socrates had to be executed. The evil is 
not voluntary in the sense that killing Socrates is not vol-
untary as an end_, but conceived as necessary to the achiev-
ing of 11 uncorrupted youth. II From the perspective of true 
lrbid., p. 142. 2Ibid., pp. 142-143. 
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virtue or true good 1 the youth need not be corrupted nor 
need Socrates be executed 1 but men resort to wickedness as 
. 
a means to good ends. 
The following passage makes Socrates' position clear: 
Socrates. Is there anyone who would 
jured than benefited by his companions? 
good man; you are obliged by the law to 
anyone like to :Qe injured? 
Meletus. Certainly not. 
rather be in ..... 
Answer 1 my 
answer. Does 
Socr. Well 1 then 1 are you prosecuting me for cor-
rupting the young and making them worse 1 voluntarily 
or involuntarily? 
Mel. For doing it voluntarily. 
Socr. Whatr Meletus? Do you mean to say that you 1 
who are so much younger than I, are yet so much wiser 
than I that you know that bad citizens always (iQ) evil 1 
and that good citizens do good 1 to those with whom they 
come in contact, while I am so extraordinarily ignorant 
as not to know that, if I make any of my companions 
evil, he will probably injure me. in some way? And you 
allege that I do this voluntarily? You will not make 
me believe that 1 nor anyone else either, I should think. 
Either I do not corrupt the young at all or, if I do 1 
I do so involuntarily, so that you are lying in either 
case. And if I corrupt them involuntarily 1 the law 
does not call upon you to prosecute me for an error 
which is involuntaryL but to take me aside privately 
and reprove and educate me. For, of course, I shall 
cease from doing wrong involuntarily1 as soon as I know 
that I have been doing wrong. But you avoided associa-
ting with me and educating me; instead you bring me up 
before the court 1 where the law sends persons 1 not 
for education 1 but for punishment. 1 
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Three points may be noted in the above quotation. 
1) Chooping between alternatives of good and evil 
makes no sense to the person who knows true good; for, to 
him, choosing evil is an impossible alternative. "Does 
anyone like to be injured? 11 
2) Evil is seen as error when in doing good a person 
finds himself a party to evil results which he did not in-
tend and the evil, therefore, is involuntary. 11 If I corrupt 
the young, I do so involuntarily. 11 
3) The correction of wrong or evil is not punishment 
but education. 11 Take me aside privately arid reprove and 
educate me. 111 
Socrates' Presuppositions 
to the Problem of Free Will 
Although it is almost impossible to distinguish pre~ 
cisely between Plato's thought and that of Socrates in the 
history of philosophy, certain principles maybe stated as 
having already appeared and which form fundamental presuppo-
sitions to the problem of the will and its freedom. The 
l;punishment here means the payment of a penalty for a 
wrong committed. Punishment, for Socrates, may a.lso be dis-
ciplinary and corrective. See Apology, tran·s. Church, 41•-42. 
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question of Socratic authorship does not alter the principles. 
The nucleus of each of the principles noted may be regarded 
without certainty as Socratic. On the other hand the elabora-
tion of the doctrines may without serio-q.s question be attribu-
ted to Plato.l 
The Soul 
In his doctrine o£ the improvement of the soul, Socrates 
presupposed the soul as a whole--a unity. The soul, as a 
unity~ was equated with the unity of man 1 s life. It is the 
whole soul which acts,_prefers, wills and improves. There 
is no evidence for the division of the soul into faculties. 
In fact the unity of the soul precludes any splitting of the 
soul for Socrates. The soul as a whole chooses between al-
ternatives, accepting and rejecting according to its own 
insights. The soul as a whole wills the good (also a unity) 
for "true good is always volilntaryi it must be won. 11 2 
Virtue as Knowledge 
Because the soul is one, and because virtue also is the 
exhibition of the one universal principle/ the soul cannot 
lsee 11 Plato and. Socrates" below. 
2Taylor, Socrates 1 p. l46. 
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be divided into its knowledge of the good and its practice 
of the good. When the soul knows it acts. When ~t acts it 
knows. Virtue is won because it is the soul in action--the 
soul acting voluntarily--the soul willing. Wrong doing is 
involuntary because a lack of virtue is a lack of knowledge 
of the universal good. To make wrong doing voluntary is to 
make man•s soul inconsistent at the highest point of the soul 1 s 
nature and thereby to destroy its unity. 
Moral Responsibility and Achievement 
socrates affirms a consistency in mants nature in 
between his ethical purposes and the means of achieving 
those purposes. When an· evil occurs, at· least two ap-
proaches can be made to it. The question may be asked~ 
"Who did it so that he may be punished?rr This question, 
though raised, was not incorporated as part of socrates' 
moral theory~ A second approach is to ask, "How did it 
happen so that it may be corrected?" This is part of 
another question, 11What is the true good, and how can it 
be achieved?" Socrates asked these last two questions, but 
their meaning and significance were left to be further ex-
plored and interpreted by Plato. If punishment is regarded 
merely as retribution, the question is, "Who is evil that 
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he may be punished?" However, if improvement of life is de-
sired, the question is· "How is the good to be known in order 
that justice may be achieved?" Because these questions were 
not understood by his opponents, Socrates was executed. To 
make the answer to these and other questions clear and vivid 
for all time as a permanent memorial to socrates' life and 
method, Plato dedicated his own life and work. For, as 
.A. E. Taylor has so wc:!ll put the matter, "For all purposes 
of importance, socrates had just one tsuccessor'--Plato.nl 
lrbid., p. 173. 
CHAPTER II 
THE PRESUPPOSITIONS QID A DOCTRI~ OF THE WILL 
AND ITS FREEDOM IN PLATO 
Plato and Socrates 
As noted in the previous chapter 1- the distinction between 
Socrates and Plato is not so clear as may be desired by the 
careful student. But Plato was not especially concerned with 
making a clear distinction. ThUS 1 in the dialogues~ what is 
spoken from the mouth of Socrates may be what Plato intended 
more than what Socrates thought. It will not be misunderstood 
if the whole system as relevant to the basic problem is ex-
pressed without special regard for the question which may be 
raised all along the way as to whether the principle is soc-
ratic or Platonic. With the risk of some strain 1 it is being 
suggested that generally Platonic doctrine includes what is 
attributed to Socrates#1 and, therefore 1 what has been said 
of Socrates may be so accepted and the discussion can proceed 
1Even the oracle at Delphi and the god who persuaded 
Socrates need cause no problem hereo Plato gives Socratest 




There is no question of the lofty place occupied by 
Socrates in Plato's life and thought. Socrates• greatness.f' 
the tenderness of his affectionr the depth and power of his 
thought, are all found in Plato. At the same time~ Plato 
rises above Socrates to the extent that Wild avers confi-
dently that, "in exploring the dark labyrinths of human re-
ality ..• we shall hardly find a better guide than Plato .. 1 
The fundamental components of ~lato~s life2 need little 
explication here.r but Plato•s relationship to Socrates is of 
importance. Seen from Plato-1~.s. point of view 1 Socrates was 
not Plato's master or teacher. Nor was he 1 as Shorey clearly 
lJohn Wild 1 Plato's Theory of Man (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1946)r :£:>• 2. Similar statements which a£.:.. 
firm Plato's status in the history of philosophy may be found 
in the following: Arthur K. Rogers, A Student•s History of 
Philosophy (New York; The Ma~illan Company, 1912), p. 671 
B. A. G. Fuller.t A History of Philosophy (rev. Sterling M. 
McMurrin1 New York: Henry Holt and Company~ 1955), pp. 124, 
l69i Paul Shoreyl What Plato Said (Chicago: The University 
of Chicago Press, 1947) 1 p. 10. 
2Many excellent biographies of Plato are in existence 
such as those by Demos, Robin, Gomperz 1 Ritter, and Burnet.· 
The Reader is referred to the biography by A. E- Taylor and 
Philip Merlan in the article, "Plato 111 Encyclopedia Br.itannica 1 
XVIII (1958) 1 63-64,~ and at the end of each chapter in Taylor•s 
work, Plato: the Man and His work (6th ed.1 New York: Meridian 
Books 1 Inc.~ 1958)7 also Diogenes Laertius, The Lives of Phil~ 
osophers, trans. c. D. Yonge (Critical Edition: Basle: Bohn 1 s 
Classical Library, 1907) 1 iii, 3. There are many random ref-
, erences in Aristotle 1 as for example,. Aristotle)' Metaphysics 1 
ed. Richard McKeon; trans. W. D. Ross (New York: Random Houser 
1941) 1 987a. 
";~.·--.~~-:rr~ . 
.. ~..,. ·. ~ 
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affirms, 11 a system of philosophy to be learnedr elaborated, 
developed,~ corrected, and improved. He was rather a person~ 
ality, a method, an inspiration 1 a moral and religious ideal."l 
The inescapable conclusion deserving greatest emphasis is 
that, for Plato 1 Socrates exemplified an unspeakably profound 
moral experience. The most wiser the most just 1 and the best 
was tried by his fellowmen and executed. The power of this 
fact is reported as of sing·ular importance and as accounting 1 
in large measure,~ for the motivation of Plato's teaching and 
writing. Socrates had said 1 
When my sons grow up, punish them 1 my friends, and har-
ass them in the same way l have harassed you, if they 
seem to care for riches or for any other thing more than 
excellence] and if they think that they are something 
when they are really nothing 1 reproach them, as l have 
reproached you, for not caring for what they should, 
' and for thi~~ng that they are something when really 
they are nothing. And if you will do this~' l myself 
and my sons will have received justice from you.2 
This expressea·not only Socrates' ideal for his own children, 
but for all. 
Whatever ethical or moral principles Plato should devise{" 
one fact of life he could not ignore. The interpretation of 
J.shorey~ p. 22. 
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the ethical principles of wickedness., of justice 1 or of the 
good life must somehow refer back to circumstances in the 
life of Socrates, illustrating the destruction of the good, 
by the action of men blinded by their stupidity. 
Since knowing the good meant doing it, socrates would 
no more alter his decision to face death than he would ex-
change a hand for a foot. For, since what he was doing was 
part of the true good, virtue 1 and excellence, he could not 
compromise it by exchanging it for his cont~uance on earth 
without the privilege of seeking knowledge by asking questions 
and discussing problems. Using the myth of Achilles as an 
example of one nwho thought nothing of danger when the al-
ternative was disgrace 1 " Socrates described his own commit-
ment to accept death rather than never to philosophize, never 
to exhort his fellowmen 1 never to declare the truth., and never 
to improve the soul. He made his position clear: "Whereuer 
·a man's station is., whether he has chosen it of his own will,. 
or whether he has been placed at it by his commander 1 there 
it is his duty to remain and face the danger without thinking 
of death or of any other thing.except disgrace." 1 This 
libid. :r 28-30. 
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statement reflects the influence of Orphic religion on socra-
tes: the soul,nin which intelligence alone exists""l departed 
from the body leaving behind what was useless and unprofitable. 
The divine part of man which in Orphic religion sprang from 
I 
the ashes of Zagreus2 became a basis for socrates' view of 
the soul~ while the wiCked part which sprang from the Titans 
was linked by Socrates to the body. 
Therefore, without depreciating Plato's speculative in-
sight, in respect to the data preferred above, it may be 
cautiously stated that Plato•s ethics was the theoretical 
extension of the facts. of Socrates 1 life. To say anything 
less is to ignore plato•s relation to Socrates• life .. 
Plato• s View of the Soul--7/lv:A] 
In order to get to the heart of the matter, it is impor-
tant that the soul in Plato's theory of man be defined. There 
are many references made to it, but the most important sources 
for his theory are found in the Republic, ~he Laws, the 
Gorgias 1 the Phaedrus, the Cratylus 1 the Sophist, the Prota-
goras, ·the Phaedo 1 and the Timaeus. 
lxenophon1 Memorabilia of Socrates, Bk. i, chap. ii, 
sp. 53-55. 
2see above 1 p. 12. 
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In the Republic Plato gives his most celebrated descrip-
tion of faculties of the sou1.1 It consists of (1) LQ 
LloytuT/koV, t-hat:q~lMeh l':e~son.'$,. (2) T~ E;r(L-8~YIJT1f('tv 
.... 
that which desires and affects.t (3) To / Bvvo££ 6£.5 , spirit 
I 
or passion. He then questions if this description of the 
soul means that it is divided into three parts or if it means 
that the nwhole soul 11 is at work in "every impulse and in all 
these forms of behavioUF?" 2 
The Meaning of Faculties 
That the soul is one and at the same time has faculties 
is not to be viewed as a dark mystery. A faculty for Plato 
is a power which the soul as a whole exercises. It involves 
a function which the soul performsJ The power which makes it 
possible for the soul to perform that function is referred to 
as a faculty. However 1 a faculty may he thought of as a part 
of a whole functioning as a part for the whole or on behalf 
of the whole affecting the whole or for which the whole may 
be responsible. For example, the eye as part of the body is 
lGreek, l(v:f.q , meaning life.t and in PlatoJ' as will be 
shown later, the principle of movement and life. Cf. Liddell 
and Scott.t pp. 2026 1 2027. See also Erwin Rhode, Psyche,trans. 
w. B. Hillis;~ (Londonx Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd ... , 1925) 1 
p. 365. 
2plato, Republi.c-: (Cornford) 1 435. 
1~1 .·I 
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a faeuJ.ty' of sight for the body. As a part of the body it 
functions for the body and the body among other things is 
responsible for the actions of the eye. Wb.en the e"3'e moves 
it is not the whole body wbi cb. :mo~es. On the other hand 
when the body as a whole moves, it moves as a totality and 
not as a part as does a faculty. In the same: '·Way a faculty 
ot the soul in the second sense. would be an activity of part 
· of the soul acting on behalf of the soul, atteoting the sou.J., 
and including-the whole soul as responsible tor its activity. 
The difference between the activitY' of a soul as a who1e and 
a tacuJ.ty of the soul is the difference between the whole 
and its parts. However, a soul acting as a whole is what 
Plato means by tJn.e soul having the, faculty" or power to do a 
certain thing. l'J.a.to does not wish to use the word, facttlt"t, 
in the second sense above. 
On the one hand, there is no evidence that Plato des= 
cribed the sOUl. as consisting of only three parts. He at 
no time restricted the f'u.nctions ·of a soul by a statement 
such as 11The soul is that whioo consists of :tteason, desire, 
and spirit •" On the other hand, the evidence that the doc-
trine of a tripartite soul is not a complete scientific 
description of the soul in Plato's thought is ~verwhelming. 
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Included in that evidence are the following. 
1) That the tripartite doctrine of the soul is not 
original with Plato but probably Pythagorean, is clearly 
shown by A. E. Taylor and others. 1 
2) The three elements are only illustrative or repre-
sentative of functions performed by the whole man. Plato 
states that they represent the highest function, the lowest . 
function, and the mean between them, and it is assumed that 
there are many intermediate functions in turn between these 
three. For only when man nhas linked these parts together in 
well-tempered harmony and has made himself one man instead of 
many, will he be able to go about whatever he may have to do. 112 
3) Plato does not retain a consistent terminology for 
the parts of the sou~~ In the Phaedrus he uses the myth of 
the charioteer (reason) and the two horses (one a noble white 
horse which loves honor, the other, the opposite, a heedless, 
evil dark horse leaping wildly forward dragging its mate and 
lsee J .. Burnet, Early Greek Philosophy {3rd ed.1 London: 
A. and C. Black~ 1920) 1 I, 296~ Also Taylor, Plato, p. 281. 
2 Plato, Republic, trans • Cornford 1 443 • See Cornford •· s 
comments~' ibid .. ,. p. 130. Also Taylor 1 Plato~ 281. Note that 
Plato says· "many" rather than "three . 11 If 11 three .. were the 
limit, nmanyu would be inappropriate. Grube, Plato's Thought, 
p. 134-5, clearly demonstrates that the soul is a unity with 
a plurality of functions of which the three faculties dis-
cussed here are an incomplete listing. 
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the charioteer toward the soul of the beloved [245-255] ). 
The terminology is so different from that of the Republic 
that the two des-criptions o£ the elements of the soul as a 
complete theory can be harmonized only by distortion. Simi-
larly in the Timaeus~ the divine reason as the immortal 
principle of soul is differentiated from the mortal form of 
soul nhaving in itself dread and necessary affections.n 
Plato lists the affections as 
first 1 pleasure~ the-strongest lure of evil1 next 
pains that take flight from good; temerity 1 rnoreover.t-
and fear, a pair of unwise counselorsi passion hard 
to entreat 1 and hope too easily led astray. These 
they combined with irrational sense and desire that 
shrinks from no venture, and so of necessity com-
pounded the mortal element.l 
The divine reason is englobed in the head7 the part which is 
of manly spirit and ambitious for victory is situated in the 
heart and lungs; and the part whose "appetite is set on meat 
and drink11 possessing both sweetness and bitterness is sit-
uated in the liver and spleen which is the seat of divination 
and visions.2 From this it appears that nothing can be gained 
lplato, Timaeus, trans. Francis M. Cornford (New York: 
The Liberal Arts Press 1 1959) 1 69d. 
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from trying to harmonize these different descriptions. How-
ever( the point is that to attribute a tripartite soul to 
Plato as a final.psychology is to overlook the o~r-and 
richer enumeration of the functions of the soul which are as 
essential as the three elements described here. 1 
4) Plato frequently refers to the mid-point between 
two extremes to form a triad with the middle factor as the 
key to the unity of the triad: "since the middle becomes 
first and last~- and again the last and first become middle, 
in that way all will necessarily come to play the same part 
toward one another 1 and by so doing they will all make a 
unity. 11 2 He thus is referring not to a sera.J.. d.t-stided into 
three parts 1 but to a soul with many functions at the highest 




£l(Le¥jlqTit<oJ/ 1 and in the middle mediating between the two 
\. / 
is /o ev,UOE.£.A£..s and together constituting a unity .. 
) 
5) Aristotle not only does not restrict Plato to a tri-
partite soul 1 but in describing Plato's doctrine in tQe 
Timaeus suggests the possibility of its having an infinite 
number of parts in all its thoughts as mind and proceeds to 
lNote functions in Laws 1 X 1 896d cited below. 
establish his own five faculties or powers of the soul: nu-
tritive/ sensitive/ imaginative/ locomotive 1 andrational.l 
It may thus be suggested that the Aristotelian method of 
"·------------····· - .. -~--- -~·---~-·-'"-"" '"---·-·~·---·- .. , ..... ····· ,. 
schematization of the soul into a fixed number of faculties 
was imposed on Plato/ but he himself desired merely to use 
the existing ci'e~~~i;tions2 of the soul as a basis for those 
aspects essential for his politics and ethics but not a 
psychology or metaphysics of the soul. 
It has been necessary to prolong this aspect of the dis-
cussion of the soul 1 because fundamental misinterpretations 
of the nature of the, will have been grounded on the meaning 
-r;~ / 
of --LJd. 6)v))O£'-&E.S as it appears in Plato's Republic. ThUS 1 
I 
for example 1 Zeller3 and others suggest that 7b \, 8u)..)D<i-. L£~ I 
is "the courageousn which includes feeling and will. 
. / 
t;'L-;JJO£L,S£5has its etymological roots ~n Bv()) (stem ev 
1Aristotle, De Anima, trans. J. A. Smith 1 ed. Richard 
McKeon (New York: Random House, 1941) , 406b·-413b. For term-
inology see W. D. Ross 1 Aristotle (New York: Meridian Books/ 
Inc. 1 1959) 1 pp. 128-129. 
2Joannes stobaeus quotes Iamblichus (according to Liddell 
and scott 1 p. 2027) to the effect that those around Plato and 
Archytas and the descendents of the Pythagoreans divided the 
soul in to 4o r'OjLI C: .-> 1 (3 v u C: s and E'J;:_L 9 u u ~ r1 T I F I 
3Eduard Zeller 1 Outlines of the History of Greek l?hiloso-
EhYr trans. L. R. Palmer (New York: Meridian Books 1 Inc., 
1949)/ pp. 155-156. 
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rush) which in the Greek may mean 11burning 11 in the form of 
sacrifice~" or 11 rag.ing" as in anger.1 '!'he English fume based 
on the Latin cognate fumus from the ;I:ndo-European2 expresses 
I 
some of the meanings of evw. e-vu 0-5 reflects the develop-
' ment of the original idea into 11breath11 and nlifeu especially 
as suggesting strong feeling and passion. The English "thyme" 
shows the pungency of BiJpa5 ,. The meaning is further extended 
I 
to include soul or spirit as the principle of life hut still 
I' 
retaining strong feeling and passion. .@vJIO£L J £ s · (trans-, 
lated literally as 11having the appearance of spiritu) !§Jathers 
up its li'j::.erary heritage in the English "high-spirited" and 
would tend to mean for Plato the soul 11breathing itself out" 
toward its object. 3 It ·is a "driving impulse"4 which calls 
forth the virtue of bravery, by which he means that "in spite 
of pain and pleasure it holds fast to the injunctions of rea-
son about what he ought or ought not to be afraid of." 5 
' / __ , ' / 
Plato sets To $vuoeLS.ts in opposition to I 0 ?J{~QV,J-11]7/I<OY • 
lLiddell and scott 1 pp. 808=813. 
2As represented in the stem €2JL... 
3Plato~" Republic, trans. Cornford.,. 436. · 4 Ibid .. .,. 439 .. 
I 
5Ibid. 1 441. It should he noted that sometimes tzv&OE~b£S / , ,. ' 
arbitrates between .dar' ro 1<ov and t3,7(t- G-LJ.Ht;Tt k t>l/ and sometimes 
it is the .Aor-urrrk' 5v which arbitrates between the other two. 
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) / 
The S:,q:l-- adds the idea of "upon 1 " and with the suffix it is 
literally rendered 1 11 Capable of breathing upon. 11 There is no 
need for a semantic trick to see this translated as "that 
which desireS 1 11 and within the Platonic frame of reference 
it tends to mean the soul capable of '.'breathing ±ts object 
toward itself11 o:r;- 1 as Plato himself defines it 1 drawing its 
opject to itself. 1 In keeping with the fact that the etymology 
/ 
may permit the suggestion· of exhaling ( 6vWOE' (E.s.) and inhaling 
I 
(fjll&~u~'ftt:A~L the meanings for Plato are the soul's striv-
ing after its object (spirit) on the one hand, and on the 
other the soul's drawing ;tts 'object to itself (appetite). 
/ 
Whether 0vJJOttbE5 includes what is meant by willing 
I 
as previously suggested by %eller cannot be answered finally 
and clearly from the data supplied up to this point. What is 
included in the soul besides .the three functions noted here will 
be discussed after the discussion of what the soul, as soul, is. 
The conclusion that the soul has many functions, the 
fuller explication of which is yet to be made, leaves un-
answered the question of what it is. To answer this generally, 
it is not unfair to Plato's thought to say that the soul's 
highest· achievement in the heavenly vision of the Symposium 
lrbid. , 436. 
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and its divinest nature in the Tirnaeus, the Phaedrus, and 
the RepUblic may best be understood as a description of pla-
to's view of Socrates• life and its meaning. The good and 
evil elements in man as seen in the Orphic myth of Dionysus, 
the body as the prison for the soul, the eternality of the 
soul in the direction of both the past and the future 1 making 
it without beginning and without end in the precise form of 
the Pythagorean elaboration of Orphism are all assumed, or 
described 1 or defended by Plato. The d'istinction between 
the body, as seen and destructible, and the soul 1 as involved 
.i.n that realm of the unseen and eternal, constitutes an ir-
reconcilable dualism which for Plato is final. But Plato asks 1 
what is the soul? What is there about the soul which makes 
it different from everything else in all of reality? 
Plato's answer to this question has the most far-reaching con-
sequenc.es on all sUbsequent philosophic thought1 for the soul 
if properly defined can, among other things, account for the 
very essence of a doctrine of the will. 
The Definition of the Soul 
For Plater the essence and the basic definition of the 
soul is "that which is moved by itself."1 The definition is 
(" " 1 To £9(VTD flw&Zv • See Plato, Phaedrusr 245-246. 
AlSOr LaWS 1 896. 
so precise and consistently maintained that it is necessary 
"' only to examine his meaning of k'J~,f!·rr 1S in order to discover 
what -v~ t;{ denotes. A. E. Taylor bas performed good service 
in summarizing the meaning of K/v£rns and relating it to 
lfvvsr He says_, 
Ten senses of the word are enumerated •. The first five 
are different forms of actual physical motion: (~) 
revolution in a circular orbit, (2) rectilinear motion, 
(3) rolling, (4) aggregation, (5) disgregation. Then 
follow three "ideal11 motions: (6) the "fluxion" of a 
point which "generates" a line, (7) the fluxion of a 
line which generates a surf~ce/ (8) the fluxion of a 
surface which generates a solid. These distinctions 
are merely preliminary to that which is ess~ntial for 
the purposes of our proof. All motions belong to one 
of two classes: (9) communicated motion, "the movement 
which can only move other things," or (10} spontaneous 
motion, the 11 movement which can move itselfJI (894b) . 
And it is argued that causally communicated motion al-
ways presupposes spontaneous motion as its source (894c-
895b). Now when we see anything which exhibits spon-
taneous1 or internally initiated, motion1 we call it 
alive,gpw,to.V r we say that there is !PviG in the 
thing • 1f!v xrf 1 in fact/ is the ~ which language 
gives to "the motion which can move itself. 11 Thus, 
"soul 11 is the namer or definiendUl)l,of which the "dis-
course11 ( /\a(pc;), 11 movement which can move itself 1 11 is 
the definition. The name. and the discourse are there-
fore equivalent, and it follows that the movements of 
soul, 11 temperp and wishes and calculations 1 true beliefs 1 
interests ( -f:Jt.L u [ /);:;:, o{f) 1 and memories 1 " are actually 
the source ahd ~ause of.all physical movement 1 since 
no physical movement is spontaneous (896d) .l 
lTaylor, Plato_, p. 491. References in the text are to 
the Laws. 
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It follows directly from the above that, for Plato, the 
very nature of the soul is its self-movement, its spontaneity, 
')/J ( its ability to will itself as a unity. The ~vj~ is a unity 
of self-directing consciousness. Of signal importance in 
f r 
this definition is the fact that the 1/hrf.:.n includes Jto,rrot.- , 
)( / I ( ) . /' / 
qeq, Aovfln(rr.s ~ :dor'6]-'o~/ ~So$~ oC) .. ~&.£~.s, ?TfL/"'.£A£Lf1.£ , ln 
and J! f/ f)jvlr:A l-. 
ties of a soul. 
:> / 
These are just examples of 
r( 
Also included are OJ t,fl ~(j/5 
I 
the kind of activi-
(choice) and 
\XlTLdt, (cause or responsibility) and all related activities. 
A considerable latitude exists for the inclusion of every as-
pect of what it means to be a self-directing consciousness. 
What Shorey finds as an apparent contradiction between 
the position found in the Laws (904-905) and that of the 
Republic (617) is resolved- so far as the definition of }jlyY:YJ 
is concerned. On the one hand, Plato says in the ~~ 
" ..• the formation of qualities he left to the wills flov/l.no:t ~ 
of individuals. For every one of us is made pretty much what 
he is by the bent of his desires and the nature of his soul." 1 
By this he means that souls contain within themselves "a prin-
ciple of change." By this principle a soul can change for 
lplato, Laws, 904b and c. 
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the bette:r or worse moved by its own impulse.! It is the 
prime cause of change. 2 
There is no need to extend the discussion by giving here 
the passages which repeat this point, but it is of prime im-
portance to emphasize its meaning and relevance as Plato, 
himself, stated it. :&very soul is that kind of reality 
which moves itself. Every act of the soul is a self-deter-
mined act of the soul as a whole. ~o ignore this point in 
Plato is to see him only through the eyes of his critics. 
To introduce concepts which would endanger the soul's self-
determination or its unity is to neglect the main fact of · 
Platonism--the meaning of In the light of his defi-
• • f ') 1 J_, ' ., I l • t ld rut~on o ~~ wou have been a perplexing d&straction 
and obscurity for him to remove the fundamental idea from 
wlJ itJ and give it over to another aspect or fac"ulty as a 
part of the soul. 
Plato•s doctrine of the soul did not include a separate 
faculty of explicit choice among alternatives not determined 
by anything antecedent or present as elaborated by later 
philosophers. The essence of Plato 1 s definition of the soul 
1see Shorey, pp. 396-397; 644-645. 
2Laws, 894e. 
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was its self-determination as a whole. This understanding 
of Plato's view of the soul is overlooked because the temp-
tation to make a list of the soul's faculties or attributes 
is seldom resisted. Plato 1 s view is depicted as that of a 
tripartite soul consisting of reason 1 spirited element, and 
appetite. However~ this is ·not his definition of the soul 
as noted, but merely a select~on of some of its faculties. 
As pointed out above, it is quite probable that Pythagoras 
made the list of faculties which is often hailed as Plato•s 
"view of the soul." The popularity of this error is in no 
small measure attributable to the neglect of the other writ-
ings of Plato except the Republic, with the result that when 
Plato refers to his notion of culpability late in that book 
he is regarded as having strayed into a deviation from the 
remainder of his system, so that he has lost his way •. 'But 
the problems which his doctrine of culpability raise can only 
be understood in the light of other writings. 
. f .· 
To ignore the importance of J/v¥.ry is to miss the funda-
mental fact of Plato's philosophy. In the Cratylus he posits 
/ 
·the 1/JvJ?'? as the. "ordering and containing principle of all 
things." 1 In the Phaedrus he sees the soul's spontaneity as. 
lplato 1 Cratylus, trans. B. Jowett (New York: .charles 
Scribner's Sons, 1897), 400. 
a motion derived from within itself andr thereby, the first 
principle of all other things. 1 And as cited above in the 
Laws this it / . first principle is ~v"(q as all its activities 
seen as spontaneous and Self-caused. 
./ J/v it{ . is thus activity 
determined by its own nature. As long as Jf-v '{ f) is nmotion 
which is self-moved" there is no prob],.em of a mechanistic 
determinism for Plato. In this respect the determinism is 
internal. 
It will be recalled that in the Dionysiac myth the soul 
was born good. Plato does not refute this aspect of the myth. 
In fact, he presupposes it. In the Gorgias (498) he says a 
man is good because there is good in him. In the Timaeus (86e) 
he says that 11 no one is willingly bad, fhe bad man becomes 
so because of some faulty habit of body and unenlightened up-
bringing 1 and these are linwelcome afflictions that come to 
I 
any man .against his will cX,f(oVa:Ld u2 The Dionysiac 
I 
myth of creation is again brought to mind by this cleavage 
between body as the source of evil and soul as the source of 
good. In this respect Plato recognized external influences 
1Plato, Phaedrus 1 trans~ Helmbold 1 245. See also 
Protagoras, 319~320. 
2Plato, Timaeus, 86. 
56 
on the soul which were not assumed to endanger the basic defi-
nition of the soul. The soul moves from within. 
This led ~lato t~ the doctrine of the tendancel of the 
/ 
soul as lj!v Xtj by which he meant developing a sound mind. 2 
This was achieved by being taught the good, the first step ·in 
which was self-knowledge.3 By such tendance the supreme worth 
/ 
of the 7jlv i'} was achieved--knowledge. 4 
/ 
Once M is understood in this sense, Plato•s ethics 
is greatly clarifiedw Virtue is not found by a sort of hope 
that a man will light upon it of his own accord. 5 One's self-
motion is never mere drifting and by luck landing at the right 
place. The soults greatest value is for it to be taught. 
Its food is knowledge. When it is said that for Plato true 
good is always voluntary, it is being said simply that true 
good is the Soul fulfilling its own true nature. It is im-
possible for lfJv1-? to choose evil. When 7j/vY-7 impels it-
self, it is doing good. The body, the world, and the soul•s 
/ 
own ignorance account for evil. For lj!v}?? to divert itself 
to evil is impossible. It is ~~¥~ speaking in the Apology 
(20), "I will never do what l know to be evil."6 That the 
( / 
1 1 e4e~c:c.q 
r' 
2 f:J o:w J/Joo-JY'J 
1/ 
3plato, Apology, 29. 4see Taylor, Plato, 145. 
Splato, Protagoras, 319-320. 6see also Ibid~, l57-358. 
57 
soul is good but imprisoned in a body is to be presupposed. 
So also that souls imprisoned by evil are at work in the 
world must not be overlooked. 
If the soul is s.elf-determined, born good 1 conditioned 
by unwelcome afflictions and "evil 11 souls, the problem of 
assessing responsibility for evil, raised more seriously by 
later philosophers, must be considered in order to put Plato's 
doctrine of ~into proper perspective.. The problem con-
cerns the .soul's power to achieve virtue and the consequences 
of failure (or success) in such an .enterprise. 
The Problem of Responsibility 
The nature of responsibility may be found in answer to 
the question, If a person performs an act 1 what determines 
the extent of his responsibility for the act and are there 
consequences which.apply to his responsibility? Plato re-
jected the theory that responsibility is measure~ for the 
purpose of retaliation for a past wrong. 1 He held t~t pun-
ishment exacted for no other reason than that the person had 
done wrong was behavior resembling the unreasonable fury of 
a beast. socrates 1 punishment was a case in point. 
Plato approved punishment as discipline but the determin-
ation of responsibility was not in order to punish the ~/ 
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in retaliation but to educate or tend it. In the light of 
what has been stated earlier~ (1) if a man does evil~ (2) he 
needs to have a punishment~ (3) not which fits the crime but 
which fits the soul~ to educate it. The clauses here numbered 
relate to three aspects of the problem. (1) refers to the 
principle of responsibilityi (2) refers to the theory of re-
wards and punishmentsi and (3) refers to the purpose of pun-
ishment .. Plato held that (1) implies (2) and (3). Wrong 
doing for l?lato was involuntary because it was the result of 
ignorance. Responsibility in the sense of incurring liability 
could not apply to the wrong doer acting out of ignorance. 
Plato opposed the view that establishing responsibility :for 
wrong doing made it possible to judge a person guilty and to 
mete out punishment to fit the crime. In adjudging a person 
reponsible 1 l?lato was interested in discovering the cause of 
the wrong doing and the means to correct the wrong so that 
the same mistake could be avoided in the future. Thus re-
sponsibility calls attention to the cause of an effect. If 
the effect is evil, and a person is responsible 1 the person 
may be treated by (2) punishing him in order to (3) correct 
his behavior. For the lJviYJ to choose an evil means that 
it does not know it to be evil and, therefore~ does not know 
< :=<;~:~~~~ 
~ .. -.·i· 
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true good. 1 The soul 1 s goodness is not achieved unless the 
soul is taught. Evil is what a soul (whose nature is good) 
is not. An "eviln soul lacks or has lost its vision of 
truth. Once the guil.ty party to an evil act is found.t the 
next step is to improve his soul by 11 tendance. 11 "Tendap.ce" 
leads to virtue1 and to have virtue, it is necessary to have 
knowledge because knowledge is virtue. The battle against 
evil is a struggle for knowledge and virtue. 
Because Plato affirms self-direction as the essence of 
the soul's nature, he sees no point in holding the power of 
self-direction responsible. For 1 to point accusingly at 
ability to determine his destiny rather than to search for · 
the blinding cause is to get on the wrong track. When the 
right answer is found, the consequence is not p~ishing the 
evil doer but educating him so that he may tend his soul, 
learn the right answer~ improve his destiny, and achieve 
virtue. It is not the ability to determine one•s destiny 
which causes evil actions but blinding ignorance. When 
Plato says that the soul can not err (is not capable of 
choosing wrong), he means that the acts of a soul are acts of 
knowledge and virtue~ and not the evil acts which arise when. 
lsee Friedrich Solmsen~ Plato's Theology (Ithaca, New 
York: Cornell University Press1 l942)t p. 39. 
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the soul is inactive or unaware of the true good. Wrong do-
ing is always the result of a wrong answer which in turn is 
the product of ignorance. When a man does wrong, it is, for 
Plato/ because of the body•s imprisoning the soul or the 
influence of another soul similarly blinded. The solution 
to the ~roblem is to gain release from the prison of "exist-
ence 11 by improving the soul in accordance with what Plato 
calls "tendance." 
The first duty of every man whQ_m~ans _to -~_!!jo;y:. __ gpgg __ Qr 
happiness is _j:.o 'tend his soul,' 'to .. see to it that his 
-------------soul is as good as it possibly can be,' that is, to get 
the knowledge or insight which ensures his using every-
thing rightly. And before a man can develop this qual-
ity of soul, he must be brought to 'know hirriself, 1 that 
is 1 to recogni:z;e the imperative need or moral wisdom 1 
and the·dreadfulness of his present state of ignorance. 
When a man fails, he is, for Plato, both disgraced and 
lacking knowledge. Thus Charmides is presented to Socrates 
by Critias as a man with both a perfect body and soul. But 
Charmides has a headache. socrates proposes a cure he had 
learned from a Thracian consisting of the use of a leaf along 
with reciting of a charm. However there is the further con-
dition that to recite the charm, the soul must first be cured. 
The outcome of the dialogue is that the cure cannot be applied 
because o£ Charmides 1 hopeless confusion. 2 Although the dialogue 
1Taylor, Plato, p. 28. 
2Plato, Charmides, trans. B. Jowett (New York: Charles 
Scribner's Sons, 1897). 
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closes with Charmides 1 embarrassment, its central proposition 
is made early; 11 The part can never be well unless the whole 
is well."l Spiritual health 1 the wholeness of the soul,. 
consists in right action guided by truth. 2 It follows that 
although responsibility £or the state of the situation may 
be determined~" no good can come out o£ a state o£ ignorance 
unless the man can be taught. For l?lato~- a man 1 s moral 
character or virtue resides (1) in his achieving human ex-
cellence by self-examination and (2) in his search £or the 
knowledge o£ the good, o£ justice,. o£ beauty 1 of truth 1 and 
of all noble ideals. The destiny of a good roan is the ac-
complished fact o£ his goodness, which is his divine nature. 
To reward him with health,. wealth~- and any other 11 1esser" 
good as a criterion o£ his goodness is to deny the very 
goodness which is being rewarded. 
It is not the ability o£ the soul to direct its movement 
which is held responsible and subject to punishment for l?lato. 
The whole of the man is held responsible in order to educate 
him. To understand what l?lato means by education,. the mean-
ing of knowledge as virtue calls for examination. 
libid. 156. 
2I'bid.l 171 ...... 2. 
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Virtue as Knowledge for Plato 
The reason for the soul•s tendance is to arrive at that 
knowledge which is moral insight and virtue. The question, 
then, is what is meant by virtue being knowledge? Plato's 
ethical theory is dominated by the view that virtue is 
knowledge. 1 The frequent occurrenc.e of this p;~:oposition, 
its defense from many points of view.~ the variety of fts ap-
plications 1 and its ultimate importance to the whole Platonic 
system constitute ample grounds for a careful interpretation 
of it. 
As noted~ Plato states that virtue is knowledge on a 
number of occasions in the dialogues. Two stateme~ts in-
volving this proposition are illuminating.. The first defends 
the power of knowl.edge and is put in the form of a question: 
Now the rest of the world are of the opinion that 
knowledge is not a powerful,. lordly, commanding thing; 
they do not think of it as actually being anything of 
that sort at all, but their notion is that a man may 
have knowledge,. and yet that knowledge which is in him 
may be overmastered by anger, or pleasure, or pain, or 
lcf. Plato, Republic, 471-473; Gorgias, trans. w. c. 
Helrobold (New York: The Liberal Arts Press, 1952), 466-474, 495; 
Meno 1 trans. E. Jowett (New York: Charles Scribner 1 s Sons 1 
1897), 99-100; Phaedo 1 trans B. Jowett (New York: Charles 
Scribner's Sons, 1897), 68-697 Protagoras, 353-360, Symposium, 
trans. B. Jowett (New York: Charles Scribner•s Sons, 1897), 
204-206. 
63 
love, or perhaps by fear--just as if knowledge were 
nothing but a slave and might be dragged about by all 
these other things. Now-is that your view? or do 
you think that knowledge is a noble thing and fit to 
command in man 1 which cannot be overcome and will not 
allow a man, if he only knows the good and the evil 1 
to do anything which is contrary to what his knowledge 
bids him do, but that wisdom will. have strength to 
help him? 
I agree with you., Socrates, said Protagoras; and 
not only so, but I above all other men 1 am bound to 
say that wisdom and knowledge are the mightiest of 
human things. 
Good 1 I said, and true, But are you aware that the 
majority of the worl~ do not share your conviction and 
mine 1 but claim that rriany people know the things which 
are best 1 but do not do them when they might?l 
In this,passage plato affirms his esteem for the consis-
tency of truth. When a man knows the truth, that knowledge 
will not be twisted or deformed by other human experiences·. 
But not only is man consistent in the arrangement of his 
ideas of the truth but once he has determined true ideas he 
is bound to live consistently with them. Man lives by his 
knowledge; he. does "what his knowledge bids him do." If 
his knowledge is in error 1 he will err. If his knowledge 
is correct he will do good. Good and evil actions are the 
products of knowing or not knowing the good. In effect, the 
whole of man may choose freely between alternatives of good 
or evil based on what he knows. plato appears to be saying 
1Plato, Protagoras, trans. B. Jowett; ed. Gregory 
Vlastos (New York: The Liberal Arts Pressr 1956) 1 352~ 
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ehat no man is so stupid as to know an act to be obJectively 
evil and yet do it. A man will rationali~e it into a sub-
jective good before he does it. 
In determining his destiny man is able to choose among 
alternatives. 1 When man choosesr his choice is based not so 
much on his fears'" anger~" pleasure 1 pain or lo-ve, as on his 
knowledge. If he knows the good~" he will, for ~lato 1 there-
upon divert his energies to do the good. 
This point is further elaborated in the following passage: 
No man voluntarily pursues evil, or that which he thinks 
to be evil. To pursue what one believes to be evil 
rather than what is good is not in human nature1 and 
when a man is compelled to choose one of two evils, no 
onJp will choose the gr.eater when he may have the less .2 
On this foundation Plato continues to build a rugged 
and sturdy ethical structure which includes some of the most 
important principles and problems of ethical theory. Certain 
points may be noted. 
Virtue as knowledge can be taught. 3 By this is meant that 
it was not ngiven by nature, 11 nor does it 11 grow spontaneously" 
of its own free will (i.e. of its own accord) •4 
libid. 1 356-357. 
3Ibid. I 361 .. 
2Ibid. I 358d. 
4Ibid., 323, 319. 
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~unishment is for the sake of the prevention and cor-
rection of evil. 1 It is not inflicted vindictively~ nor for 
the sake of past wrong nor as a payment for wrongdoing. ~un­
ishment deters the recipient and others from doing the wrong 
again by making the lesson more vivid. 
The salvation ofhuman life consists in the 11 right 
choice" or measure·not so much of pleasure vs. pain~ as of 
good vs. evil. 2 This measuring is a consideration of the 
presence of good or evil and is both an intellectual and 
moral activity. 
Erring in the choice or measuring of good and evil is 
from defect of knowledge or from ignorance. 3 Whenr in 
choosing, man errs, it is because he has exercised choice. 
on the wrong grounds or for the wrong reasons. Wrong grounds 
or reasons when chosen result in error, wickedness" and evil 
and are chosen from ignorance. 
One who makes the right choice does so on the right in-
formation. Having made the right choice, he cannot reverse 
himself and choose the wrong without destroying his knowledge 
of the goodi for the moment he does so he errs both in action 
lrbid., 324. 2rbid., 356-357. 
a a 
and in knowledge. 1 Goodness and truth are mutually dependent. 
A man will·make the rigiit choice voluntarily; that is~ 
he chooses it because he knows it is right. But when he 
chooses wrongr he has chosen it for the wrong reasons, which 
means he does not really know the good or the right reasons, 
andr being ignorant1 he may think he is choosing a good thing 
for the right reasons, but actually he is doing a bad thing 
for the wrong reasons. In choosing good but doing wrong, his 
doing the wrong is involuntary. He is not choosing the wrong, 
for "when a man is compelled to choose one of two evils, no 
2 
one will choose the greater when he may have less." This 
does not mean what Windelband says Aristotle tried to make 
. 3 
it mean; namely, that the wicked is not free. A. E. Taylor 
points this out with unmatched forcefulness and finality. 
Thus the proposition tall wrong-doing is involuntary 1 • 
has nothing to do with the question of human freedom; 
it is merely the negative way of stating that a man 
who really knows what his highest good is 1 will always 
act on his knowledge. The man who really knows the 
good but chooses something else is as much of a nonen-
tity as a round square, and it is just because 1 there 
is no such person' ~hat the wildest paradoxes can be 
asserted about him. 
Taylor adds that knowledge of the good is the "only 
lrbid. 1 357-358 .. 
3windelband 1 p. 191. 
2Ibid. r 358. 
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knowledge which cannot be put to wrong use~"l 
A wicked man must be punished in order to learn not to 
harm himself or others. He is not held accountable in order 
lxbid. This argument is excellently put in a number 
of the dmalogues but especially The Lesser Hippias,trans. 
B. Jowett (New York: Charles Scribner•s Sons, 1897), 
370-376. It is important to note that the comparison 
made in the Protagoras between mathematical choices and 
ethical ones has a far-reaching effect (356-358) • A 
mathematician who ignores his mathematics is thereby no 
longer a mathematician. So also it is impossible for a. 
truly good man to choose evil, because he is thereby no 
longer a truly good man. The question of freedom of the 
will isr as Taylor pointed out 1 . not in dispute and, for 
reasonsgiven later, not to be challenged. Plato•s em-
phasis on this point is not minor 1 for he states it 
(besides where already cited) in the Meno, trans. B. 
Jowett (New York: Charles Scribner,s sons, 1897), 77-78; 
Alcibiades, trans. B. Jowett (New York: Charles Scribner 1 s 
sons, 1897), i, 124-125; Laws, trans.B. Jowett (New Yo"rk: 
Charles Scribner•s Sons~ 1897), ix, 861-862; Apology, 
trans. Church, 25-26; Charmides, trans. B. Jowett (New 
York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1897), 169-175; Gorgias, 
trans. w. c. Helffibold (New York: The Liberal Arts Press, 
1952), 464-475; Phaedo, trans. B. Jowett (New York.: 
Charles Scribner 1 s Sonsr 1897), 65-74; Republic/ trans. 
Francis M. Cornford (New York: Oxford University PreSS.t 
1945), vir 503-504; and others. 
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to be punishedi rather, he is held accountable and punished 
in order to be taught.l 
The notion of choice in Plato as discussed up to this 
point involves at least two distinctions which have been 
considered but which need emphasis. (~) The soul seeking 
and finding the knowledge of the good will think and act 
consistently with that knowledge. (2) The soul may avoid 
the intellectual principle2 or it may pursue iti3 it may prac-
tice virtue or 11Wallow in the mire of all ignorance.n3 Windelband 
classifies these two distinctions as exhibiting two views of 
freedom.4 The first is the ethical conception·of freedom: 
The wise roan is free and the w.icked roan is not because the 
wise roan knows what he is doing but the wicked does not. The 
second distinction is the psychological conception of freedom--
lGorgias, 507-SlOi Laws~" ix, 862: nWhether the end is 
to be attained by word or action( with pleasure or pain~ by 
giving or taking away privileges~" by means of penalties or 
gifts, or in whatsoever way the law shall make a roan hate 
injustice, and love or not hate the nature of the just~" this 
is the noblest work of law .•r 
4A History of Philosophy, p. 191 .• 
the freedom of cho~ce between alternatives--a decision between 
motives. Windelband notes that both distinctions are recog-
nized and developed py Plato. He even goes so far as to 
suggest that Plato developed the view that man may choose 
(psychological freedom) to sink into ignorance (ethical non-
freedom).l 
The Problem of Choice and Responsibility in the Myth of Er 
Toward the end of the Republic, Plato relates a myth 
which has since been widely used as the basis for philosophic 
speculation. Er, a bold warrior, the son of Armenius, was 
killed in battle. When put on the funeral pyre on the 
t~elfth day after he was slain, he came to life,and related 
the details of what his soul had seen. Several peculiarities 
are observed in the myth which seem to affirm concepts pre-
viously rejected vehemently by Plato. The first of these is 
the view that ~he just are rewarded in a clean and bright 
dwelling place in the sky,~ whereas, the unjust are punished 
"ten times over" for each sin with horrible torment in Tartarus 
under the earth. 3 A. E. Taylor gives the myth no significant 
lrbid., pp. 191-192. 
2plato, Republic, trans. Cornford, 614+ 
3rbid., 615. 
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statust commenting that it is not really permissable to ex-
tract metaphysics from myth. 1 Demos uses it to demonstrate 
that Plato has no doctrine of the self.2 Shorey compares it 
with the post-resurrection experience of Jesus Christ and 
suggests that Plato•s view is Mill 1 S 1 in which every man 
should believe. the doctrine of free will of himself but dis-
believe it of others. 3 No less a philosopher than Zeller 
suggests that this myth.completes Plato's metaphysics of the 
soul.4 Wild ignores the myth altogether. 
The appeal to literary criticism is of no avail, since 
the hard facts of the•story are still there. That the myth 
is Orphic 1 Homeric/ or Platonic does nothing to alleviate 
the problem. 
Of some significance is the fact that hhose who lay 
heavy stress on the myth are inclined to balance it against 
principles clearly expressed in other writings of Plato and 
to extol the former at the cost of the latter. To make this 
first point clear, it is necessary to emphasize that every-
where else Plato posits a view of the soul based on "tendance," 
lTaylor., Plato, pp. 307,.....308. 
2Raphael Demos, The Philosophy of Plato (New York: 
Charles Scribner•s Sons, 1939), p. 335. 
3shoreyl pp. 2521 644-645. 4zeller, pp. 153-154. 
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education, and its goodness achieved by knowledge 1 which is 
its own indestructible reward. In the myth of Er, the vision 
o£ the upper· and lower regions reveals a soul whose goodness 
is 11 reduced 11 to a system of rew.ards, and whose evil is "pun-
ished" with that same unreasonable fury of a beast.l. which 
is interested not in correctibility but in accountability for 
the sake of punishment 1 a view which Plato strongly rejected. 
A second and perhaps more .serious problem is that of 
the choosing o£ one's destiny. 
The souls, as soon as they came, were required t.o go 
before'Lachesis. An Interpreter first marshalled them 
in orderi and then, having taken from the lap of Lache-
sis a number o£ lots and samples of lives, he mounted 
on a high platform and said: 
'The word of Lachesis 1 maiden daughter of Necessity. 
Souls of a day, here shall begin a new round of earthly 
life 1 , to end,in death. No guardian spirit will cast 
lots for you~ but you shall choose your own destiny. 
Let him to whom the first lot falls choose first a life 
to which he will be bound of necessity. But Virtue 
owns. no master i. as a man honours or dishon~:l;l;rS her, so 
shall he have more of her or less. Theblameis his 
who choosesi Heaven is blameless.l2 
To subject this myth to intensive interpretation is dif-
ficult because o£ its flimsy structure. For example, to find 
a doctrine of freedom of the will as the basis for accounta-
bility requires more imagination than observation. In the 
lPlato, Protagoras, 324. 2Plato, Republic 1 355. 
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passage cited, the Interpreter is quoted as sayin:g 1 "You 
shall choose your own destiny." That is)' before birth the 
soul is presumed (in the myth) prior to its reincarnation to 
be in a position to choose the life to which after birth it 
will be bound of necessity. Thus~ man is supposedly free 
only for the short time between the cycles of reincarnation 
during which time he makes that decision by which he will be 
bound for the entire period of his reincarnation, until the 
same opportunity arises again at the end of the cycle. 
On the other hand, Er relates that the souls changed 
their fate from good to evil or. vice versa, because they 
were not hasty in making their decision and because of the 
chance of the iot. 1 By this latter statement Er means that 
when those at the end of the line got to the daughter of 
Necessity, there were very few "lots 11 left.to choose from. 
With the a~teJEnatives so gre.atly reduced, the last to choose 
was left with only the worst altern.atives. Once the choice 
was made in the other world and reincarnation took place 
man•s life on this earth merely unfolded the fate chosen. 
Thusr to attempt to get a doctrine of moral freedom and re-
sponsibility out of the myth is either to make a gteat· tt:J~1inker · 
1 rbid. t 619. 
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appear ridiculous or to make an interesting but non-philo-
sophic myth into a pollution of an otherwise brilliant 
philosophical system. 
This is true even of the doctrine of recollectionr 
which Zeller says is inseparable from Plato 1 s epistemology 
and uthe ultimate basis o£ h.ts Plato•s view on ethics,. 
politics, and aesthetics.nl But on the view of the myth of 
Er, recollection has no real function, since one 1 s destiny 
is decided before birth at the choosing of one•s lot. This 
is a choice of which no person is aware in this life. To 
look to this myth for a doctrine of responsibility is there-
fore to strain the myth and the intellect. ·The use of the 
myth was based on a presupposed meaning of freedom of the 
will based on the text more than the literature or "context: 11 
11 The blame is his who choosesi heaven is blameless." 2 
In spite of the difficulties presented by the Myth of Er 
and its obvious limitationsr the myth clarifies several 
matters of importance to this study. The weaknesses of the . 
myth are not a problem so long as the reader does not insist 
either (1) on getting a complete doctrine of responsibility 
1 Zeller,. p. 154. 2ci ted above .• 
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out of the myth or (2) on putting a complete doctrine of 
responsibility into the myth. Equally to be avoided in the 
exegesis of the myth is ·the attempt to affix to the act of 
choosing 1 1 tself 1 ·the blame for a man • s action when in fact 
it..is'the wisdom or stupidity ~f the choic.e w~ch determines 
whether or not the choice is right or wrong. 
At its most essential point 1 with reference to the 
question of responsibility the myth reaffirms Plato's 
deepest insights. (1) Man is free to¥ and has the power 
to( distinguish between good and evil. This power functions 
according to a man•s ability to be taught the knowledge of 
good or evil. (2) Man is free to choose the best within his 
reach in keeping with what he has learned to know as good or 
evil. Plato 1 s doctrine of the soul.~ freedomt and responsi-
bility does not begin and end with the view that man is free 
to choose his destiny and choosing wrong is to be punished 
according to his wrong. Plato holds rather to the view that 
(1) man is freely capable of discerning right from wrong; 
(2) man will choose according to his knowledge and ability; 
{3) man's greatest task and purpose is that of devoting his 
energy to the gaining of the knowledge of the gopd which be-
comes the guid.e of his best actions in order that his soul 
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may become just. 1 Plato has, here, reaffirmed the soul•s 
power of self-determination and has placed responsibility 
in the book of life as a credit in the education column 
rather than as a debit in the column of "rewards and 
punishments. 11 
In this respect the core of the myth is the same as 
what Plato has affirmed consistently and never denied~ 
The elements of the doctrine of reincarnation, of the 
choosing of one's destiny by lot, and of the rewards and 
punishments which await man after he dies cannot be evalu-
ated here. But in order to furth~r the claim that Plato's 
central view of the soul as described in the ~yth of Er 
(assuming that it is possible to separate the philosophy 
from the myth) may be more consistently interpreted as 
having power freely to think and act accor.GHng to knowledge 
of good or evil, reference is here made to Plato•s view 
found in the Laws. 2 Here Plato says that the attainment 
of the degrees of excellence or evil in the soul is left 
to one•s own will. 11For in general every man is such as the 
1Republic 1 618. 2904c. 
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volitions of his own soul make.hirn. 111 To this Plato adds 
that the soul will ngo to its own place with the good and do 
and suffer with its like." 2 The soul, therefore 1 freely 
chooses the best that it knows within its reach. 
An Evaluation of 
Platots Doctrine of the soul by Demos 
Demos sees in Plato 1 s view that "the soul•s acts are 
voluntary only in the sense that they proceed from know-
ledge 11 a teleological determinism, by wh.ich is meant that 
3 
"the soul by its very vature is compelled to love the good." 
Demos contrasts this position with the view that freedom 
must include the ability to see the good and yet reject it. 
When he says that the root of Plato's problem is that he has 
no doctrine of the self, he means that for Plato the motions 
of the soul follow from the motions. of its parts, but, says 
Demos, 
for action to be moral, the unity of the soul should be 
prior to its parts. A choice between reason and desire 
is possible only when there exists a self .independent 
of both 1 and determining the reaative place of each in 
conduct.4 
lcf. Shorey, p. 396. 
3see Demos, p. 335. 
2Plato, Laws, 904. Cf. Shoreyrp.397 
4 Ibid. 1 pp. 335-336. 
Rather than reduce the soul to its objects of choice, a place 
must be left for an agent of choice 1 says Demos. He concludes 
thatr although Plato did not reject the notion of freedomr 
he was unaware of the issue itself~ 
The importance of this problem in Plato can hardly be 
overlooked, and Demos' point requires elaboration. 
In the first place, Demos says that Plato does not have 
a doctrine of freedom defined as absence of any necessitation. 
By this, apparently, Demos means the power to accept or reject 
alternatives,to see the good and yet reject it. He says that 
for Plato the soul is determined by its reason and cannot 
knowingly reject the good. In the fuller exploration of this 
problem 1 the following points must be appended. 
' / . . . 
1) 1(hrJ?v; is not determined by anything except itself. 
2) To claim to see the good (in Plato's view) and ye_t 
reject it is not to see the good. 
3) The soul for Plato is not (as Demos claims) compelled 
to love the good. Since the soul is in its nature gooq, its 
self-motion is its goodness. To regard self-motion as com-
pelled motion must be carefully understood. Criticism of 
compelled motion is not a: criticism of Plato. An evil soul 
(if not in itself a contradiction) is one which lacks know-
( 
ledge of the good. The '1/1-vfx;. choosesr but, when it is 
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ignorant, its evil state is the result of what it is not 1 
rather than what it is.l To ask how it becomes what it is 
not is· for Plato a problem of 11 tendance 11 and 11 education." 
He sees no need to go deeper than that. 
4) In regard to Demos'· need for an agent of choice, 
Plato did not destroy the soul's unity by dividing the soul 
t' 
into parts.. For, ?/J'V~ is the whole of the soul consisting 
of the unity of all its functions, and its ultimate nature 
is its inner self~ovement, its power of self-determination, 
inclusively considered. 
Furthermore, for Plato, there is no gap between the 
Jf-v:tn 's knowledge of its 11 divine" natutt;e .and its choosing 
its divine nature. For an eye to see in total darkness is 
an impossibility. Because an eye needs light to see does not 
mean it is not free. When an eye is in darkness, it is un-
able to utilize its function as an eye, and 1 therefore, it 
is in bondage--a complete slave to the darkness 1 and thus it 
is fl:e:e to see but cannot see. When an eye is in the light 1 
it is able to function as an eye, and therefo!r'e.is "free" in 
Plato's sense. If it phould shut out the light, it would 
J I 
lcf. the Greek verb for "sin, 11 rJ.J4(1,0Td 11 1..V , meal)ing 
T? 
to "miss the mark,'' used in the New Testament. 
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lose its freedom to see because to see it must have light. 
The question of whether it can choose to see good or evil 
is already a~sumed (for Plato) • 
So the ~:fa to move itself (that is, to be will 
t3o,_;)vt'G\L- ) must be in the presence of good. This is the 
' . ? . 
beginning and the end of the matter. For the soul to turn 
to evil is the same as for the eye to shut out its light and 
no more. And 1 again 1 just as the eye in darkness is blind 
and unable to see light1 so the soul which does evil is blind 
and unable to see the good. 
For Plato, the soul's ability to move itself is possible 
only if it is in the presence of the good. An evil soul is 
one determined by everything except itself, which means no 
self-determination. 
In order that the nature of the soul's activity may be 
more clearly understoo~ it seems necessary to give more pre-
cise interpretation of Plato•s view of the will. 
Plato's View of ·the Will 
For Plato, "Will cannot be distinguished from the ,fudg-
~ 1 this is good,' and this judgment is always, of course, 
·so 
a: deliverance of the To 'Cort~TII(tJt.l." 1 The striving of the soul 
to achieve true goodness or virtue so that all that is chosen 
is the one true excellence is the ethical theory of the will. 
And just as a man has hand.s, feet·, dreams, feelings, and 
;_ ':,' ~ . ' 
thoughts, so he also has the ability to choose between ideas, 
alternatives, and actions and the power to achieve the good 
-
as conceived. The ability to choose does not ~ive an action 
its goodness. The goodness·of an act is judged by its ex-
cellence or defectiveness. All men are able to shaose or 
refuse to 'choose_ (psychological freedom) • · The ability to 
make this qhoice does not make a man evil. His evil act makes 
him an evil doer and 1 therefore, responsible. The good roan 
chooses wiselyi the wicked man chooses stupidly. In either 
case the power of the self-determination of the soul is basic. 
What a man does is never distinguishable from what he know.s. 
The fact that the 11majority of th-e .world claim that many peo-
ple know the th~ngs which are best but do not do them when 
they might 11 2 indicates Plato's awareness of the psychological 
, 1Taylor 1 Plato, p. 2,82. See Plato, Republic, iv, 436. T6 ltoJ-ntz-tfdv refers to skill in calculating (as in tllat::g-
ematids) or in reasoning. Applying the skill in judging 
results in the judgment which guides man's functioning: 
Ti'?\Drurt.tl<bv may yield true or false judgments. · T:he ':"':!-.~1 
is not a faculty which operates between ideas (or judgments) 
. and actions. 
2plato, Protagoras, 352~ 
8'1 
facts. Knowledge of the highest good does not destroy psy-
chological freedom: the power to choose between alternativesp 
When a man acquires knowledge of the highest good, he cannot 
~~ve as though he were ignorant of the highest goodi forr to 
do so would be an admission of ignorance. such an admiss·ion 
is inconsistent with what the man originally c~aimed. 
Socrates chose to think 1 to ask questions, and to exam-
ine his life. Wheh asked to desist from such activities 1 he 
preferred to die. His accusers, believing him to be bad, 
sentenced him to death 1 while proclaiming· that they were pre·-
serving piety. The ability to choose possessed by Socrates 
and .his accusers did not determine responsibilityi rather, 
what they chose determined it. Plato 1 s theory is based on 
the fact that once Socrates had found the highest excellence 1 
he must rationally and logically choose it and all that is 
consistent with it. Knowledge carries with it the responsi-
bility for action consistent with the knowledge. 
In addition to this 1 Plato's view of the will presup-
poses that "this is good 11 is not arr-.· .eweive concept, changing 
for every person or ·situation. Virtue is one. Although the 
application may vary, virtue is not different in different 
situa·tions. There is not one virtue for legislators 1 another 
for the physician 1 another for artisans. There is not one 
virtue for the poor and another for the rich, another for 
the just 1 another for the unjust.l That 2 + 2 = 4 may apply 
to apples 1 pears or bananas, but when it applies to each .case 
it is always the same. The resulting sum is not four for 
apples 1 five for pears and six for bananas. 
Furthermore, to say "this il:)·good" means good ends are 
achieved only by good means. A man cannot become good by 
becoming bad. A man by doing ill cannot become a physician, 
a skilled artisan, or anything good, because he cannot· do 
good by doing ill. 2 
At the same time good cannot haVe evil consequences. 
nNo evil can happen to a good man either in life or after 
death. " 3 
In the light of these general principles 1 the question 
of the specific meaning of the will for Plato and its relation 
to the soul becomes novi a matter of prime importance. 
The "will" is not separated out from the other functions 
of the soul in Plato. ·Whether there is a doctrine of the 
will in the tripartite view of the soul has already been 
lLaws, ix, 858-864. 2protagoras, 345, 352. 
3Apology, trans. Church 1 41. 
~ 
discussed. However, because a theory of the will which may 
endanger the unity of the soul may be invented on the meaning 
of ,q_C>ll Jt(rrJ .. S 
I 
it is important to asses the significance of 
;S:; 1) .Ai <rl~ • 
L 
The stem in Greek is It is found in this form 
in the Indo-European. The original S.tem has come directly 
into the English (by Grimm•s Law) as will, well, weal 1 wealth 1 
and wild. In the Latin it becomes volo (v. will, wish) and 
voluntas (n. will, choice). In the Greek it carries many of· 
the meanings of the English "will 11 including among others, 
wishr choose, prefer, plan, purpose 1 plot, consult, advise. 
That this word had so fruitful a background would ~ave made 
it easy for Plato to use it, if he had wished to divide the 
soul and set off a separate faculty not already provided for 
in the functions of ~- The fact that he used other words 
(already cited) to express the a~~a of willing as intention 
and purpose, reveals the variety of the functions of the soul 
which were referred to by the appropriately descriptive terms 
without detaching the functions from the soul as a whole. 
The aspect of the soul basic to all its functions--that 
of self-motion, was thus attributed by Plato to the Jfvit} 
~ / -
as a whole. Plato included (~nt.ldtvz·~o-~ with its wide variety 
I 
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of meanings among the many other activities of the soul. But 
the basic principle of self-determination as noted here is 
/ 
the fundamental principle of the Platonic 1/JvY'1 . All the 
other terms used·by Plato are descriptive apvroximations in 
no. way endangering the fundamental notion of J/Jv1{, nor its 
unity. ,Mov~:«:JS describes the soul as a whole "willing." 
Th~t J/vt1 possesses the ability or fi:eedom to choose 
between alternatives cannot be denied. 1 But for Plato the 
goodness or wickedness of a man does not depend on his act 
of choice (as a faculty), but on how much good he has been 
able to choose, and this ability is based on how much he knows 
about himself and the good. His ability to choose is like his 
lAs pointed out by Windelband, pp. 78 and 79 above. 
To ascertain whether Plato is a determinist or indeterminist 
it is necessary to understand (for Plato) (1) that the soul 
is free to choose among many possible alternatives--it is 
self-directed; (2) that philosophy (the love of truth--know-
ledge) ·is not forced upon the soul but is the self-realiza-
tion of the soul as a product of tendance ;o:r _ educationi (3) 
that the consistency required of knowledge is both logical 
and ethical based on specific definitions and objective valid-
ity and not on a theoretical determinism running contrary to 
those facts of experience exhibiting freedom. A person is 
free to think 1 for Plato, but in a sense knowledge is not 
optional. A man may accept or reject it, but knowledge has 
objective validity and reference. To be free to determine 
knowledge's content by choice is a surrender to sophism. , 
:Know:l.edge ; is not. .t-he L.:tesu:;J:t ·ciif 1nan:t.s · selxf?:.:determirii:ng·'lPa·Jiry • 
Because of the obJectivity of knowledge man's self-determina-
tion cannot decree the content of knowledge nor the cond::u-
sion.s which are to be declared from that content. Man's 
self-determination is limited, therefore, but not denied. 
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ability to think or see, or the fact that he has two hands.· 
Choosing cannot be blamed as if to punish it just as the hand1 
itself, is blameless·. Nor can the man as the agent who chooses 
he punished merely for possessing the ability to choose. The 
degree of goodness achieved by man's choice depends on the 
/ 
degree of moral excellence of his soul ( ~~~) rather than 
his power of choice. ~is self-moved regardless... The 
power of choice as freedom is thus non-moral in :Plato and is 
therefore only another term for metaphysical agency--the power 
of self-determination. A man may practice virtue or do wrong. 
His reasons for his actions require substantial interpretation, 
hut most important for :Plato and the evaluation of :Platonic 
philosophy in the history of thought is that the power of 
choice remains as a power of the whole. 
/ fv,l/-11 as Voluntary Action 
For Plato, the notion that the voluntary action of the 
soul means action consistent with knowledge of the good cannot 
he affirmed on the presupposition of a s.egment.ed theory of the 
/ 
soul. ~V~ is in essence a good in the universe and, as 
such, can respond only to good 1 just as the eyes can respond 
only to light. lf a man responds to had or chooses had, he 
could not have been good to start with, hut, says Plato, 
essentially he was. Therefore,·he cannot as a good soul 
' t' 
strive for evil. #i:n , yielding to the good, will become 
divine 1 but, ignoring the good and dragged down bY: the evil 
forces, will remain imprisoned.· Good canbe achieved only 
when )}vV{ does its job well. When )/JvYM is imprisoned 
and unable to function 1 evil occurs. Ignorance imprisons 
the soul 1 renders it helpless, and weakens its power to move 
itself. 
The questions of the moral nature of man are of basic 
importance at this point since self~motion or self-determina-
tion seems on the surface to omit the moral factors per ~-
Plato's reply to these questions rests on his interpretation 
of moral excellence in terms of virtue a$ knowledge of the 
good. Plato would claim to give the grounds of all ethical 
theory in his positing of rationally dascernible objective 
standards of right action and justice. True know;;Ledge of the 
highest good includes the skill to perform it. To ask Plato 
why a man who could not but follow knowledge 1 ignores it is 
not to ask Plato a question which he did not understand. 
Plato's answer is simple. The question answers itself. A 
person does not follow the knowledge he claims because he 
does not have true knowledge in the first place. He is ignor-
ant. If he had true knowledge he could not ignore it. As 
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pointed out by Taylor, a failure to understand this point is 
a failure to understand Plato, and it is hopeless to attempt 
to make sense out of l?latoJs ethics without the clear in-
sight into the full implications of the relationship of the 
knowledge of truth to the practice of virtue. 
Of special importance is Plato's inclusion of 
G/ q vP e-rr;s 
l . ' 
as one of the soul 1 s £unctions. It may be rendered as "chaos-
/ 
ing 11 (a thing) 1 and with ;tpo as it sometimes appears r 11be-
foren (another). This means choosing between alternatives. 
This notion is regarded by many ethical theorists as the very 
essence of the meaning of free will. In the moral sense free-
dom means "the freedom to choose between alternative courses 
f t • nl o ac J.On ••• In the most elemental sense this merely means 
that the doctrine of £reedom proposes that man can count be-
yond the number none." The moment man is aware of 11 two" he 
is aware of alternatives and can then choose between them. 
/ 
~OO't~;O£W means that one of the alternatives may be dealt 
with, taken, or chosen to the exclusion of or before the other. 
/ 
This differs £rom;s-ov}=.1pcr~..- discussed above in that the latter 
concerns impulsion or power 1 whereas the former r.efers to 
lTitus, Ethics, 87. 
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/ 
selectivity. When the soul functions as J{';?oo(u_,_,o£ w (" 
/ / 
it is functioning in the sense of choosing among alterna-
tives. When the idea of pow.er, or impelling force is assumed 
/ 
as inclu~ed in the termFoq~;O£w,. {choosing) its difference 
from /e?ovA-o yq~.­F I is lost. In Plato both concepts are distin-
/' 
included in ljlu f'J . guishable functions and 
Choice is possible so long as counting is·possible for 
Plato. If the;r-e is only the Eleatic One 1 no choice is possi-
ble in any sense 1 morally~ intellectually, metaphysicallyr 
/ 
or otherwise. Strictly speaking iff2!od, t--;0£1,() is more limited 
. ~ . r, 1 
than poll} .. oj!q L-. For Plato ~v;H;z is limited to neither'" I I 
but in the process of moving itself it includes all the facts 
of consciousness in the Laws as pointed out by~- E. Taylor 
(above), and of special irilportance to.this study is the inclu-
/ u / 
sion o~;Jcv?l~.uc( t.. and q ~C"&vd • ~thus thinks 1 counts~: 
selects, desires, purposes, impels 1 attracts, and has many 
other functions which may be considered as the activities of 
that kind of being which causes its.elf .. · Plato sees the moral 
problem not as a question of the power of choice but of 
achieving 11 excellence" thi-ough n tendance. 11 
This same problem is 1 in a measure,. seen in current dis .... 
cussions of the subject by the distinction between what Paul 
Edwards calls "the ability to act according to onets choices 
8'9 
or desiresnl and what Bran·~ Blanshard cl.ai:ms in insisting 
that rrthe choice itself is open." 2 On these two concepts 
stand two different interpretations of :moral experience and 
rl 
responsibility. The one rests its case on ~}/:.Jo 01 (.,P Fu!S 1 or j { I 
the power of choice. So long as this power is affirmed~" both 
praise and blame are valid possibilities. The denial of 
,...7/---:.::J cl()'(;4~~/ S :means that the :man was ~ot the cause of his own 
I( I / 
actions 1 since -q>:Joej<...t:f(JJ.S as noted in the :myth of Er is 
· I'. I 
what :makes one•s actions one's own. on the positive side 1 
if the :man knew a certain act to be right or wrong, chose to 
do one or the other, but could have chosen otherwise 1 he is 
thereby held accountable Clfld praised or blamed accordingly. 
( . 
Without J(;ooduJ'i£1.5 virtue and wickedness vanish into each 
I t 
other. With the death of choice, funeral services for both 
good and evil are also held and the burial of all three is 
final. 
The other view presupposes the choice already :made or 
determined, for if a :man knows an act to be good, he chooses 
it, and thereby achieves excellence 1 virtue~- the good and is 
lnHard and Soft Determinism," Determinism and Freedo:m 1 
ed. Sidney Hook (New York: New York University Press 1 1958) 1 
p. 106. 
2"The Case for Deter:minism1 11 ibid .. " p. 5 .. 
·go 
to be praised. The fundamental significance of the Platonic 
doctrine is that although "choice" is not denied 1 neither is 
it to be regarded as that factor responsible· for imparting 
the moral quality to action. The mere power of choice,. all-
important as it may be, does not establish moral excellence 
or moral evil. The excellence or evil must be established 
for Plato on other grounds. )for l?lato the goodp.ess or evil 
of an act is assessed by reasoning which includes self-exam-
inationM once through his reasoning ability a man is led to 
the conclusion that an act· is goo~ rationally he must choose 
/ 
it ( 77t..ooq c../Errl~). Choosing or rejecting a good is not the 
IT I J 
\..< / 
result of a strength o:t weakness ( 9'&!J!Yo-lct ) in the power of 
{ . 
choosing (even in the myth of Er). A "strong" choice is possi-
ble when the alternatives are sharp and clear. A nweak" choice 
occurs when the issues are vague and uncertain. The question 
of character as the determination of will is more aptly ap-
:·1 / 
plied to the actions of l'?dV/\o.U Ot ._.. Again 1 suffice it to say C I 
that for a known good to be rejected is not the result of a 
defective power of choice~ for Plato. The defect is rather 
in the man himself whose nature is thereby observed as 
fouled. 
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';['he Significance of Plato•s View of the Soul 
In summary,. 7/Jvv:: i.s that kind of causation which 
I 
causes itself and everything else which does not have its 
own cause~ ·~includes all the functions of conscious-
ness. When~ li.fts i.ts~lf up to rise~ it is a soul 
achi.evi.ng good. It is self-determined. When it does not 
lift i.tself and is dragged down 1 it is wicked.. It is a 
slave. When it moves it can only lift. When it does not 
move it can 
voluntarily 
only be dragged down~ When it lifts it is acting 
/ (..&'o v)..JJ.Mti 9 • When it is dragged down it is not 
I I 
acting voluntarily but is being enslaved by that which im-
/ 
prisons it. ~Y1 is good; causing and effecting the right 
choices is what it does and thereby it achieves excellence/ 
I 
virtue, and justice. ~Y1 discerns by all its acts of con-
sciousness~ including thinking and knowing which are its food. 
When it knows the good, it wills it: it uses all its powers 
to bring good into being. Its self-determination means that 
all its powers including what· is described as choosingt 
willing 1 thinking 1 d.eserving, valuing r hoping r purposing 1 and 
imagining are within itself and are functions of the whole 
self.. This is j-vy{ . It causes itself and it is the 
cause of all things which do not have their own cause .. 
~~~ is the divinest kind of being.. It is that being which 
9.2 
moves itself to excellence. Its self-determination is its 
power of impelling itself to good~ Since its nature is good, 
virtue, knowledge, and excellence 1 when it impels itself it 
moves itself to good, virtue., knowJ..edge 1 and excellence. 
I£ a man is tried and found evil it will be discovered 
'. ( 
that he is not impelling himself as~ hut is being im-
pelled by some other power or activity not J/)vy_; such as his 
-...IL ,,r.! · body, or the worldt or an evil·~ or evil men. The good 
is not relative 1 differing for each individual according to 
his '~wn principles or activities. Assuming that love of one's 
fellowmen is an absolute good, JJ..vi( would include such a 
love. For a man to know that such a love would complete his 
'h , I-~ nature and yet to reject it would mean that his ~ is 
not functioning, for if it were to function it would impel 
him to such a known good. 
To discover the degree of goodness in a man means to 
appraise this conditiQn and to determine how to bring about 
the desired excellence. on this. account 1 if a man claimed 
he did his best 1 he must still be appraised and the gap be-· 
tween "his best11 and 11 the good 11 must be measured. It is. the 
function of the~ to enter into such causal activities 
as will close the gap.and establish the good. If man's best 
is known but the true good in the situation is not known, 
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then ignorance prevails and responsibility is lost. 
The doctrine of reminiscence must not be overlooked in 
the problem of the moral life for Plato. For in man•s pre-
vious existence he learned truth ?nly to have lost it. To 
recover it, he must go to the effort of prolonged and steady 
thinking. Knowledge is won by "personal participation in 
research.nl In so doing, learning means ttthe following up 
by personal effort of the suggestions of sense-experience-. nl 
EValuation of the Doctrine of the Will And Its Freedom 
from Its Embryonic Stages to Its Development in Plato 
In order to ~ndicate clearly the stage at which the 
discussion of the doctrine of the will has arrived1 it may 
be helpful to present the main features of the transformations 
of the doctrine which have developed from its embryonic stages 
to the notion·which is found in Plato. According to the 
working definition of the problem as established at the out-
set, the question to be answered concerns the power or 
powers in man which enable him to determine or choose his 
destiny. 
1see A~ E .• Taylor., Plato"' pp. 136-137. 
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In the myths the forces and powers which determined 
human destiny were largely outside of men: .and were conceived 
in terms of the indulgences of the gods based on a human 
nature composed of divine and wicked elements. Man's dis~ 
satisfaction with this conception ied him to ask how his des-
tiny was regulated. While reflecting on nature~ a wide 
variety of ideas was proposed. The differences in the ideas 
extend from the One of the Eleatics.at one end to the skep-
ticism of the Sophists at the other. Thus the area of the 
discussion of the powers determining human destiny covers 
the distance from the notion of man's contemplating the 
Eleatic One to the sophist doctrine of manls thinking and 
doing anything he wants with the aim of gaining power over 
others • Between the notion that man has nothing to say about 
the meaning and destiny of his life since it is all objectively 
given and the notion that nothing is objectively given and 
man may say anything he pleases about the meaning and destiny 
of his life, there is a wide gap. 
To avoid the extremes and to fill the gap ~lato (follow-
ing the initiative of Socrates) asked not only the question 
of how to determine one 1 s destiny but the very basic question 
of how to determine and choose the right destiny. The discussion 
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of the functions of the soul in relation to its powers to 
move itself toward the good ·warrants a review and evaluation 
of the development o£ the doctrine of the soul so that the 
doctrine of free will may be seen in proper perspective. 
(l) Early Greek thought (especially in Plato), viewed ) 
the soul as . a unity. Activities of the soul we:r;e not dele- I 
gated to faculties set apart from the whole and charged wit~ 
I 
the task of performing a specific function only. There was i 
not a part which thoufht, a part which impelled, a part which 
I 
imagined, a part which remembered,, and a part which desired!. 
I 
I The activities of the soul w~re activities of the whole so~ 
performing the functions as a unity. The heterogeneity of 
human,activities suggested a definition of the soul in terms 
) 
of its versatility as a unity and not in terms of a soul I with functions assigned to specialized faculties. 
{2) The doctrine of the soul gradually evolved from the 
early speculation that ·the soul's destiny was ordained by 
the power of the gods or the forces of nature to the later 
insight that the soul' as a self-determining reality could 
utilize all its powers to achieve any attainable goals. For 
Plato 1 self-determination did not mean the arbitrary and ir-
responsible freedom©£ the Sophists 1 s subJectivism. For ex-
ample 1 for Plato., man can ·think only in the way. thinking is 
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done. The soul 1 s self-determination does not propose that 
man set aside the rules of thinking. Rather the soul 1 s self-
determination urges him to find the rules and to use them. 
(3) The essence_of Plato's view of the soul was its 
self-determination. In positing the soul as a reality which 
moved itself)' Plato attributed to the soul as a whole all of 
its functions including the power to shoose among alternatives 
in the sense that nothing antecedent to or pre.sent in the 
choice completely determined the choice. Even if a soul's 
abts were conditioned by the past or limited by the act•s 
feasibility, there belonged to the soul the power 1 however 
limited 1 to choose among alternatives.. But what Plato des-
cribed as the central nature of the soul, namely, the achieve-
ment of its aims by the power of its own agency 1 later thinkers 
overlooked. The power to choose among alternatives (as des-
cribed above) became for some later thinkers that which was 
defined as a free 'will which in turn was'one of the several 
faculties into which the soul was divided. Such a free will 
cannot be regarded as part of a soul freely willing as a 
whole. Only the latter view of the soul could coincide with 
Plato•s thought of the soul and the functions of willing. 
97 
It may be noted that a free will in the thought of the 
later philosophers included in the faculty of choice the 
power of choosing contrary to oneJs knowledge of the good. 
But because 1 for Plato 1 the power of choice was an activity 
of the whole soul, the hypothesis that the soul may choose 
contrary to its knowledge was, for Plato, to divide the 
soul and thereby destroy the soul's unity. 
(4) The activities of the soul when it wills and chooses 
are.r for Plato 1 two specific functions of the soul as a whole .. 
These activities were later to be described in a doctrine of 
the will which treated the will as though it had power of 
its own independent of ·the control of the soul as a whole. 
In such a view, the will and not the soul is defective when 
man does evil .. 
(5) The soul in Plato as self~oved is free. The soul 
is not wholly indeterminate (i.e. not completely free) .. Its 
limits .are defined by all the forces which circumscribe H:. 
and by the nature of its own inner structure. However in 
those areas in the soul's power where there are no limiting 
external forces 1 the soul is self-determined and free. If 
freedom is to be defined as the ability or power to choose 
98 
among alternatives 1 the soul 1 for Plato, has such ability 
and power. There remains the serious question of whatt for 
Plato 1 are the alternatives which may rightfully be con-
sidered as optional. The answer to this question is that 
only those alternatives which are possible to the soul and 
capable of responding to the soul 1 s act of choice may be 
considered within the range of the soul 1 s agency, i.e~, its 
power of choice. A soul may choose within the whole area 
of all its possible activities. , In this sense the soul may 
will freely. But when confronted by true good 1 the soul, 
though free, has no alternative except to leave everything 
1 
else out of account and to choose that good. Two examples 
illustrate this point. There is, for Plato 1 no choice in 
knowledge of the truth because there is no alternative to 1 
and therefore no choice in, knowledge such as that 2 + 2 = 4. 
There is no choice when true good is known because there is 
no alternative to, and therefore no choice in true good, 
such as self-knowledge or self-examination. To expose ob-
jective truth ~r knowledg~) to· alternatives in order to 
make it subject to an act of choice is to deny its status as 
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objective truth (or knowledge). For l?lato, when the good 
is known, there is no alternative but to do it. To suggest 
that a person may know the true good but not choose it is 
to put true good a"~:: the mercy of what is less that itself. 
True good therefore is not optional. It is irresistible 
and inexorable. A soul's knowledge o£ the truth involves 
a command to the soul that it live consistent with its 
knowledge. Finally, when a man chooses to do wrong, know-
ledge cannot be involvedi for, i£ it were, it would reveal 
the truth and compel action consistent with the truth revealed. 
(6) The doctrine o£ ~distinguishes between 
causation resulting in good and the source o£ evil. For 
l?lato, evil is not caused in the same way good is. Evil .is 
not voluntary or willed--the result o£ the action of the 
·$;-1?·' or anything else. Evil like· darkness is absence or 
defect. To correct darkness a light must be lighted, and 
in the realm o£ good and evil, evil disappears when knowledge 
is attained and good is done. 
However, the doctrine that to know the good .is to do it 
must contend against the experienced fact that there is 
stubborn rejection of the goodby some who readily admit 
that they know that very good. A severe intellectual strain 
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results when the individual says that good is always willed 
but evil is not. The impelling power which does evil seems 
no less than the impelling power which achieves good. For a 
man to do an evil 1 he must sometimes work harder than if he 
were to do an equivalent amount of good. Evil seems to be 
no more the result of a vacuum than good is the result of 
fate. Destructive power is no more deniable than construct-
ive power. Plato attempts to s.ave his philosophy from this 
dilemna by limiting the notion of the good to meaning true 
good not relative good.' The impelling power to achieve the 
true good is positive action 1 intellectual light, and an ex-
cellent life. The experience of complete evil is nnegative" 
action 1 in·tellectual darkness, and a shameful death. Plato 1 s 
thought in this area results in a doctrine of perfection 
rather than of moral good in the sense of choosing among 
alternatives. 
Plato had contributed profound insights to the study of 
human nature. However, by and large his thinking was not 
systematically organized. As a result 1 in presenting his 
doctrine on any subject 1 there is always t~e danger that 
essential aspects have been overlooked.- Final proof that 
some ideas are truly re~ated to each other is lacking and 
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in many instances answers to basic problems are left to vague 
guesses. Plato's followers were aware of this situation and 
attempted to organiz.e his thought without distorting it in 
order to make it clearer and more acceptable. Plato's use 
of myth is an example of the dang.ers in presenting ideas 
unsystematically and the confusion which may result because 
of the difficulty in separating fact from fiction. 
The follower of Plato who was most successful in systema-
tizing Plato 1 s thought was Aristotle. Aristotle 1 s greatness 
must include the proposition that he clearly understood Plato. 
His differences from Plato are not so much the result of mis-
understanding as they are the expression of a sincere effort 
to correct defects ~y using exact methods, by collecting 
data, and by organizing the results. 
For those who succeeded Plato, the doctrine .of the 
soul as a unity did not give adequate account of the exper-
ienced facts,which tended to exhibit the soul as a plurality. 
To explore these facts and to discover where they could lead 
became one of the major efforts of Aristotle. There can be 
no question that although the central concepts of the nature 
of the soul were profoundly stated by Plato, the details of 
the implications of moral choice were largely ignored (perhaps 
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intentionally) with the result that stubborn questions ·can 
only be answered with a weak guess. The presentation of 
some of these details was made by Aristotle, Platots 
successor. ThereforeJ in turning now to Aristotle 1 the 
result may very well be not oniy to achieve greater insight 
into PlatoJs doctrines but perhaps to gain a more profound 
understanding of the problems of the will and the idea of 
freedom. 
CHAPTER III 
THE DE.VELOPME:l\fr OF THE DOCTRINE OF •r.HE WILL 
IN ARISTOTLE 
· Aristotle (384-322 B.C.) wa.s born in Sta.gira, a town on 
.. . 
the northwestern shores of the Aegean in 384.B,C., the son 
·of Nicomachus~ couz:-t ph_ysician. to Philip of Macedon~ In 
367 B.C., at seventeen, he entered Plato•s Academy andre-
mained as student and teacher in that Academy until Plato's 
death twenty years later in 347 B.C .. when he was thii:ty-seven. 
While he was at the Academy, some of the greatest of Plato•s 
works were written 1 and his complete familiarity with Plato•s 
views is almost unquestionable. With the death of Plato, 
A±±stotle and Xenocrates left the Academy~ because of its 
degeneration into a school of mathematics under the direction 
of Plato•s nephew, Speusippus. They went together to .Assos. 
There Aristotle set up a school with others who had studied 
~ith Plato 1 and 1 during his three-year stay, married Pythias~ 
the adopted daughter and niece of Hermias1 a prince and the 
ruler o:t Atarnous, a town of Assos. Pythias died after 
104 
bearing him a daughter, and not long afterward he established 
a permanent but unlegalized union with Herpyllis, a native of 
Stagirar who bore him a son, Nicomachus, after whom the 
Nichomachean Ethics was named. He spent two years on the 
isle of Lesbos studying natural history and marine biology. 
In 343 B.C. Philip of Macedon invited him to the ~ce-
danian court in Pella (80 miles west of stagira) to teach 
Alexander, who was then thirteen years old. Aristotle per-
formed this task for the next seven years until Philiprs 
death and Alexander's accession to the throne in 335 B .. C • 
. 
Aristotle returned to Athensf and, with the money and 
scientific data sent to him by Alexander during the l:atterts 
military campaigns which foJ:med his empite, Aristotle organ-
ized a school in the Lyceum which came to be called Peripatetic 
after the fact that he taught as he walke~. He collected and 
interpreted data pertaining to many subjects and continued to 
teach for the next twelve years until Alexander 1 s death, when 
he was forced to flee to his mother's home in Chalcis. He 
died the following year in 322 B.c. 1 
1For the biographical data, see, for example, ~duard 
Zeller, Aristotle, trans • .B. F. c .. Costelloe and J.·H. Muirhead 
(New York: Longmans, ~reen~ and Company 7 1897) 1 I, 1-477 
Laertius, passimt w. w. Jaeger, Aristotlet trans. R. Robinson 
(2d ed.7 Oxford: The Clarendon press, 1948), passim; McKeon, 
pp. xi-xxxiv; Ross, pp. 9-24. 
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The Nature o£ the Soul 
In the study o£ Plato the method used to arrive at .an 
understanding of the function of willing consisted of an 
examination of the nature and functions of the soul. It 
is1 therefore 1 not surprising to discover that Aristotle was 
keenly aware of the significance of the study of the soul; 
for, knowledge of the soul 11 contri'buted greatly to the advance 
of truth in general~ and, above allr to our understanding of 
Nature."l Truth was advanced and the understanding of nature 
was increased because study of the soul was the philosophical 
study of life. The understanding of nature was among other 
things also based on the study of causation which in turn 
was rooted in the subject matter of the soul. But the impor-
tance of the soul is almost equally matched 'by the tendency 
of studies of the soul to be elusive; for uassured knowledge 
about the soul is one of the most difficult things in the 
world."l 
In order to acquire the desired knowledge of the soul, 
Aristotle proposes a definition of the problem: to discover 
(1) the soul's essential nature 1 and (2) its properties. 1 
1Aristotle 1 De Anima, trans. J. A. Smith, 402a. 
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The method for determining the soults properties is simply 
one of demonstration. But the method for determining the 
soulrs essence is not so explicit. An ade~ate procedure is 
to ask, 11What is soul?" To answer the question involves 
formulating the most general possible definition of the soul. 1 
The Soul as the. Originator Or Cause 
of Movement Yet Unmoved 
Aristotle 1 s predecessors had held to two characteristics 
of soul which distinguish it from what is not of the nature 
of soul~ namely 1 movement and sensation.2 ~1ose wno held 
that what had soul was moved annexed to this view the addition-
al proposition that what had soul ili it was "eminently orig-
inative of niovement." 3 on the other hand those who concentra-
ted on the soul•s sensations or perceptions tended to "identify 
soul with the principle or principles of nature." 3 
In discussing the question of the soul''s movement, Aris-
tot.le bases his reasoning on the conclusions he had arrived 
at in the Physics, 4 namely, that in the act of motion there 
are three things--the moved, the movent, and Ehe instrument 
1Ibid. 1 412a. 2Ibid. I 403b. 
4Aristo-t.J.e 1 Physics~ ed. Mc:Keon 1 trans. R. P. Hardie and 
R. K. caye (New York:. Random House~ 1941) 1 256b-267b. 
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of motion.l The moved ari.d the instrument of motion are in 
motion;.hut nthe movent--that is to say, that which causes 
motion in such a manner that it is not merely the instrument 
of motion--must he unmoved." 1 
Aristotle develops his argument as follows: In the 
first place, there must be a limit in the causal series--a 
first cause,2 sfnce the kinds of motion are limited~ In the 
second place 1 a thing which moves itself is a thing divided 
in two parts: that which is moved and that which moves» 
The whole moves itself. It does this by contaiD;ing a part 
that imparts motion and another part that is moved. 3 The 
part which imparts motion is unmoved. 4 Aristotle was 1 there-
fore1 able to say that there is a· part that .is moved and a 
part that is an unmoved movent. 5 
From the conclusions of the Physics~ Aristotle also is 
able to define four types of movement: locomotion, alteration, 
diminution, and growth~6 But all.these movements involve loca-
tion in space and 11 it is a mistake to say that the soul is a 
spatial magnitude." 7 He corrects Platots view expressed in 
1Ibid .. 1 256b. 
4Ibid. 1 258b. 
2Ibid.l 257a. 
Sibid., 257b. 
6Aristotle 1 De Anima, 406a. 
3Ibid., 258a. 
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the Tifuaeus that the soul and body move each otherl by propos-
ing ~t l?lato did not mean soul but m:i.nd there. In contrast 
he sa~s, "That the soul cannot be moved is therefore clear 
from Jhat we have said, and i£ it cannot be moved at all, 
I 
mani£Jstly it cannot be moved by itself.n 2 In these dis-
tinctions Aristotle has not only revised :Plato•s doctrine o£ 
I 
the uhity o£ the soul, but he has replaced Plato's definition 
of th~ soul as that which is moved by itself with the propo-
siti+ that the soul's essence .consists~ ax:_ unm~ed_mo"l'_nt:_. 
/on the grounds that he has dismissed all other views o£ 
the ~oul as inadequate, Aristotle proceeds to define it £or 
hims11£. nThe soul 1 " he says, "must be a substance in the 
Sensl of = the form of a natural body having life potentially 
I 
with~n it.•3 It is "substance in the sense which corresponds 
to t}::te de fini ti ve formula of a thing 1 s essence. "4 ~.is_g. 
~.i of soul and body,_5 
I [ This definition o£ man expresses the mere £act. To make 
the/definition more comprehensive, the 11 ground" must be in-
1 . I . 
clu1ed and exhibited. 6 Aristotle attempts to accomplish this 
I 
/ Iss. 
/ 2.Aristotle, De Anima, 408b. 
See also Plato,. Laws~- S94-S96. 
3rbid., 412a. 
I 4Ibid. I 412:b. 5Ibid., 412b-413a. 6 Ibid~, 413a. 
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by contending that 11what has soul in it differs from what 
has not, in that the former displays life. Now this word 
has more than one sense, and provided any one alone of these 
is found in a thing we say that thing is living."l But what 
must be found in order to say that a thing displays. life or 
is ll:ving? Aristotle says that a thing is living when it 
posse~ses one or more of the five psychic powers: the nu-
tritive, the appetitive, the sensory, the locomotive, and 
the power of thinking. 2 The $OU1 1 however, is not only living 
but is also the cause of the body in the three senses of 
causation: (1) the source or origin of movement, (2) the 
end 1 (3) the essence of the whole living body. 3 
Without discarding these contentions 1 Aristotle reduces 
his argument to the proposition that a soul has two distinctive 
peculiarities: (1) local movement and (2) thinking, discrim-
inating., and pe~ceiving. 4 The latter aspect of the soul is 
not difficult to definei for, there is in the soul what is 
called_mind, which is that whereby the soul thinks and judges 1 
and it is able to think itself. 5 The fuller development of 
Aristotle 1 s concept of mind must wait. More important at 
l.lbid. 2Ibid. 1 4l4a. . 3Ibid. 1 415b. 
4 Ibid., 427a. 5Ibid • .,. 429. 
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this point in the argument is that although mind, imagination 
and nutrition are all involved in movement, the faculty which 
' ) / 
originates movement is appetite ( OfJ£kTI fo!DV) • 1 
( 
That which moves therefore is a single faculty and 
the faculty of appetiter for if there had been two 
sources of movement~-mind and appetite--they would have 
produced movement in virtue of some common character. 
As it is~ mind is never found producing movement without 
appetite (for wish is a form of appetiue; and when move-
ment,is produced according to calculation it is also 
according to wish), but appetite can originate movement 
contrary to calculation1 for desire is a form of appe-
ti~e- Now mind2 is always right 1 but appetite and imagi-
nation may be either right or ~rong. That is why, though 
in any case it is the object of appetite which originates 
movement, this object may be either the real or the ap-
parent good. To produce movement the object must be more 
than this: it must be good that can,be brought into 
being by action; and only What can be otherwise than as 
it is can, thus be :brought into being. That then such a 
power in the soul as has been described, i.e. that called 
appetite 1 originates movement is clear. Those who dis-
tinguish parts in the soul, if they distinguish and divide 
in accordance with differences of power 1 find themselves 
with a very large number of parts, a nutritive, a sensi ..... 
tivel and intellective, a deliberative 1 and now an appeti-
tive part; for these are more different from one another 
than the faculties of desire and passion.3 , 
Now what originates movement is specifically one--the 
faculty of appetite, and the things that originate movement 
lRoss, p. 143 1 translates it as "desire.n Liddell and 
scott suggest that it be called the impulsive or conative 
faculty .. 
2
.Mind = Nous • 3Aristotle1 De Anima, 433al b. 
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are numerically many.l Furthermoret 11 that which moves with-
out itself being moved is the realizable good, that which at 
once moves and is moved is the faculty of appetite." 1 And 
in both men and animals the capability of appetite is the 
capability of self....omovement.l Movement is thus not originated 
) / 
by the whole soul but by desire or appetite ( C)P£1-!T/ /r!OV). 
I 
Based on these data Ross's statement of Aristotlets view 
that "desire is thus the cause of movement" 2 cannot be refuted .. 
In the Metaphysics Aristotle defines the means whereby the 
unmoved mover causes motion: 
There is something which moves without being moved, being 
eternal, substance,. a.'l'ld ac-tuality. And the object of 
desire and the object of thought move in tlLis way1 they 
move without being moved. The primary objects of desire 
and of thought are the saine.. For the apparent good is 
the object of appetite, andthe real good is the primary 
object of rational wish .. 3 
Man seeks the good because it attracts him in his rati.onal 
wishes. The result is a motion from potentiality to actuality. 
The heart of Aristotle's doctrine of the soul as the origina-
tor of movement is that-it is the form of a·natural body 
which he defines as an essential attribute. Ross points out 
that Aristotle means by this that the 11 soul is a cause of 
~Ibid" 1 433b • 2Ross, p. 144. 
3Aristotle 1 Metaphysics, 1072a. 
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movement but not self movingi i.t moves without being moved."l 
nThe soul is the first grade of actuality of a natural body 
having life potentially in it.n2 In the light o£ Aristotlets 
doctrine of the faculties of the soul and the relation of the 
soul to the body, the question may be rightly raised as to 
the status of the soul's Qnity. 
The Unity of the soul 
Although Ar.istotle lists faculties of the soul (which 
will be discussed later) 1 he seeks with difficulty to main-
tain its essential unity. Its unity is not sustained by the 
body.. On the contrary 1 the body t s unity is provided by the 
soul:··. "In each o£ the bodily parts there are present all the 
parts of the soul, and the souls so present are homogeneous 
with one another and with the whole.~~? .In this respect Aria-
totle suggests that the soul c~not be separated into its parts. 
on the other hand~ for Aristotle there is division; the 
soul is as a whole divisible 1 by which he means that it may 
be divided not into parts but into complete souls .4 Thus 1 for 
example, it is not possible to separate an orange section from 
1Ross 1 p. 132. See also Jaeger, p. 45. 
2Aristotle, ~ Anima, 412a. 3:rbid.., 4llb. 
4Ibid .. , Aristotle affirms that the parts are souls 
"homogeneous with one another and with the whelen. 
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an orange and still have a whole orange~ The parts are in-
disseverable without destroying the whole. But, if it were 
possible to cut an orange in two and thereby yield two com-
plete oranges while at the same retaining the whole orange 1 
the notion of divisibility for Aristotle would thereby be 
illustrated. The parts or faculties of the soul are wholes 
which are interrelated (or, as Ross pu·ts it) 1 are character-
i2:ed by "interpenetration. irl 
Zeller 1 unwilling to accept Aristotle's logic, is not 
so sure of the unity of the soul in Aristotle. Zeller des-
.cribes Aristotle 1 s doctrine of unity: 
Aristotle accordingly sums up his whole doctrine of the 
soul in a single sentence: the Soul is in a certain 
sense all Actuality, inasmuch as it unites in itself 
the sensual and the spiritual 1 and thus contains the 
~orm of both--a description which applies especially, 
of course, to the soul of man.2 
In spite of Aristotle•s own affirmation of unity, Zeller 
proposes that in Aristotle there is no unifying principle of 
personality by which is meant a power,"which governs while 
it unites all the other parts of the soul.n3 Aristotle, in 
his eagerness to preserve the soul 1 s unity, may have been con .... 
vinced that he had done so, if in no other way than by 
2zeller, Aristotle 1 II, 119. 
3Ibid., II., 120. 
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proclamation. The soul•s unity was affirmed by counting it 
as one soul and not as many. When the soul was described, a 
unit of reality was being described which is not divisible 
into smaller and more basic parts of which it is composed. 
Nor are its faculties separable from it. As A. E. Taylor. 
states the matter, there is, for Aristotle, "one single con-
tinuous process,nl which Taylor discusses in terms o:t the 
grades of psychical life. At one point Aristotle suggests 
hesitatingly that "the soul is inseparable from its partst 
or at any rate that certain parts of it are."2 This state-
ment has led some to the conclusion that Aristotle is here 
leaving room for the immortality of Mous. For, although Axis-
totle distinctly says that nthe soul cannot be without a 
body," 3 nevertheless 1 he seems to have abandoned his desire 
for unity and has made out of Nous a separa:ble' faculty of the 
soul: 
We have no evidence yet· about mind or the power to thinlq 
it seems to be a widely different kind of soul,. differing 
as to what is eternal from what is perishable; it alone 
is capable of existence in isolation :trom all other psy-· 
chic powers. All the other.,parts of soul 1 it is evident 
from what we have said, are, in spite of certain state-
ments to ·the contrary, incapable of separate exis'tence 
lTaylor 1 l\.ristotle, p-. 7 5. 
2Aristotle, De Anima 1 413a. 3Ibid.l 414a. 
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thoug~of course~ distinguishable by definition.l 
Because mind is in its essential nature activity, it is nsep-
arable, impassible 1 umnixed." 2 .He goes on 1 "When mind is set 
free from its present conditions it appears as .just what it 
is and nothing more: this alone is immortal and eternal." 2 
Furthermore 1 "in each and every c"ase that which unifies is 
mind."3 In the universe as a whole potential and actual know-
ledge are identical2 and at the same time 1'the faculty of . 
knowing is never :moved but remains at rest. 114 
Without bending the data, .Aristoide· .. :may be described 
here as inconsistently providing for the Wlity of the soul, 
first in terms of its.grades of faculties and powers which 
develop from the first grade of actuality of a natural body 
to the most highly developed stage of intelligence.. The mind 
imparts to the soul a separable aspect as Nous. 
The ~ey to the problem o£ the soul 1 s unity in Aristotle 
becomes the distinction :between the soul acting as a whole 
(as in Plato) or the soul acting through its parts. The m1ity 
of the soul for Aristotle is that the faculties are insepar-
able (except possibly for Nous) from the whole. For Aristotle 
1Ibid. 1 413b.. See Jaeger., p. 49. 
2Ibid. 1 43 Oa. 
3 . Ibid. I 430b. 4Ibid .. , 433a. 
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the soul is divided into parts (perhaps souls) which function 
as parts but not as functions of the soul as a whole. It is 
not the whole .~oul which desires, or thinks, or eenses. In 
each case a faculty functions for the soul as a part of the 
soul • .More·specific.consideration. to this problem may be 
given when the faculties are discussed. 
To explore the·extent of the divisiveJn.ess t.o the soul 
created by Nous, it is of importance to give consideration 
to Aristotlets doctrine of substance. 
Soul .as Substance 
In the definitions cited above 1 Aristotle uses the word 
nsu'bstance" to mean ·the essence of a soul. By essence he 
means the form which is nthat precisely in virtue of which a 
thing is called 'a this.•n1 Furthermore, he has also defined 
it as that which cannot be moved and therefore cannot be 
moved by itself.2 Although 1 in a sense, this appears to be 
the doctrine of soul as substance 1 it is necessary to add 
Aristotlets view of substance as found elsewhere beginning 
with the organon. In the Organon Aristotle says that "sub-
stance, in the truest and primary and most definite sense 
libid., 4J.2a. 2Ibid.t 408b. 
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of the wordt is that which is neither predicable of a subject 
nor present in a subject~ 1 There are two meanings of sub-
stance: primary and secondaryi a secondary substance is one 
which is not present in a subjectil and is predicated uni-
vocally or unambiguously. A primary substance is individual, 
contains no Vial:' iations of degrees.t and admits of contrary 
qualities.2 The definitions of the Organon are elaborated in 
the Metaphysics where.he says that substance in its truest 
s~nse is substratum by which_is meant nthat of which every-
thing else is predicated 1 'While it is itself not predicated 
of anything else. 113 It is that which underlies a thing. In 
this respect substance is a substratum; whereas motion is a 
predicate. Since Aristotle defines movement as change from 
potentiality to actuality, he views movement as predicable 
a.nd thereby rejects l?lato' s in·terpretation of 
movement as that which moves itself--~. 
the source of 
' ( 
For jkvYrJ to 
be the cause of the world it would have to be prior or first. 
Since it is coeval with the heavens and, in fact, later rather 
than prior 1 it cannot be the cause of movement. 4 That which 
1Aristotle 1 Org.anon 1 ed. :Richard .M.c:Keon 1 trans. E. M.. 
Edghill (New York: :Random Housel 194l)r 3a. 
2Ibid. 1 3a-4b. 
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moves without being moved is the object of desire and the ob-
ject of thought (substance) i and presu:.mably not Plato• s ~: 
There is, then, something which is always moved with an 
unceasing motion~ which is motion in a circle; and this 
is plain not in theory only but in fact. Therefore the 
first heaven must be eternal. There is therefore also 
something which moves it~ ,And since that which is moved 
and moves is intermediate 1 there is something which 
moves without being moved, being eternal,. substance 1 and 
actuality .. And the object o£ desire and the object of 
thought move in this way; they move without being moved. 
The primary objects of desire and of thought are the 
same. For the apparent good is the object of appetite 1 
and the real good is the primary object of rational wish. 
But desire is consequent on opinion rather than opinion 
on desire, for the thinking is the startihg-point. And 
thought is moved by the object of thought, and one of 
the two columns of opposites is in itself the object of 
thought; and in this, substance is first, and in substance, 
that which is simple and exists actually~ (The one and 
the simple are not the same; for •onet means a measure, 
but tsimple 1 means that the thing itself has a certain 
nature.) l 
Aristotle does not end the discussion of soul as substance 
here. Having given an account of motion by finding the prime 
mover as the first principle behind motion, Aristotle pro,..... 
pos.es to define more clearly what the nature of the prime 
mover is. The first principle upon which all heaven and 
nature depend cannot he left merely as a substratum or unmoved 
mover without an explanation emulating the importance of the 
first principle~ Aristotle finds such an explanation by 
changing to a theological perspective and making the first 
1Ibid. 1 1072a. 
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principle God. As the discussion of the first principle 
develops~ Aristotle arrives at the idea of God by introducing 
the need to explain more than movement if a first principle 
is to be found~ The first principle must also include 
life,~ the highest good 1. duration and thinking. Thus .I' 
the first principle explains life./' life is seen as the 
best to be enjoyed. However the best life is the life 
which is hest in itself. 
Having arrived at this point in the argument, Aristotle 
proceeds readily to his conclusion: The best in itself is 
not just thought but thought thinking itself. such thought 
(called also contemplation) is the divine element of the · 
first principle. The life of the divine element is its 
actuality. This actuality is God. such an actuality as the 
best cannot be of finite duration and th6refore is eternal. 
God 1 therefore, is the first principle understood as thought 
thinking itself. Life as roost good and eternal is God's 
self-dependent actuality. God 1 then,~ is a living being 
of eternal duration and most good~ Man enjoys the state of 
contemplation which God enjoys but only occasionally and 
for a short time. Any theory of the will or of freedom in 
' Aristotle will be founded on the f~rst principles outlined 
above. The qonclusions to be drawn from the discussion of 
the first pr:Lnciple are stated by Aristotle as follows: 
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Since there is something which moves while itself unmoved~ 
existing actually, this can in no way be otherwise than 
as it is. For motion in space is the first of the kinds 
of changet and motion in a circle the first kind of 
spatial motion; and this the first mover produces. The 
first mover, then, exists of necessity; and in so far as 
it exists by necessity, its mode of being is good, and 
it is in this sense a first principle. For the necessary 
has all these senses.--that which is necessary perforce 
because it is contrary to the natural impulse~ that with-
out which the good is impossible~ and that which cannot 
be otherwise but can exist only in a single way. 
On such a_principle 1 then, depend the heavens and 
the world of nature. And it is a life such as the best 
which we enjoy, and enjoy for but a short time (for it 
is ever in this state, which we cannot be), since its 
actuality is also pleasure. {And for this reason are 
making, perception, and thinking most pleasant, and hopes 
and memories are so on account of these~ And thinking 
in itself deals with that which is best in itself1 and 
that which is thinkip.g.in the fullest sense with that 
which is best. in the fullest sense. And thought thinks 
on itself because it shares the :mature of the object of 
thoughtt for it becomes an object of thought in coming 
into contact with and thinking its objects, so that thought 
and object of thought are the same. For that which is 
capable of receiving the object of thoughtr i.e. the 
essence, is thought. But it is active when it possesses 
this object. There±ore the possession rather than the 
receptivity is the divine element which thought seems to 
contain, and the act of contemplation is what is most 
pleasant and best,. If,. then, God is always in that good 
state in which we sometimes are, this compels our wondery 
and if in a bet·ter this compels it yet more. And God is 
in a better state. And life also belongs to·God1 for the 
actuality of thought is life, and God is that actuality1 
and God•s self-dependent actuality is-life most good and 
eternal •. We say therefore that. God is a living being, 
eternal, most good 1 so that life and duration continuous 
and eternal belong to God; £or this is God.l 
libid., 1072b. 
121. 
After relating the. first principle to God( Aristotle ,re-
turns to the first principle which 1 defined as substance is not 
only the source of all good, but the cause of the universe: 
The first principle or primary being is not movable 
either in itself or accidentally, but produces the pri-
mary eternal and single movement. But since that which 
is moved must be moved by something, and the first mover 
must be in it.self unmovaple, and eternal movement must 
be produced by something eternal and a single :movement 
by a single thing, and since we see that J::>esides the 
simple spatial movement of the universe, which we say 
the first and unmovable substance produces, there are 
other spatial mo-vements--those of the planets--which are 
eternal (for a body which moves in a circle is eternal 
and unresting; we have proved these points in the physi-
cal tr.eatises) 1 each of these movements also IQ.Ust be 
caused by a .substance both unmovable in itself and eter-
nal. For the nature of the .stars is eternal just because 
it is a certain kind of substance, and the mover is 
eternal and prior to the moved, and that which is prior 
to a substance must be a substance. Evidently, then, 
there must be substances which are of the same nmUber 
as the movements of the .stars, and in their nature eter-
nal:~ and in themselves unmovable,. and without magnitude, 
for the reason before :mentioned.l 
In saying that life belongs to God., Aristotle means life 
is self-dependent actuality of thought. Although Aristotle 
has formulated his doctrine qf the soul on what he considers 
are the requirements fer an explanation of motion, he has never-
the-less fou,nd it necessary to relate the concept of the first 
principle to "self-dependence. 11 The concept of sel.f"':"dependence 
has not:t howeve~ been applied to motion but to thought. He says 1 
"It must be of itself that the divine thought thinks (since it is 
the most excellen.t:o~,things), and its thinking is a thinking 
libid.l l073a .. 
].22 
on thinking.Jtl 
It is not difficult to see that with reference to God 
the central idea of J?lato 1 s 7Pv-v..-: is e:rri,braced by Aristotle 
' 
in his view of Godrs self-dependent actuality as thought 
thinking itself. Even more of Plato•s view of the soul ap-
pears when Aristotle adds that the object of desire and the 
object of thought move without b.eing moved. And as if to 
close the subject, :Ross adds that nAristo~cle 1 s genu.L11:e view 
is that the prime mover is not in space.n2 With motion :m.ot 
limited to space, the V'i.ew emerges that Aristotle 1 s prime 
mover is not a denial of Plato's view of the first principle: 
the A,ristotelian prime mover comes remarkably close to as-
)JJ I suroing the role of Pl.ato• s ~v¥-1 . 
The point may be further explored without doing Aristotle 
an injusticel' because.Aristotle cannot resolve his own meta-
physical problems without accounting for the soul's basic 
functions. That Aristotle rejects the view that the source 
of movement is motion is clear. He does so because he wants 
actuality to be prior to potencyw3 But the view of God 1 s 
thought as thinking itself and as self-dependent actuality 
would seem to be Aristotle•s attempt to bring the motion of 
self-determination as previously noted into the motion of 
libid., 1074b. Anselm added to this the idea of life as 
the actuality of thought·and thereby derived his ontological 
argument for God. 
2;aoss~ p. 177. 3see pag.e 129 .. 
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substance as it applies to God. The thought thinking itsel~ 
as a more adequate interpretation of that which moves, but is 
itself unmovedr removes the difficulty of the parado:g. (if not 
the flat contradiction) in the principle of the mover which 
doesntt move. Having affirmed the unmoved aspect of sub-
stance or the substratum as being at restr the question 
.. 
arises as to the meaning of causation. It is important to 
discover how a substratum which somehow is at rest can be 
the cause of motion. When the doctrine of soul as substance 
is advanced in Aristotle, he is first of all in agreement 
with Plato that there are things which cannot account for 
their own existence and therefore must have a cause outside 
of themselves. For both Plato and Aristotle 1 therefore, such 
a cause or mover is by definition the cause of all those 
things which require a cause. In Plato, that cause turns 
out to be fv;t//.t which is the only reality which does not 
have to be caused by something other than itseLf. Further-
more, those things which are dependent are not self-deter-
mining, but those which are independent are. 
On the other hand, for Aristotle, the cause required by 
things which are caused is necessary because of the logic and 
the facts of the situation. Since an infinite re~ress is to 
be avoided 1 he postulates the cause as uncaused. The words 
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substance,. substratum 1 essence,. and actuality, merely 
refer to names which with varying emphasis may apply 
to the cause 1 which is another way of defining the un-
.-,/, . I' 
moved mover. In fact, for Aristotle_, yt X-11 does not 
f 
function the same causally as it does for p·lato. Rather, 
7j/v~1 1 for Aristotle is itself an unmoved moveri for 
to posit a motion which moves itself merely raases the 
question one step further back: What moves that which 
moves itself? Thus that which does not have to be 
caused by something other than itself is that which does 
not move and never has or will move. Having affirmed 
the status of the :soul in these terms 1 he does not 
) / 
elaborate it. Nous and t:}:'f kTtl{ot/ are posited as 
I 
faculties which exhibit the situation of an unmoved mover, 
but the essential metaphysics of- the problem is avoided 
until he comes to the discussion of the nature of God 
and the First Cause. 
In the discussion of the First CauseJ the idea of 
there being many first causes and unmoved movers fades"' 
and the universe is left with one First Cause--God. As 
such 1 God is life and mind. He is 1 as the contemplator 
of himself and his perfection1 unmoved. To be unmoved 
is to contemplate perfection. Since it is the best 1 it 
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is unchangeable,. for to change it would be to make it 
something different from the best and therefore not the 
best. The unmoved is the knowledge of perfection which 
being perfect has nothing to move to. such knowledge 
excludes knowledge of evil or of anything less than the 
perfect. 
, 
Aristotle has thus not changed Plato 1 s view that 
evil in the world is not caused or willed; for 1 by defi-. 
nition all that is is caused by God as the unmoved mover 
from which evil has been excluded. Ultimately there is 
no other possibility pertaining to the good in its per-
fection than for God to know it. The final state is a 
state of knowing. In man this is the essence of his 
faculty of Nous moving the soul by its appetitive faculty 
which longs for the perfection found in the contemplation 
of the knowledge of the good. 
The Aristotelian doctrine of sUbstance may be ex-
pressed in the light of the logic of the syllogism. 
Actuality is both the first and final cause. As in the 
syllogism there is nothing in the end which was not in 
the beginning. There is nothing in the conclusion which 
was not in the major premise. The primal sUbstance is 
now and will be forever what it was in the beginning. 
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Looking at substance only~ it is difficult to see how 
to account for moral improvement or metaphysical change. 
Substance is the first cause. The soul is not in the 
first cause~ but the first cause or substance somehow 
moves the soul to make choices and thereby do right or 
wrong depending on whether the object chosen is good or 
evil. ' 
Aristotle•s view of substance results in several 
notions~ depending on the concept to which his view is 
applied. Applied to God 1 substance appears to mean 
"thought-thinking-itself." ;In this ~espect Plato and 
Aristotle do not disagree. Applied to man~" substance 
seems to mean that substratum which moves the aoul but 
which is itself as substratum not moved. At this point 
Plato and Aristotle differ where soul and the substratum 
differ. Plato would see no basis for positing a sub-
stratum. Applied to nature~ substance is the uncaused 
cause. Here again Plato and Aristotle would differ 
where Aristotle asserts a substratum which is uncaused 
but causal. Again, Plato would deny such a substratum. 
To understand what Aristotle means by such a notion as 
a substratum which causes,. without itself being a cause, 
clarification occurs (at least, for Aristotle) in the 
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understanding of the nature of motion. The description 
of motion means change. 'J'herefore to understand causation 
it is necessary to understand Aristotle•s view of the 
problem of change: matter and form. 
Matter and Form 
'X'he discussion of matter and form describes the 
process of change. In this respect Aristotle presupposes 
three kinds of substance: the matterJ the nature 1 and 
the particular composed of the two.l 'J'hese are also 
defined as (1) the sensible which is eternal; (2) the 
sensible which is perishable7 and (3) the immovable .. 2 
These are two different descriptions of the same aspects 
of .substance in which the second and third of the first 
list coincide with the third and second of the second 
list. 
In reference to immovable substance~ there is no prob-
lem of change. However, just as easily as the problem of 
change is eliminated in regard to the immovable, it is com,.... 
3 plicated in regard to sensible substance. In this respect 
1Aristotle1 Metaphysics, l070a,. 




he says1 "Everything that changes is something and: is changed 
by something into something. That by which it is changed is 
the immediate mOlTer; that which is changed, the :matter1 that 
into which it is changed, the form." 1 Matter is not of one 
kind. There are different kinds of matter. There is matter, 
for example, for ~enerationi there is matter for motion and 
apparently for any of the different kinds of changes involved. 
There are four kinds of changes: (1) generation and destruc-
tion, (2) alteration (quality), (3) increase and diminution 
(quantity), and (4) motion (location) .. 2 Furthermore, changes 
will be from given states to "contrary" states 1 and the mat-
ter must have within it the capacity to change from one o£ 
the states into the other. 
»Everything changes from that which is potentially to 
that which is actually. n 2 1tTherefore," he goes on ·to say 1 
"not only can a thing come to be, incidentallyf out of that 
which is not, but also all things come to be out of that which 
is, but is potentially, and is not actually."2 ln this re .... 
spect Aristotle denies that the proposition A is A is final. 
He is saying that if A is A were final, it would not be 
possible to explain: how A becomes B. Now A becomes B 1 because 
1:r:bid. 1 1069b-1070a~ 2Ibid. 1 l069b. 
B is already in A potentially. . Aristotle is thus again 
thinking the syllogism. It is not possible to £ind in the 
conclusion what was not somehow in the major premise. 
Matter, therefore,Jis a kind o.f raw material which con .... 
tains within itself all the potentialities o.f which it is 
capable. It is eternal and .thereby is not potentially non-
existent, although every other potentiality is in it .• l 
Now form is the state into which a thing passes. That 
state is its end toward which potentiality is diret::ted. This 
end or form into which a thing passes is whatj- as stated 
above, Aristotle means by actuality. The principle o£ 
individuation is found in the matter which assumes the state 
or form constitutive o£ an individual. ~urthermore, as 
cited above, actuality is prior to potentiality as .well as 
its end. Thus, change i.s the process whereby an individual 
becomes or turns into an actuality which was already potenti-
ally in its matter from all eternity. 
If this is the principle o£ change for all .events, the 
changes in, human nature will be on the same ground 1 but 
rooted in the faculties of the soul. 
1
.see Ibid. 1 1069b-1070a. The last £orm and matter are 
eternal. See also Ross.~·p. 174. 
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Faculties of the soul 
Although Aristotle has defined the soul~ the discussion 
of the soul in terms of its faculties develops from the need 
to explain its functions. The soul as substance provides a 
stop to the infinite regress of first causes. At the same 
time it provides a. stop at the end of the process of change. 
But to explain the wide variety of fu...11.ctions of the soul 1-
Aristotle devises the system of ordering the soul in terms 
of its faculties. These faculties are described on the basis 
of an ordering concept of increasing complexity. Thus at 
one.end ±here is the mdnimal soul which he describes as the 
nutritive soul and as one characterized by the faculty of 
nutrition. At the other end there is the rational soul. The 
more complex souls include all that is gathered up in the 
less complex just as the more complex geometric figures in-
elude all that is involved in figures beginning with the 
elemental triangle. 1 
Aristotle suggests that in listing the distinguishing 
parts·of the soul in terms of faculties or powers a very large 
number are d.iscovered. 2 There are several lists made in 
Aristotle of the faculties of the soul.. It is a cumbersome 
1
.Aristotle, De Anima, 4l4b. 2Ibid. 1 433b. 
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task to compose a list whilh may be regarded as £ully com ..... 
plete. It must be borne i mind that each time Aristotle 
sunrrnari.zes the situation a new classification and list re-
sults with a new set o:E pr Without getting into these 
abstruse difficulties 1 the factU.ties of the soul as variously 
listedl may be regarded as numerous.,. but of those with which 
Aristotle is most concerne 1 the following deserve to be 
mentioned: (1) nutritive- incl'Udingfeeding and reproductionr 2 
{2) sensitive--including t ,e £ive senses of taster touch, 
smell 1 sight, and hearingi3 (3) appetitive--including pleasure, 
painr wish, passion 1 and de ire; 4 (4) imaginative--including 
dreaming 1 Opining 1 remember 'ng .~ Or any form Of an image j 5 ( 5) 
perceiving--meaning the pow r o;E discrimination as applied to 
all t)?.e senses; 6 (6) .locomo iVe;...,,....,including bodily movements, 
lFor instance comparin the list in De Anima, 413b with 
414at 427a 1 and 433b 1 the f llowing are the results. 413b: 
(1) self-nutrition, (2) sen ation, (3) thinking, (4) motivity; 
414a: (1) nutritiVe 1 (2) a ~etitive~" {3) sensory, (4) loco-
motive, (5) thinking, 427a: (1) local movement/ (2), ·thinking 1 
(3) discriminating, (4) per eiving, 433b: (1) nutritive, (2) 
sensitive, (3) intellective (4) del:iJyerative 1 (5) appetitive-. 
2Ibid., 416b. 3 Ibid .. 1 417a-427b. 
4 Ibid., 433a and b. s e also 414b.. 5Ibid., 427b-428a. 
6Ibid"~ 417a. see alsl427b and Ross' 11 Sensus communis," 
Aristotle 1 pp. 138-l39. 
132 
pushing, pulling, turning~ etc~i 1 (7) reasoning--including 
thinking, especially as intuition, knowing.~ judging, calcu....,. 
lating, and spec~l~ting. 2 lt is important to recognize that 
this list is no complete enumeration o£ all the data. The 
attempt to harmonize the data is beyond the scope of the 
present study.3 
With the faculties so listed by Aristotle, the question 
o£ the unity of the soul may be resumed. The answer to this 
question is one o£ the most puzzling to Aristotle.4 He illus-
trates the dividing o£ the soul into parts by describing a 
plant a part of which may be cut, separated from the whole, 
but continue to live JTthough removed to a distance."4 
Aristotle promptly quali;fies this description of the soul 
as he affirms that all the parts of the soul (except Nous) 
are,. 11 in spite of certain statements to the contrary, incapa-
ble of separate existence though~" o£ course, distinguishable 
by definition."4 He seems to predicate unity on the concept 
lAristotle, De Anima, 433a and b. 2Ibid .. 1 429b-433b. 
3Fuller, pp. 185-198 1 names only three: vegetative, sensi-
tive, and rational.. Windelband, pp. 149-154.~ also names three: 
vegetatii7ie 1 animal, and reason. Ross, p. 129, lists five; (1) 
nutritive_, (2) sensitive, (3) imagination.r- (4) movement,. and 
(5) reason.. Any attempt to harmonize the many commentators 
such as Zeller 1 Jaeger, Cassirer.~ and the primary sources in 
Aristotle is not possible here. 
4De Anima, 413b. 
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a£ the parts being incapable o£ separate existence. Each 
part is united to the whole but functions separately as a 
faculty. There are two ways o£ observing the functioning o£ 
the parts: (1) as separate (though not separable) functions 
like the eyes and ears (parts) of the body (the whole)T or 
(2) as parts which are entireties interpenetrating the basic 
whole like the skeleton~ nervous system1 and circulatory sys-
tems {to ment~on a few) interpenetrating the body. Aristotle 
does not reject either description. Furthermorer each of the 
faculties produces alterations in two ways (l) by substitution 
a£ one quality for another or {2) by development from potenti-
ality in the direction o£ fixity or nature.1 Thus the £acul-
ties of.the soul are not the whole soul functioningt but are 
parts which function in themselves and are able to develop on 
-----~·--------
their own. For Aristotle.the soul"s P,ower to achieve its des-
tiny is a function o£ the soul 1 s faculties and not of the soul 
itself as a whole {as in Plato). The functions which are in,... 
valved in this aspect o£ the soul are considered in Aris-
totle 1 s ethics. It is at this point that the doctrine of the 
will begins to emerge. 
1 Ibid .. t 417b. 
The Study of the Ethics o£ the soul 
The search for Happiness 
Ethics for Aristotle is a matte~ of practical thinking. 
But practical thinking has a goal: "Every art and every 
investigation( and likewise every practical pursuit or under-
taking, seems to aim at some good: hence 1 it has been well 
said that the Good is That at which all things aim.n1 
Practical philosophy is the science of politics, of which 
ethics is a branch. The purpose o£ practical philosophy is 
to find the Supreme Good: 
If.t therefore, among the ends at which our actions aim 
there be one which we wish ;f:crr its:'own sake 1 while we 
wish the others only for the sake of this 1 and if we do 
not choose everything for the sake of someth±ng else 
(which would obviously result in a process ad infinitum~ 
so that all desire would be futile and vain)r it is clear 
that this-one ultimate End must be the Good, a.nd indeed 
the su.preme Good. Will not then a knowledge of this 
Supreme Good be also of great practical importance for 
the conduct of life? Will it not better enable us to 
attain what is ~tting.t -like archersh~g-.a~get-to 
r ___....__.... - ......... _ .. ~_._ .. _,,, ...... ~· ._...,. ... · .. ,.,~ ... ...-....... ~~-"··....., . ..,..,... . ..,"'"·······"~, .. , .. .,.,.,,.,~........ . ..,. -~~ .. __ ._.,..,._,...,_,_ ..... ~_.....,,._.,. .... -··· .... 
aim at?_ ... If this be so, we ought to make an attempt to 
determine at all events in outline what exactly this su-
pr~e Good is, and of which of the theoretical or practi-
cal sciences it is the object.2 
1Aristotle" Nicomachean Ethics, ed. T. E. Page, trans. 
H. Rackham (Cambridge: Harvard University Presst 1956), lG94a. 
2-Ibid. 1 l094b •. 
· I.3.a ·.~ 
According to Aristotle the highest of all the goods that 
action can achieve to 
) 
which the majority of mankind are agreed 
is £ v fi tit 1 ;tVt;t'l~. The proper rendering of this term as sug-
gested by RaCkham is well-being or prosperity~ but the trans-
lation must be Happiness. THe-reason for the difference be-
. ' 
tween the translation and the rendering is that Aristotle is 
not describing a state of feeling but a k.ind of activity. 1 
But the dldea of &Qod-for Aristotle is not "good in itselfn 
.and the cause of all other goods. 2 A trans-cendental good· has 
no practical use and would apply to both the absolute .and the 
relative as a category. At the same time there is a wide 
variety o;f possible definitions of the good. The good results 
in a plurality rather than a unity. Ar~stotle therefore p~o-
poses a new definition of the good: "Perhaps we may def;i,ne 
it as that for the sake of which everything else i~ done. 
This applies to something diff~rent in each different art."3 
Because this definition is not precise enough Aristotle offers 
a more comprehensive interpretation; 
Now there do appear to be several ends at which our 
actions aim; but as we choose soine of them--for instance 
-'~Ibid. ,. l095a. 2The Platonic yiew. 
3 Aristotle, .Nicomachean Ethics, 1097a. 
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wealth, or flutes 1 and instruments, generally--as a 
means to something else 1 it is clear that not qll of 
them are final ends; whereas the Supreme Good se~s to 
be something final. Consequently.~ if there be some one 
thing which alone is a final end 1 this thing--or if 
there be several final endsi the one among them which 
is the most final--will be the Good which we are seeking. 
In speaking of degrees of finality~ we mean that a thing 
pursued as an end in itself is moi;.e final than one pur-
sued as a means to something else 1 and that a thing never 
chosen as a means to anything else is more final than 
things chosen both as ends in themselves and as means 
to that end1 and .accordingly a thing chosen always as 
an end and never as a means we call absolutely final. 
~ow happiness above all else appears to be absolutely 
final in this sense, since we always choose it for its 
own sake 1 and never as a means to something else; whereas 
honor,. pleasure.t intelligence 1 and excellence in its 
various forms, we choose indeed for their own sakes 
(since we should be glad to have each of them although 
no extraneous advantage resulted from it), but we also 
choose them for the sake of happiness, in the belief 
that they will be a means to our securing it. But no 
one chooses happiness for the sake of honor.~ pleasuret 
etc. nor as a means to anything whatever other than 
itself. 1) 
The highest good is "never a means." It is always an 
end. The key to the nature of the highest good is found in 
the principle of self-sufficiency: 11 Happiness 1 therefore, 
being found to be something final and self-sufficient, is 
the End at which all actions aim·. n 2 
The, Elements of the Supreme Good And ~he Function of Man 
The struggle between the soul and its functions as parts 
2lbid._, l097b. 
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of the soul is no less intense in the search for the meaning 
of happiness. Aristotle declares that the good of man "re-
sides in the function of man.r if he has a function."l A 
human being has a certain function which is peculiar to him-
self 1 differentiating him from all his parts and all .. lower. 
forms of life. This function is called the practical life 
of the rational part of man 1 which has two divisions: (1) 
that which is obedient to principle and (2) that which po·s-
sesses principle in the sense of ezercising intelligence. 
Aristotle accepts this distinction between possessing the 
rational faculty and exercising it~ and defines the function 
of man as nthe active exercis.e of the soul • s faculties in 
conformity with rational principle.,. or at all events not 
in dissociation from rational principle.n 2 
For Aristotle happiness is the result of organizing 
the faculties of the soul. Happiness occurs.when a good man 
c-------·---------~····· .. ·······-··~··· ...... -----~ .. --,----~--~---
uses his soul•s faculties rightly: "The Good o£ man is the 
active exercise of his soul's faculties in conformity wit."IL 
ezcellence or virtue 1 or i± there be several human excellen-
ces or virtues, in conformity_with the best and most perfect 
among them. 112 
2Ibid.l l098a. 
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Aristotle is pleased that his definition agrees with 
the "current opinions on the subject 1 111 but he probes deeper 
by dividing good into three classes: {1) external goods, 
(2) goods of the soul 1 (3) goods of the body. 1 However 1 in 
each class happiness is an activity in conformity with vir-
tue11 the results o£ which are "essentially pleasant .. "2 
Happiness may depend on external advantages such as good 
birth 1 satisfactory children, and personal beauty, as well 
as wealth 1 friends 1 and political power.3 But the happiness 
which is won excels that which is divinely given or the re-
sult of fortune: 
But perhaps it is quite wrong to be guided in our 
judgment by the chances Of fortune, since true prosper-
ity and adversity do not depe~d on fortune 1 s favours 1 
although 1 as we said, our life does require these in 
addit.ion; but it is the active exercise of our faculties 
in conformity with virtue that causes happiness, and 
the opposite activities its opposite. 4 
Properly functioning faculties yield a happiness which 
is lasting: 
The happy man therefore will possess the element of 
stability in question, and will remain happy all his 
life; since he will be always or at least most often em-
ployed in doing and contemplating the things that are in 
conformity with virtue. And he will bear changes of for-
tunes most noblyr and with perfect propriety in every way 1 
being as he is. 'good in very truth• and 'four-square with-
out reproach. ' 4 
l;rbid., 1098b. 
4;rbid. 1 llOOb. 
2J:bid .. , 1099a. 3J:bid., 1099b. 
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Happiness endures adversity and a good man will always 
act nobly: 
Even in adversity nobility shines through, when a man 
endures repeated and severe misfortune with patience 1 
not owing to insensibility but from generosity and 
greatness of soul .. And if, as we said, a man's life is 
determined. by his activities 1 no supremely happy man 
can ever become miserable. For he wil~ never do hate-
ful or base actions 1 · since we hold that the truly good 
and wise man will bear all kinds of fortune in a seemly 
way 1 and will always. act in the noblest 'manner that the 
circumstances allow7 even.as a good general makes the 
most effective use of the forces at his disposal, and a 
good shoemaker makes the finest shoe possible out of 
the leather supplied him1 and so on with all the other 
crafts and professions .. And ·this being so, the happy 
man can never become miserable1 though it is true he 
will not be supremell blessed if he encounters the mis-
fortunes of a Priam. 
Thus happiness is "an end 1 something utterly and abso-
lutely final and complete. 112 It is a thing "honoured and 
perfect.n3 Furthermorer happiness based on goodness requires 
that man examine goodness in terms of human goods and human 
happiness. 
In making such an examination Aristotle accepts a cur-
rent teaching that the soul consists of two parts, one having 
no plan or principle, the other having a plan or principle. 4 




4xbid.j ll02a and b. 
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nature and which causes nutrition and growth. It was believed 
most active during sleep when the soul is neither good nor 
bad. The other aspect of the part which has no plan (i.e. i:s. 
not rational), "yet in a manner participates in the rational 
I / 
principle111 is the seat of appetite (£1ft.- 0VMIJ1t k!ov) and de-
. I 
) / 
sire :(o.ark!rlkOtl ).. The second part is Nous .. 
( 
This division of' the soul corresponds to a division in 
the notion of virtue. The virtues matching the two parts of 
the soul are intellectual and moral,. Examples of the intell-
ectual virtues are wisdom and pr.udence 1 examples of moral 
virtues are liberality and temperance. 2 The concepts of 
praise and blame are moral, rather than intellectual 1 for, 
"when describing a man•s moral character we do not say that 
he is wise or intelligent, but gentle or temperate1 but a 
wise man also is praised for his disposition 1 and praiseworthy 
dispositions we term virtues. 2 
The central question concerns how a soul as divided in 
function achieves the goal of acquiring virtues. which produce 
1 Ibid. r 1102b · 
2Ibid. 1 ll03a. In the translator 1 s note to this state .... 
ment Rackham says, "Throughout AristotleJs ethical works, 
praise and blame are the ordinary tests of virtue and vice.'' 
{Ibid., p. 69.) 
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happiness. The answer to this question in Aristotle embraces 
(1) the capacities or functions of the soul which produce 
virtue/ (2) the meaning of voluntary and involuntary acts 1 
and (3) the problem of respons.ibili ty .. 
Aristotle's conception of the functions of the soul which 
produce virtue involves only a brief review of intellectual 
virtue but an elaborate interpretation of moral virtue. The 
concepts related to moral virtue are habit and character 1 
the three of which deserve examination .. 
;J/ 
The £. b>o 5 
related to 
11} 
and h () o 5 pharacter) 
(Virtue) 
Intellectual virtue for Aristotle is produced and in-
creased by instruction and requires experience and time. 
) / 
Moral or ethical vir.tue cqo£ T h ) l however I is the product of 
)/ 
habit ( E~o-s ) • The virtues are not brought into human nature 
by nature. Nature has only the capacity to receive them and 
this capacity is matured by habit so that the end product of 
')1 1 
the habit of right action is a good character <n~os ) - The 
faculties of right action are in a potential form first. "We 
lXbid. See John Wild, Introduction to Realistic Philoso-
EhZ (New York: Harper & Brothers Publishers 1 1948), p. 58, 
for the interpretation of habit as "second nature" and hered-
itary characteristics as "first nature~" 
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exhibit their actual exercise afterward. 111 This aspect of 
human nature may be compared to other faculties and especi-
ally those pertaining to the senses. Man was bornr for ex~ 
ample 1 with the faculties of sight and hearing.. He was ·able 
to use them without first having to practice ... However.r be-
coming just is anol:.her matter... Man ;becomes just by doing 
just acts1 he learns to become temperate by doing temperate 
2 actsr brave by brave acts.~ etc~ But since his actions 
determine the quality of his dispositions how does he come 
to act rightly? 
To answer this question Aristotle sets down the formula, 
"to act in conformity with right principle. " 3 But such a 
formula for conduct is too general and thus necessarily in-
exact. A better formula must be postulated. Aristotle at-
tempts such a formula based on the principle that moral quali-
ties are "so constituted as to be destroyed by excess and 
defici.ency. n3 Where they may be destroyed by excess and de-
ficiency, they can be preserved by the observance of the mean .. 
The moral life is thus based·on a formal definition of virtue 
as a mean. This defintio~ for Aristotle 1 implies three states 
of the soul: (l) an emotion~ (2) a capacity 1 or {3) a disposition. 4 
2rbid., ll03b. 3 ;t)::>id. 1 1104a. 
4 . 
Ibid .. 1 ll05b .. 
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Emotions are such things as desire, anger, fear, joy, jealousy, 
pity, etc. 1 and may be characterized by those states of con-
sciousness which are accompanied by pleasure or pain. The 
capacities of the state of a soul are the faculties which 
make it possible for a person to be capable of feeling his 
emotions. And the dispositions are 
the formed states of character in virtue of which we are 
well or d:ll disposed in respect of the emotions, for in-
stance we have a bad disposition in regard to anger if 
we are disposed to get angry too violently or not vio-
lently enough, a good disposition if we habitually feel 
a moderate amount of anger and similarly in respect to 
other emotions .. l 
The soul becomes virtuous not by its emotions nor by its 
capacities to feel its emotions. The test of these 11 states" 
as creating virtue is whether praise or blame may apply to 
them. Aristotle avers that neither praise nor blame may 
apply to emotions nor the capacity to feel emotions. On the 
other handl the soul becomes virtuous as chod.:ce becomes in-
volved. These views are clearly expressed: 
The virtues and vices are not emotions because we are 
not pronounced good or bad according to our emotions 1 
but we are according to our virtues and vices1 nor are 
we either praised or blamed for our emotions--a man is 
not praised for being frightened or angry, nor is he 
blamed for being angry merely 1 but for being angry in a 
is 
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certain way--but we are praised or blamed for our vir-
tues and vices.. Again, we are not angry or afraid from 
choice, but the virtues are certain modes of choice, or 
at all events involve choice. Moreovert we are said to 
be 1 moved 1 by the emotions 1 whereas in respect of the' 
virtues and vices we are not said to be •moved 1 but to 
be•disposed 1 in a certain way. 
And the same considerations also prove that the vir-
tues and vices are not capacities1 since we are not pro-
nounced good or bad,. praised or blamed,. merely by reason 
of our capacity for emotion. Again, we possess certain 
capacities by nature, but we are not born good or bad by 
nature: of this however we spoke l:>efore .. l 
The key to thE? problem is in the third state. Virtue 
a settled disposition of the mind determining the choice 
(JlPo o/t-,c!/:([t.S ) of actions and emotions, consisting 
essentially in the observance of the mean relative to us, 
this being determined by principle,. that is, as the pru-
dent man would determine it.2 
\ / 
To ,U £(ToY (The Mean) 
If virtue is the habit of observing the mean determined 
by prudence~ the concept of the mean is of utmost ~portance. 
Observing the mean includes discovering the middle point 
....... / "' :J,/ ( To J,J£o-o 11 ) between extremes (/q' <Xtr'Pq ) • The first rule 
I I . 
is to avoid the extreme which is more opposed to the mean. 
The second rule is for the individual to examine his own 
nature and to note the manner in which that nature is warped 
2Ibid. 1 ll07a ... 
/ 
~45_ 
and to drag himself away from the besetting error thus com-
pensating for his inner distortion. 1 The result will be that 
sometimes the individual will lean to the side of excess and 
sometimes to the side of deficiency, but even though there 
seems to be a wide latitude in such conduct 1 by so doing he 
will find that "this is the easiest way of hitting the mean 
and right course.n2 
The soul, thus 1 has a faculty whose task is to choose 
the mean between extremes. This faculty is so assessed by 
the te:at that it may be praised or blamed. The criterion of 
praise or blamer for Aristotle 1 raises first the question of 
the willingness of one~s actions and second the question of 
responsibility. 
c I ) I 
E k Q v <1 1- Dt/ (willing)1 -o{ I! oven Ot/ 
and o-0r·.! ,;,~oG frl ov (not willing) 
(against the will)~ 
;In the third book of the Ethics Aristotle measures the 
question of moral responsibility in terms of the voluntary 
and involuntary aspects of onets actions: 
Virtue is concerned with emotions and actions 1 and it 
is only voluntary actions for which praise and blame are 
given1 those that are involuntary are condoned, and 
sometimes even pitied. Hence it seems to be necessary 
for the student of ethics to define the difference be-
tween the Voluntary here and the Involuntary1 and this 
will also be of service to the legislator in assigning 
rewards and punishments. 2 
2Ibid. 1 1109b. 
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The terminology which Aristotle uses here is not very differ-
ent from Plato•s. However he consistently uses the term 
c I ) ! 
£/<'o Vo-t-ov' to mean voluntary and ex tf.JDV(fL DV to mean involun-
_1 / 
tary. Accordingly" Rackham suggests that p(h!()vcr 1 ov suggests 
unwilling or against the will which is what eventually Aris-
-y 
totle limits it to. Aristotle introduces the negative 6ut< 
( , 
l!iA!6VcJf ov' to mean not voluntary or not willing 1 which is 
used to describe acts'done in ignoran:oe of their full ci~cum-
stances and consequences and thus not willed .. in the full sense 
of the word. The significant etymological considerations 
~:_ I 
are pertinent. The form (tt!ova:-c.-ov is based on two Greek words 
( } ' 
{j,; and o v<JL~ • [J.c( is the preposition which can mean 
=>I 
either nout of" or nutterly" (meaning completeness). o·I)&Lg 
) /" 
is the noun form of the verb ELluL "to be~ It . and as the 
I I 
noun is translated'su'bstance' or ''that which is one•s own." Thusr 
literally'speaking 1 an act is voluntary if it is "utterly 
) / 
that which is one• s own" and Q(Jeo\Jrr:uJt{ "involuntary" when 
it is "not one which is utterly that which is . one 1 s own." 
Involuntary acts are those done (a) under compulsion or 
(b) through ignorance.l "An act is compulsory when its ori-
gin is from without., being of such a nature that the agent 1 
1 :rbid.t lllOa. 
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who is really passive, contributes nothing to it." 1 Aris .... 
totle uses the illustration of a cargo jettisoned in a storm. 
He says that no one voluntarily throws away his property". but ... 
in order to save his own life and the liVes of his shiplliates 1 
a sane man would do so. such ac.ts .are mixed.~ and are more 
like voluntary actions than involuntary ones, because "at the 
:? / 
actual time when they are done they a;r::e chosen ( 9"t:....P £ w ) ,. n l 
I 
The factor determining an act's voluntariness is seen 
in that 
the end~ of an act varies with the occasion* so that the 
terms 'voluntary• and tinvoluntary• should be used with 
reference to the time of the action; now the actual deed 
in the cases in question is done voluntarily 1- for the 
origin of the movement of the parts of the 'body instru-
mental to the act lies in the agent; 3 and when the ori .... 
gin of an action is in one•s selfc~ it is in one•s own 
power to do it or not. such acts therefore are voluntary~ 
though perhaps involuntary apart ·from circumstances--for 
no one would choose to do any such action in and for 
;Ltself.l 
Aristotle has thus found it necessary to acknowledge the 
role of Plato• s J/!vy.t{ as self ..... motion :but he assigns that 
role to part of the soul as one of its functions. However1 
before exploring the limits of these concepts in :Plato and 
Aristotle 1 it would seem to be rewarding to continue to fol,..... 
low the course of Aristotle 1 s argument. 
" 2 T£,\os 




Aristotle illustrates what he means by ra~ating choice 
to praise or blame. If a person submits to pain or disgrace 
in order to achieve a great or noble result 1 he is praised. 
Such an instance would be a case of an intrinsically involun-
tary action where a given alternative as a result of a given 
set of circumstances is deliberately chosen, even though the 
ori~in o.U the choice lies in the agent. Though the actions 
are regarded as intrinsically involuntary, nevertheless 1 they 
are voluntary because the agent preferred the alternative. 1 
Such actions are tied to the question of praise or 
blame: 
It is absurd to.blame external thingsr instead of blam-
ing ourselves for falling an easy prey to their attrac-
tion] or to take the credit of our noble deeds to our-
selves while putting the blame £or our disgraceful ones 
upon the temptations of pleasure. 1 
In addition to the acts which are intrinsically involun-
tary, there are those done through ignorance. Aristotle says 
that 
an act done through ignorance is in every case not vol-
untary12 but it is involuntary3 only when it causes the 
agent pain and r.egret since a man who has acted through 
ignorance and feels no compunQt.ion at all for what he 
has done cannot indeed be said to have acted voluntarily 
as he was not aware of his actionr yet cannot be said to 
have acted involuntarily! as he is not sorry for it. 1 
lN;,·comachean Ethics., lllOb. 
J C I 
2 01/f'< e/t(f.>t)fTLOV. 3 ) I ~ t< ova-t-o J/. 
1.4:$ .. · .· 
) ( . /' 
The distinction between acts which are O)Ji./ £/.!O'Vf:"IOt) 
) ,/ 
and those which are q kDVcrt ov' is clear. .An act is not vol-
untary (negation) if it is not willed. It is involuntary 
(opposition) if the act is done against the agent's will.l 
Thus~ if in acting through ignorance an agent regrets the act~ 
it is considered tha.t he acted involuntarily. If he does n,ot 
regret it 1 it is a non-voluntary :situation and the person 
has acted in ignorance~ whereas·±n the involuntary situation 
he has acted through ignorance. .An act conuni tted when a man 
is drunk or in a rage is one done in ignorance. However 1 if 
he regrets it 1 it is clearly done nagainst his will" and is 
therefore involuntary: 
Now ·it is true that all wicked men are ignorant of what 
they ought to do and re£rain from doing and that this 
error is the cause of injustice and of vice in general. 
But the ter.m involuntary does not really.apply to an 
action when the agent is ignorant of his true interests. 
The ignorance that makes an act blamewort;hy is not ig-
norance displayed in moral choice (that sort of ignor-
ance constitutes vice)~-that is to say1 it is not general 
ignorance {because that is held to be blameworthy) 1 bu,t 
particular ignoranceJ ignorance of the circumstances of 
the act and of the things affected by iti for in this 
case the act is pitied and forgiven 1 because he who acts 
in ignorance of any of these circumstances is an invol-
untary agent.2 
lNicomachean mthics, lllOb. 
2Ibid. , lllOb-lllla; 
·.·-;r:.· .. ',·-
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Aristotle counts the circumstances referred to ~pecif-
ically as being six. They are (1) the agent 1 (2) the act, 
(3) the thing that is affected by or is the sphere of the 
act, (4) the instrument~ (5) the effect, and (6) the manner. 1 
Any one of these may be the circumstance or occasion for 
establishing that an act is involuntary. Of more importance 
is the nature of a voluntary action. 
Whereas an involuntary aytion is one done under compul-
sion or through ignorance 1 a voluntary action is one which 
/ 
Choice (/ffo6C5LP£<:ri.S) differs originates in the agent. 
ll( I 
.from a voluntary action which is 1 as has been said,. more gen.-
eral,. Choice involves reasoning and some process of thought 
/.{ 
and is therefore preceded by deliberation ( }3 ov A£Vrr1 S ) • 
I 
Choice is not opinion ( s:tcr )1 nor wish ( £3o;;d£o-1.5) .r nor 
? I 
desire (ElJ:_Lf!?-WJ;~ ),. nor passion ( fJvt)o/s ). 2 
I I I 
Aristotlets Conception of the Will as Choosing 
/ c r 
The will (cKova=tq ) as choosing 'l/f0Cfrarl5) 
( / 
voluntary actions ( Et:6vo:tq ) in the wider range of 
differs from 
that choice 
is a voluntary act which includes deliberation. At the same 
3 
time 1 not every voluntary act is chosen. The difference is 
1Ibid~r lllla. 2Ibid. r llllb-lll2a. 3 Ibid. 1 lll2a. 
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that which exists between those actions which originate in 
the agent and those which he chooses. Activities which can-
not be affected by the agent are not deliberated upon and 
therefore even though they may be voluntary, they are not 
obj.ects of choice .. 1 Deliberation is employed in matters 
which, though sUbject to rules that generally hold good are 
uncertain in their issue. 2 For Aristotle to will an action 
is to be the originator or ag.ent of .it. But to choose an 
action includes deliberation on the possibility or means of 
accomplishing the contemplated action involving desire 
? / / 
c op c Krt ;~ otJ ) 1 deliberation (.Po v'A.c V C)l . .S )I selection 
( 
(lrj.o,;t:u/ =to decide) and finally "fixing our desire" 
} !' .• 
( ()pE Y vU = yearn for or· grasp at); 
( I 
It appears therefore, as has been said 1 that a man 
is the origin of his actions 1 and that the province of 
deliberation is to discover actions w'.ithin one's own 
power to performy and all our actions aim at ends other 
than themselves. It follows that we do not deliberate 
about ends, but about means. Nor yet do we deliberate 
about particular factst for instance 1 Is this object a 
loaf? or~' Is this loaf properly baked? for these are 
matters of direct perception. Deliberation must stop 
at the particular fact, or it Will embark on a process 
ad infinitum. 
The object of deliberation and the object of choice 
are the same, except that when a thing is chosen it has 
already been determined 1 since it is the thing already 
2Ibid. 1 lll2b. 
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selected as the result of our deliberation that is cho-
sen. For a man stops inquiring how he shall act as soon 
as he has carried back the origin o£ action to himselfr 
and to the dominant part of himself.~ for it is this part 
that chooses. This may be illustrated'by the ancient 
constitutions represented in Homer: the kings used to 
proclaim to the people the measures they had chosen to 
adopt .•. 
As then the object o£ choice is something wll.t.hin our 
power which after deliberation we desire~' Choice will be 
a deliberate desire.of:things in our power, for we first 
deliberate~' then select~' and finally fix our desire ac-
cording to the ·result of our deliberation~ 
Let this serve as a description in outline of Choice" 
and of the nature of its objects.,- and th6 fact that it 
deals with means to ends ... l . 
Aristotle appears to be tying his concepts together 
looselyJ fort on the one hand he has stated that it is the 
dominant part of-man that chooses~ lthis- dominant part would 
ordinarily be taken to be reason, but on the other hand he 
defines choice as "deliberate des-ire~" Deliberation refers 
chiefly to any act o£ thought or reason which is required by 
the circumstances involved in the choice. At the same time 
he has maintained that choice refers to means, but as purpose 
it also chooses ends other than those found in the actions 
themselves. Choices have to do with means whereas wishes are 
for ends .. 1 But a desire 1 even a deliberative desire 1 is not 
just for a means but for the end. Aristotle escapes endangering 
1 Ibid. ~' 1113 a. 
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. ',' 
his consistency hy pointing out that the act of choosing or 
willing does not accomplish the result .. \Choosing is aimed 
rather. at the means and not at the end. If a man wants bread 
. he does not will the bread.. He rather wills to close the gap 
between himself as he is and the object of his desire by 
instituting the means whereby the gap may be closed .. 
The discussion of the nature of voluntary actions has 
thus led to the conclusion that. in Aristotle {1) an act is 
voluntary or willed if it originates in a man, (2) an act is 
chosen i£ itis a voluntary act involving deliberate desire .. 
Aristotle"s division qf the soul into parts appears 
clearly in the discussion of the "part that chooses .. " Though 
the dominant part of man, it is not the whole of man which 
chooses* Like the kings in a Homeric epic poem~ the function 
of the dominant part is to choose and then to proclaim to all 
.. 
the other parts the choices as made~ ,A choice originates in 
the agent (as will) and after ·the ·obJect has been selected 
and the means of achieving the object has been determined, 
the agent fixes his desires on the achieving of the object. 
It follows that j1.1.13t as in Harrier better choices are made 
by better kings 1 so in man better choices are made by improv-
i.ng the faculty of choice. ·Therefore, in Aristotle the doc-
trine of soul 1 as divided 1 has been made to give birth to a 
~54 
will as a part of the soul. The parts of the soul may be 
treated as the parts of the body. The unity of the soul,. as 
the Unity of the body,. is that the parts cannot exist inde-
pendently of the whole. 
However 1 the distinction between Plato and Aristotle is 
·crucial·. lt is the distinction between the soul functioning 
as a whole and the soul functioning by dele~ting its powers 
to its parts. 'l'he question of whether theparts are not just 
;t:aculties of the whole,. but interpenetrating souls cannot be 
answered here,. All that can be said with certainty is what 
has been said above; namely, that the soul of man is somehow 
divided so that the will as choice becomes a function as part 
of the whole. Aristotle cannot overlook the doctrine of self-
determination as basic to agency. Self-determination or agency 
is not the essence of Aristotle 1 s view of the soul but merely 
the factor which assigns responsibility to man for his actions. 
As responsible, man does what he does because of his choosing 
which is a faculty responsible for choice. 
The doctrine of the will is 1 for Aristotle, a presuppo-
sition of" his interest in assigning praise}' blame,. and respon-
sibility. In fact, as may be recalled, he had made praise and 
blame the distinctive test of the voluntariness of an act. 
Light may therefore be shed on the nature of the will when 
1.55 
detailed consideration is given to the question of responsi-
bility. 
Praiser Blame/ and Responsibility 
Xn order to explain what is involved in a situation of 
praise or blame and responsibility Aristotle shifts from his 
I 
use of E./(olJcrL<I) to the use of a dative of pos.session with 
;J / 
Et- /1..1 t-. The importance of the origination. of. an act and its 
I 
choice is not lost in the least by this different form. 
Instead there is thereby introduced the element of the will 
as that which is •rwithin our powe:~;" and therefore "free"~ 
He says: 
If then whereas we wish for our·end 1 the means to our 
end are matters of deliberation and choice, it follows 
that actions dealing with these means are done by choice, 
and voluntary. But the activities in which the virtues 
are exercised deal with means~ Therefore 1 virtue also 
depends on ourselves. And so also does vice. For where 
we are free to act we are also free to refrain from act-
ing 1 and where we are able to sa.y No 1 we are also able to 
say Yes; if therefore we are responsible for dving a 
thing when to-do it is right, we are also responsibl,e 
for not doing it when not to do it is wrong, and if we 
are responsible for rightly not doing a thing 1 we are 
also responsible for wrongly doing it~ But if it is in 
our power to do and to refrain from doing right and 
wrong 1 and if 1 as we saw, being good or bad is doing 
right or wrong 1 it consequently depends on us whether 
we are virtuous or vicious. ~ •• it is true that no one 
is unwilling to be blessed but not true that wickedness 
is involuntar:u or else we must contradict what we now 
just asserted and say that man is not the originator and 
begetter of his actions as he is of his children. But 
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if it is manifest that a man is the author of his actions 1 
and if we are unable to trace our conduct back to any 
other origins than those within ourselves, then actions 
of which the origins are within us 1 themselves depend 
upon us, and are voluntary .1 · 
The value of this conclusion for Aristotle is applied 
to men•s behavior in private life and to the practice of the 
lawgivers/ particularly with resp~ct to the matter of punish-
ing those who do evil except when done under compulsion or 
through ignorance. Those who do noble deeds are honored and 
encouraged. But nNobody tries to encourage us to do things 
that do not depend upon ourselves and are not voluntaryl -since 
it is no good our being .:r;>ersuaded not to feel heat or pain or 
hunger or the .like, because we shall feel them all the same." 1 
Even when an act is done through ignorance, Aristotle 
wishes to establish the basis for praise or blame. He says 
if the cause of the ignorance is within the area of the man•s 
ability to choose 1 then he is subject to punishment. Thus~ 
£or exa:fnpl,.e 1 if a person allows himself to become intoxicated 
and thereby commits an evil 1 he is held responsible because 
he has had it within his power to create the conditions which 
caused him to perform an evil act. "If a man kriowingly acts 
1Ibid. 1 lll3b. 
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in a way that will result in his becoming unjust~ he must be 
said to be voluntarily unjust."l Aristotle wants to make 
man responsible for his voluntary evil acts. To do this he 
does not refrain from critici.zing Plato: "No~ only are vices 
of the soul voluntary· b'ut in some cases bodily defects are 
f'lO as well, and we blame them accordingly." 1 Arif'ltotle 
points out that bodily defects, which ordinarily may be re .... 
garded as involuntary1 may in f'act be the results of debauch ...... 
ery or some other avoidabl,e act on the part of the perspn and 
therefore blameworthy. Aristotle is adamant on this point 
because unless the matter o.f voluntariness is asserted vir-
tue and vice become indistinguishableA 
"/ 
More specifically choice '(#oa.~,,.a.ta-t~) becomes the basis 
/ I l . 
for prescribing the consequences of an act (praise or blame) 
and therefore the grounds for the dif;ferentiation between the 
moral aspects of good and evil acts. The term referring to 
c ,. 
the voluntariness of actions or the will ( 2t!ov<JL(}\ ) is the 
one most frequently used by Aristotle to expresf'l the basis 
for the causal agent (responsibi.li ty) • 2 , On this basis and 
in opposition to Plato he emphasizes the fact. that both vice 
and virtue are voluntary in exactly the same way. But 
1Ibid. , lll4a. 2Ibid. I· lll4b.; 
·iris· 
voluntariness is a kind ofspontaneity {self,.....dependence)l in 
man1 s actions, even if not in his choice of an end; for, both 
our virtues and our vices are voluntary in the same manner. 2 
To illustrate this asp.ect 1 it is helpful to consider 
specific virtues or vices such as courage or -cowardice. 3 He 
defines these virtues in terms of right action as does l?lato 
and affirms the need for alJ.,egiance to that which principle 
dictates and that £or the sake of what is noble, which is the 
end at which virtue aims.4 However 1 he emphasizes avoiding 
extremes by observing the mean, and the intrinsic value of 
each virtue. 
Courage, a.s a virtue, wouid be the observance of a mean 
rationally estabJ;,ished between two extremes. The two extremes 
for courage would be fear at one end and confidence at the 
other. 5 
The fear of death is the proper test of courage and 
that man is courageous who fl£earlessly confronts noble death." 4 
When we fear what we ought not to fear or in the wrong manner 
) / 
1 ()1 7[r o v: Translated spontaneity by ;Rackham. It tends 
to refer to the origin of the act in the agent. 
2Nicomachean Ethics, lll4b. 
4 . ' 
Ibid., lll5b. 
3Ibid. I lll5b-ll.l9b. 
5 Ibid., ll.l5a. 
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or at the wrong time, we err. 1 When we fear the right things, 
for the right purposes and in the right way at tl:J.e right time 
we exhibit courage,. "rhe determinants J?ertain to ends and 
establish merit. In fact "every activity aims at the end 
that corresponds to·the disposition of which it is the mani~ 
festation." 1 
The excesses( in the~extremes of cour~g:e, are rashness 
and cowardice. The ~ash man is the one who exceeds in con-
fidence making a bold shoW'.but- in reality not enduring ter .... 
rors. 1 The cowarq is the' despt>ndent person who has excessive 
fear to the extent of fearing everything,.2 But there is still 
more to courage"' 
Courage in its truest sense is a mean as described. How-
ever~ in practice t.I;t-ere is, first., political courage--the wish 
for honor and the shunning o:£; disgrace. Secondly, there is 
the Socratic view of courage a~ knowledge of what is formid-
able and what is not. such courage is based on the advantages 
of experience as in professional soldiers who will fight only 
if they have the advantag.e. Thirdly, there is the· courage 
which is spurred on by anger, wrath, or spirit. It is like 
the wild beast who though wounded rushes against the hunters. 
].Ibid. t 1115b. 2;rbid. ~ _1116a. 3 Ibid., 1117a. 
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When this kind of courage is reinforced by deliberate choice 
and purpose, it may become true courage.1 FourthlY~: there 
is the courage o£ sanguinity. somewhat l~ke the courage of 
knowledge or experience 1 the courage o£ the sanguine is con-
fident or has a fixed disposition of success and because of 
a long history of victory is not surprised by danger but is 
calm~y calculative in the face of sudden peril. ~inally 1 
there is the courageof ignorance in which the individual 
appears couragemus but only because he is unaware of any 
dangers which may be encountered .. 
The virtue of courage, therefore, exc~:U~ently illustrates 
the principle that "every activity aims at the end that cor-
responds to the disposition o£ which it is a manifestation. 112 
A careful examination o£ the virtue of courage also reveals 
its volunta:rinesst It is an act·of an agent~ But the habits 
and character of the agent will determine the way in which 
the virtue is expressed. 
• 0 
Courage also exemplifies the principle that sometimes 
a course o£ action chosen 11 against one•s willf! may illustrate 
a high degree-of moral goodness. 'J;lhe choice is made in re,..... 
sponse to the higher of two Pl:."inciples. 




This maybe illustrated when being coru;ageous is not 
pleasant but may in £act be the occasion for pain. In such 
a caset courage is a virtue not because it is essentially 
pleasant but because of the quality ofachie'Vement~ In ;fact, 
the pl.easure may be only that of attaining the end and not 
o£ enjoying the experiences required to achieve the end. 
Thus a boxer endures the pain o£ the blows, but takes great 
pleasure in the victory. ·In such a situation courage is 
justly praised as virtuous. When a man is courageous in the 
£ace o£ pain he is so against bis will, but £or the sake o£ 
doing what is noble and avoiding what is base he endures the 
pain to achieve excellence. To perform such actions is a 
matter o£ moral goodness and therefore is an act o£ choice: 
the will deliberately desiring or preferring one course o£ 
action as right over ~gaihst another as wrong. 
Zeller points out that £orAristotle moral responsibil-
ity is the test o£ the voluntariness of a manls action. In 
turn 1 the voluntariness becomes "the distinguishing mark o£ 
the practi.cal as ·Opposed to the theoretic li£e.n1 Zeller 
disregards the distinction between willing and choosing/ but 
rightly joins th~lmoral and theoretical aspects o£ the soul 
1zeller, II, p. l59. · 
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in the will: . "The ultimate source o£ moral action is the 
rational desire or will 1 and the most essential property of 
will is the freedom with which it decides between sensual 
and rational impulses."1 When freedom so disposed has become 
07 
second nature by habit or custom 1 ( 4 $ o s), morality is 
per£ect~d. 2 
Taylor.also ignores the distinction between willing and 
choosing and points out the same important elements o£ moral 
action as does Zeller. 11Will is a process which has both an 
intellectual and an appetitive element. The appetitive ele-
ment is our wish for some result. The intellectual factor 
is the calculation o£ the steps by which that result may be 
obtained."3 For Taylor 1 however.~ responsibility does not 
arise £rom the mere £act that there is freedom to choose be-
· tween alternatives, but £rom the fact of choice as agency and 
therefore causal. 
Will may ibhu~;Lbe defined as the deliberate appetition 
of somethingwithin our power 1 and the very definition 
shows that our choice is an efficient cause of the acts 
we choose to do. This is why we rightly regard men as 
responsible or answerable for their acts of choice, 
good and bad alike.3 
lxbid. 1 p. 160. 
2rbid./ See John Wild, Realistic Philosophy, Chapts. 
II & III. 
3Taylor, Aristotle, p. 96. 
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- -~·-~-:- -.r-~-~. ~---::--:-~;~""'· .., .•~""'·· .. 7 ;;--"-'""~~'ili-• r;;;.~~t'"~~""--,'iii<i~~-*~:!:mwm.~~~.-ii!i.~=-.f1N4•;_~.;-·ii __ ~~.~~il'!i;~~~i!i~s;:.;.;·;t;;:;_f!~=-:!i":~ ..:?~~~~~illi ... r:~"7 .. "'!'
. :-::: ·~ ~-./ . . . -"· ·: . 
1.65 
The distinction made by Taylor is significant in order to 
understand Aristotle's view. Responsibility iS not determined 
or -based on the power of choice as free. Responsibility is 
based on the acts o£ choice as causal.l 
Moral responsihili ty defined on the basis of acts 1' in 
one's powern leads Ross to oheerve AristotleJs opposition to 
socrates (and Plato): 
Virtuous actions being not only voluntary but in accord-
ance with cP.oice·, it follows that virtue and vice are in 
our own power. socratest saying~ 1 No man is willingly 
badr' is untrue unless we are prepared to say that man 
is not the sourc·e and begetter of actions. 2 
But just as virtuous actions (though voluntary) are de-
~ermined by habits and character 1 so also is vice. Vice may 
become second nature, though originally a matter of moral 
choice. "It was in.the power of the vicious man not to become 
vicious! hut it does not follow that he can now cease to he so." 2 
The doctrine of responsibility has there£ore demonstra.-
/ 
ted that the voluntariness or wi.ll ( c/(o lJ(Tf OLI) of an action 
is equivalent in ·Aristotle to that which is the source, origi ..... 
nation 1 or begetting agency of the action. That such a will 
or act of voluntariness points merely to the agency and 
lsee Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, lll3b. 
2Ross, p. 196. 
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therefore incJ.udes acts which are not free car.i.not be disputed 
"- / 
since E" k'o 'V~t.,ov applies to those situations which are not 
free (such as in children and animals). But responsibility 
for action, in Aristotle,. leaves room for the principle that 
the choice is free (the ability to say yes or no to an action; 
to accept or reject a mode of behav:ior 1 to accept or reject 
possible alternatives). 
Ross points out that Aristotle's doctrine o;E responsi ...... 
bility as meaning 11 actions within our power" in the sense of 
the opposite of "impossible to usn ~s the nearest he comes 
. 1 to a doctrine of free will. ,It has been clearly shown tha,t 
. -p / 
the use of the dative of possession with [LJLAL expresses , 
for Aristotle the conc.ept of .responsibility as meaning 11 A.ctions 
belonging to us as·agents.n To reduce the meaning of this 
concept to one of responsibility for what is possibl.e is at 
this point a distortion of Aristotle. However, Ross• evalua-
tion of Aristotle's doctrine. o£ :Eree wil.l {excepting the 
above qualification) cannot be treated lightly. 
The following points are iln];>ortant in Ross 1 appraisal of 
Aristotle 1 s · doctr.ine of free will: 
(1.) The doing of a particular act foll.ows necessarily 
1:rbid. t p. 194 • 
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from the apprehension of the appropriate premises.l This 
point is illustrated by Ross in the statement, "!f every-
thing that is sweet ought to be tasted, and this particular 
object is sweet~" a man who can taste it and is not prevented 
·must forthwith do so."1 _This proposition is not too far re .... 
moved from Plato's view that ethical principles and actions 
must be consistent~PlatoJ-·however~. applied his view to his 
perfectionist doctrine of knowl.edg.e as virtue. 
(2) Character, once established cannot be changed at 
will. !t is based on the notion of virtue founded on habit 
and character .. l 
(3) Voluntariness is distinguished from 'freedom,of the 
will- 1 Freedom ofthe. will is choice. Vol.untariness is agency .. 
Ross 1 however 1 di.screa,i ts. 'Aristotle • s doctrine of free 
wil.f.. in saying that Aristotle merely '1 shared the plain man' s 
belief in free will but he did not examine.the problem very 
thoroughly.,." 1 !t is in keeping with :Ross 1 s evaluation of 
Aristotler therefore 1 to point out that the doctrine of re-
sponsibility caused Aristotle to posit the plain man1 s belief 
in free will in order that praise and blame could be assigned • 
. A.. lL Taylor suggests a more plausible explanation for 
Aristotlets conception of the will. Taylor proposes that 
Aristotle's view is based more on the doctrine of goodness 
than on the need to asse::s responsibility. He declares that 
Aristotle is led to consider the relation of will to conduct 
because the reference to will or choice was introduced into 
the definition of goodness of character., Thus Aristotlels 
main object is to escape the paradoxical doctrine which 
superficial students might derive from the works of 
Plato, that wrongdoing is always well~eaning ignorance. 
Aristotle•s point is that it is the condition of will 
revealed by men 1 S act which is the real object of our 
approval or blame. This is because in voluntary action 
the man himself is the efficient cause of his act,. Hence 
the law recognizes only two grounds on which a man may 
plead that he is not answerable for what he does. (1) 
Actual physical compulsion by force majeure. (2) .Ignor-
ance, not due to the man's own previous negligence, of 
some circumstances material to the issue.l 
Taylor has thus made the interesting point that Aris-
totle's view of the will is that man as agent is responsible 
for the condition of his will as revealed by his actions. 
According to Taylor, therefore, the wrong act would be proof 
of .a wrong choice made on the wrong grounds. 
Responsibility for an action stems from the agent as 
cause. Praise (approval) or blame (disapproval) is based on 
whether the action is right or wrong and therefore not on the 
1 Taylor, Aristotle 1 p. 96. 
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mere fact that the choice was free. Thus two ideas emerge: 
(1) Voluntariness for Aristotle means a will or agency and 
a will or agency which can do or refrain from doing right or 
wrong is free. Thus responsibility means that the agent as 
the cause of his acts is answeraPle £or them. (2) When the. 
agent acts to do right, he may be approved and praised as 
virtuous; when the agent acts to do wrong he may be dis~-
proved and blamed as wicked. But the conditions .af the ageht 
which result in righter wrong actions when he knows good and 
evil and is free to choose between them are the basic factors 
in moral behavior and therefore subject to praise or blame .. 
Thus in orc;ier to dEhst.il:n9'uish between right and wrong 
action 1 it is presupposed that the agent exercises the power 
of moral choice. The problem• of moral choice is the problem 
~· . . 
of the will as free. The problem involves what.determines 
right action when the will is free~ This leads to the prob-
lem o£ voluntariness as the problem of the will as cause or 
agent. In order to bring the meaning,o£ the will into 
clearer fo:t!i!ASr the deve'lopment of the doctrine of the will 
in these two senses warrants attention. 
The Problem of Free Will and.the Problem of Causality 
In the sixth book of the Ethics Aristotle discusses the 
:~ 
j ' r; ~~ 
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( intellectual virtues and the right principle which determines ) 
- the mean for moral virtue 1 and makes the central point which· 
excellently indicates his position both with regard to caus-
ality and also with reference to the function of the will and 
the meaning of moral action. In the area of free will or 
moral desire is found that function of the ~oul which Aristotle 
has referred to as deliberate desire~ Zeller directs atten~ 
tion to the developments which take place when desire becomes 
deliberate. If desire spr;i.ngs from: rational reflection~' it 
is practical or deliberative reason. If the desire is ir-
rational 1 it retains ihs name as desire. 1 nnesire which is 
guided by reason Aristotle~' with Plato~' calls Will in the 
narrower sense of the word 1 appropriating the name desire to 
its irrational exercise.';2 Desire in this latter sense stands 
in a twofold relation to reason. When it submits to it 1 it 
obtains a share in it. However 1 when it resists the demands 
of reason, it often overpowers those demands. 
Eetween these two kinds of impulse stands man with his 
free will; for that we are the authors of our own actions, 
and that it lies in our own power to be good or badt is 
Aristotle • s firm conviction1 which he supports by the 
recognized voluntariness of virtue, and by the.moral re .... 
sponsibility which is presupposed in legislation and in 
judgment universally passed in rewards and punishments 1 
praise and blamet exhortation and warning. 3 
lzeller 1 pp. 112-113. 
3 Ibid., pp. 114~116. 
2Ibid." pp. 113 ..... 114. 
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The free will described by Zeller is the freedom of the 
soul as a who~e, as the agent responsible for his actions. 
. . 
At the same time 1 Aristotle seems to say that the faculties 
of the soul·also are free. Desire and Intellect are so con-
ceived. Aristotle says 1 npursuit and avoidance in the sphere 
of Desire correspond to affirmation and desire in the sphere 
of the lntellect,. 11 J.. 
Given the freedom of the faculties; Aristotle grapples 
with the problem of determining .the procedure for making 
choices which re~ult in right actions: 
,Inasmuch as moral virtue is a disposition of the mind 
in regard to choice, and choice is deliberate desire 1 
it follows thatt if the choice is to be goodl both'the 
principle must be true and the desire right 1 and that 
desire must pursue the same things as principle affirms.l 
To discover such a procedure, A;ristojcle proposes ·a defi-
nition of the practical reason as "the attainment of truth 
The practical reason is the 
faculty which functions in theareaof moral choice (free will). 
Aristotle abandons the earlier notion that moral choi<?e con-
. . 
cerns only means. Choice i:s· also call~d·deliberate desire. 
. .. 
and desireful deliberation a_nd.man is the union of desire and 
deliberation. In the .. proper exercise of these faculties (rea-
son and desire) man w;i_ll s-g:.cceed in doing right and this is 
lAristotle '· Nicomachean Ethics, · 113 9a. 
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the function of the practical reason. Aristotle states the 
whole situation in the following pithy statement; 
Now the cause of action (the efficient, not the finai 
cause) is choice {7ro o,,...<-/-J:£(Tt s ) and the cause of 
choice is desire an rea~oning directed to some end. 
Hence choice necessarily involves both intellect or 
thought and a certain disposition of character .... 
Thought by its.elf moves nothing.J but only thought 
directed to an end 1 and dealing with action. This in-
deed is the moving cause of productive acti.vity also~ 
since he who makes something always has some further 
end in viewr the act of making is not an end in itself.~ 
it is only a means, and belongs to something else. 
Whereas a thing done is an end in itself; since doing 
well (welfare) is the End 1 and it is at this that de-
sire aims. Hence Choice may be called either thought 
related'to desire or desire related to thought1 and 
man 1 as an originator of action1 is a union of desire 
and intellect. 
(Choice is not concerned with anything that has 
happened already1 for examplel' no one chooses to have 
sacked Troy; for neither does one deliber~te about what 
has happened in the past~ but about what still lies in 
the future and may happen or not; what has happened can-
not be made not to have happened ••• ) 
The attainment of truth is then the function of both 
the intellectual parts of the soul;. therefore their 
respective virtues are those dispositions which will 
best qualify them to attain truth. 1 
Choice works to achieve ends such as right action.J fu-
ture goals~ and truth. Free will, moral choic~, choice, and 
free choice are all identi.cal notions consisting of deliber-
ate desire (or desireful deliberation).. How to put these 
notions together either as separate faculties or as functions 
~7J. 
of the soul is not an easy task. Zeller made a determined 
effort to achieve such a goal but failed. His failure is 
in part due to the fact that he reduces the problem to a 
search for the seat of the will. He says~ 
Will cannot belong to :Reason·as such1 for :Reason taken 
in itself is not practical but theoretical. Even prac-
tical thought is sometimes regarded by Aristotle as a 
function of a different faculty from theoretic. Move-
ment and actionr in fact, come :from desire, which in 
turn is excited by imagination. Desire, again,. can 
cause movement 1 but not rational movement, :for it be-
longs to animals as well as man, whereas the Will bek 
longs to man alone. ·Both :Reason and Desire must there-
fore enter into Will as constituent parts. But in which 
~f these two the essence of the Will or the power of 
:free self-determination resides it is hard to say. on 
the one hand the power of con~rolling desire is attribu-
ted to Reason, which is defined as the motive force,. or 
more accurately the source from which the resolutions 
of Will proceed! and ~orality is treated as a perver-
sity of :Reason. 
Zeller is further frustrated t6 observe that for Aris-
totle, because reason initiates no movement and is perfect 
and infall~.ble, it cannot be the seat of the will to which 
belongs the doing of good and evil. Zeller .is unable to lo-
cate where 1 for Aristotle, the will re'Sides. 2 
on the other hand, the problem is further complicated 
because :Reason cannot be implicated in the life of the body, 
nor can error nor immorality be attributed to reason. 
1 Zeller 1 II 1 126 1 127. 2Ibid. 1 p. 128. 
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Furthermore~ only what is good in our actions can be deduced 
from reasont while what is ~oral and evil is attributed to 
the lower faculties of the soul. This disjunction leaves 
Zeller to say that Aristotle breaks up human nature into two 
parts "between which no living bond of connection can be dis-
covered."l 
Blinded by his frustration, Zeller upbraids Aristotle 
for failing to go deeply into the c;ruestion of s.elf-conscious-
ness and to ask what constitutes the permanent self~ This 
proves to Zeller "more clearly than anything else how imper-
fectly he [Aristotle:] grasped the problem of the unity of 
the personal life." 2 ·In a footnote Zeller adds, "It is diffi-
cult1 therefore.~ to say what Aristotle regarded as the seat 
of the freedom of the w:i.ll. u2 
Although the answer to the problem of free will may be 
found by viewing the free will or choice as deliberate desire 
achieving ends the question of causality is yet to be answered. 
The will as cause or agent concerns the problem of the agency 
producing motion or change from what is to what is to be. 
There is no question thatwhat is closest to perfection 
in the soul.r on Aristotlels view:r is the intellectual aspect: 
, 
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Nous (n:tind o:r thought), the part of the soul. which knows or 
thinks. He describes it in detail: 
The thinking part of·the soul must therefore be, while 
impassible 1 capable of receiving the form of an·object; 
that is, must· be potentially identical in character with 
its object without being the object. Mind must be relat-
ed to what is thinkable, ·as sense is to what is sensible.l 
Mind can have no nature of its own except that of having 
capacity.. It is pure from all admixture. Aristotle means 
by mind that "whereby the soul thinks and judges.nl Until 
it thinks, it is not actually any r_eal thing. Furthermore t 
a unique aspect of the mind is that the 
mind is itself thinkable in exactly the same way as its 
objects are. For (a) in the case of objects which in-
volve no matter, what thinks and what is thought are 
identical~-· (b) in the case of those whtch contain mat-
ter1 each of the objects of thought is only potentially 
present. It follows that while they will not have mind 
in them (for mind is a potentiality of them only in so 
f~ as they are capable of being disengaged from matter) 
mind may yet be thinkable-2 
There are two kinds of reason, active and passive.. Aristotle 
distinguishes between them in that 
mind as we have described it is what it is by virtue of 
becoming all things 1. while the;re is another which is 
_what it is by virtue of making all things:. this is a 
sort of positive state like light; for in a sense light 
makes potential colors into actual colo:rs. 2 
The passive reason1 therefore, is that which apprehends its 
1Aristotle, De Anima 1 429a .. 2lbid .. 1 430a. 
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objects by.becoming identical with them.. The active reason· 
leads the passive reason to become its objects by apprehend-
ing them.. The passive reason is affected by the circumstan-
ces of life and perishes with the individual. However., the 
active reason is immortal and eternal since it does not take 
upon itself any impression from its present conditions. 1 
X£ the active reason is the originative source and if 
the passive reason has the role simply of receiving the e£-
;fects of the agency of the active reasont then agency and 
self-determination must somehow be related to the active rea-
son rather;:.than the passive reason.,. a suggestion which was 
originally seen in relating the a.et of choice to deliberative 
desire. But even more sig~ificant is the role of the practi-
cal reason or mind. 
The practical 'reason.~- is differentiated from the con-
templative by having the very principle of moral freedom 
(choice) as its distinguishing characteristic. This occurs 
when desire is added to reason: 
To perceive then is like bare asserting or knowing7 but 
when the object is pleasant or painful, the soul makes a 
quasi-affirmation or negation~ and pursues or avoids the 
object~ To feel pleasure or pain is to act with a sen-
sitive mean towards what is good or bad as such. Both 
avoidance and appetite when actual are identical with 
this; the faculty of appetite and avoidance are not 
different 1 either from one another or from the faculty 
of sense-perception, but their being ~ different.l 
Aristotle has thus assigned the faculty of choice within the 
soul to the practical reason. In fact~' practical reason is 
moral choice. He has suggested that the soul is able to make 
.. both an affirmation or negation, to pursue or avoid its ob-
ject as deter-mined by the pleasure or pain involved. There 
may be a question in making too much of this concept 1 in the 
light of the fact that Aristotle is not too desirous of giv-
ing over to the nature of the rational soul any ability to 
move toward or away from objects. The concept is further 
complicated when Aristotle suggests that the activity of what 
4 
has been perfected indicates that the latter is a kind of 
activity which is different from movement. 
As was pointed out earlier1 if appetite or desire (the 
part of the soul lacking principle) is the cause of movement 
in the Aristotelian system~ it is seen to function in combina-
tion with practical thought or reas.on. The practical reason 
calculates means to an end (imagination). 2 The rationality 
or goodness of mind (theoretical reason) is always right, 
l;rbid,. 1 43la. 2Ibid. 1 433a .. 
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whereas appetite and imagination may be either right or\'Cwrong .. 
On the other hadd1 there is that desire which moves toward 
the good as a wish or rational desire or appetite. That 
which moves toward apparent good is passion or irrational de-
sire. An irrational desire is o;ne Which is influenced by 
what is just at hand as over against what is a future goad 
or pleasure. 1 In this way Aristotle describes the conditions 
of the soul which lead to right action. He is describing 
the function of the practical reason. 
The soul functioning rationally become~ practical when 
it accepts or rejects an object because of the pleasure or 
pain involved •. That the rational mind. is capable of setting 
the good be£ore an indiVidual is apparent. When man .t s appe-
tite moves him toward the good 1 it is rational: a thoughtful 
·desire at work. The appetitive faculty and the rational fac-
ulty(' together 1 :move the soul to the good. The rational fac .... 
ulty alone, {Nous) posits the end or the good which is always 
right. The appetitive faculty alon~ is blind and without 
reason a:nd leads the soul toward the objects which move it 
more powerfully. When reason and appetite are joined ;t they 
together attempt to close the gap between the good as seen by 
1Ibid. J 433b. 
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reason and the objects irrationally sought after by :blind 
appetite. At this state ±he rational appetite (or appetitive 
reason. as these conjoined faculties may be called) becomes 
the activity of the practical reason whose function it is to 
choose the means of closing the gap :between the goal seen )Jy 
reason and the state created by desire. The gap is closed 
in the process of choosing (as deliberative desire) which is 
previously seen 1 for the practi-
cal reason which is a free will~ 
Thus free will or choice is found for Aristotle as the 
function of the practical reason (which is the name of the 
faculties of reason and appetite or desire conjoined). 
Free will in the sense of moral choices 1 of accepting 
or rejecting the right or wrong; is what the soul does 1 not 
in the area.of its prime substance 1 but in the middle area 
between the highest faculties of the· soul seen as mind (theo-
retical reason) 1 and the lower faculties of the soul 1 the 
realm of appetite. And just as the finding of.happiness is 
the finding of the mean between extremes~ so the faculty 
wh~~h functions to bring happiness to man turns out to be the 
''middle faculty 11 of moral choice (free will) located between 
theoretical reason and desire. 
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Evaluation 
In spite of the fact that Ross points out that Aristotle 
did not examine the problem of free will very thoroughly~- in 
a preliminary way it is important to note with Demos that 
Aristotle has defined choice exactly in the same way in 
which Plato didl namely~- as a function of knowledge and 
~ 
appetite. 1 
Voegelin 1 however, describes the period of transition 
from the ·earlier philosophers culminating with Plato to the 
later period beginning with ,Aristotle as 11 an intellectual 
thinning-out."2 He points to the Platopic conceptions as the 
high points and contrasts them with the Aristotelian concep-
tions as the intellectual thinning-out of Greek philosophy. 
Thus, for example, Plato's view of the soul as a whole immor-
tal is thinned out in Aristotle so that only part of itr the 
act~ve intellectt is immortal. Everything else perishes. 
Voegelin describes the development of the Aristotelian philos-
ophy from Plato as a restrained derailment of the structure 
of philosophy. 3 This restraint he attributes entirely to 
lDemos, 12· 335. 
2Eric Voegelin, Plato and Aristotle, ·vo. III: Order 
and History (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 
1957) t p. 276. 
3Ibid. 1 277. 
. ·.-·.-
Aristotlels genius~ for in the subsequent perio9- (after Aris-
totle) the derailment becomes almost complete. 
In spite of this version· of Aristotle • s endeavor~, Aris-
totle has given moral goodness status in his doctrine of a 
free will. Whereas 1 in Plato, the good in man comes from 
}iY '1{, and evil· <from what is not ~~ i.e. 1 his body 
from some evil or demonic soul which is operating in the 
world 1 in Aristotle good and evil are determined in man 1 s 
or 
moral nature as a result o£ his act of choice. This is the 
area where he is able to act or refr<;iin from acting. If a 
man has done a good thing, his action in doing it imparts its 
:moral quality to the achievement as an act of virtue. In 
order for an act to be morally good, a man must choose or 
will the :means.to achieve the end •. Moral goodness is there .... 
sult of a deliberate desire to achieve a particul~ goal or 
result by the choice of the appropriate means.· Unless good-
ness is so achieved 1 it cannot be. praised nor blamed, ap .... 
proved nor disapproved. 
A. E. Taylor points out that Aristotle is not correcting 
a weakness in Plato. Aristotle retains Platots view that a 
voluntary action in :man means that he is the 11 efficient cause 
of his act. 111 Ross points out that where the cause of an 
~aylor, Aristotle, p. 96. 
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action is in the agent himself, such an action is termed vol-
untaryr and for it a man is praised or blamed. 1 Ethical vir-
tue is thus not based on the knowledge of moral laws as Socra-
tes may be understood to have affirmed the moral situation, 
but rather on the application of means to implement those 
laws as the function of a free will2 in order to achieve a 
good result. 
Freedom of the will in this sense i.s arbitrarily pre-
supposed and is validated by the fact that virtue as volun-
tary is. approved and men are universally held responsible for 
their acti.ons. 3 Although the ideal of the good differs in 
Plato and Aristotle, the fact that virtue me based' on educa-
tion is something upon which both Plato and Aristotle are in 
complete agreement. 4 The distinguishing characteristic in 
this situation is very well expressed by Annie E~ F. MacGregor 
when she says., 
1 Ross 1 p. 193. 
2see Eduard Zeller, outlines of the History of Greek 
Philosophy (New York: Meridian Books 1 lnc. 1 l959)f p. 209. 
3 Ibid. I p. 206 .. 
4 See Werner Jaeger 1 Paideia: The Ideals of Greek Cul-
ture~" Vol. III: The Conflict of Cultural Ideals in the Age 
of Plato 1 trans. Gilbert Highet (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1944) 1 pp-. 24t 25. 
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The Socratic formula l'Virtue-is knowledge' is found to 
be an inadequa~e explanation of the moral life of man. 
Knowledge of what is right is not coincident with doing 
it, for man, while knowing the right course, .is found 
deliberately.choosing the wrong one. Desire tends to 
run counter to the dictates of reason1 and the wi11 1 
i.~. the whole personality, ~ selective and active, 
perplexed by the difficulty of reconciling two such op-
p~ite demands~ tends to choose the easier course and 
to follow the inclination rather_than to endure the pain 
of refusing desire in obedience to the voice of reason. 
Hence more intellectual instruction is not sufficient 
to ensure right doing. There arises the further need 
for ¥chastisement 1 ' or the straightening of the crooked 
will, in order to ensure its co-operation with reason 
in assenting to what she affirms to be right, and its 
r~fusal to give preference to desire or the irrational 
element in man•s nature, when such desire runs counter 
.to the rational principle.l 
This dls the: dott.rine clearly developed by Aristotle. 
~-
The emphasis which Aristotle places on making a habit 
of virtue is rashly interpreted by G. :m. M,oor.e 2 as meaning 
,. 
that to maintain that a virtue which includes no more than 
habit or instinct is good in itself. Moore calls such an 
idea a gross absurdity of which the ethics of Aristotle is 
guilty,. a:nid co~ents that the idea that an action must be 
~ 
done for the sake of.the good is often allowed to drop out 
of sight. It seems 1 however, more in keeping with the 
l.Annie E. F .. MacGregor, nEthical Discipline," Encyclo-
pedia of Religion and Ethics, ed. James Hastings, V (1958) 1 405. 
2G. E. Moore, Principia Ethica (Cambridge; University 
Press, 1959), p. 176. 
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Aristotelian spirit to agree with G. M. A. GrUbe when he 
says that "to Socrates and Plato, as to Aristotle 1 the activi-
ties. of the soul culminated in the intellect as its highest 
function .. "l 
The significance of Aristotle 1 s thought may be outlined 
in terms of the important points already considered. Such an 
outline may serve not only as a summary of the important 
factors in Aristotle 1 s thought seen in the light of his basic 
conclusions 1 but also as a preparation for Augustine who 
built his doctrine o£ free will more on the Aristotelian 
. (. 
foundation of the soulls faculties than on Plato 1 s ·1fJvyry. 
(1) The doctrine of the Will.--Whereas in Plato the doc-· 
trine of the will is a ~otion (though presupposed) involving 
the functioning of the soul as a whole 1 in Aristotle the doc-
trine is clearly described as a fundamental aspect of his 
philosophical system. The aspect of soul which he defines 
as will ms the agency of the soul. When an act is done it 
is seen as the act of a specific individual 1 such an act is 
said to be an act of "his will.n This is what is meant by 
an act•s voluntariness. 
1 . 
G. M. A. Grube, Platots Thought (Boston: Beacon Press 1 
1958) 1 p. 122 • 
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A free will is defined as the faculty which unites rea-
son and desire. When·reason and desire function together the 
united function is also called practical reason 1 choice~ free 
choicer moral choicer and moral action as well as deliberate 
desire (or appetite)~ rational desire (or appetite) 1 desire-
ful deliberation 1 and moral intellect.. .An age;n.t exercising 
free will does right when.he uses reason and desirefully 
seeks the goal pointed to by reason. 
A good man is one whose desires are made reasonable. A 
bad man is one whose desires ignore reason. The practical 
reason (free will) arbitrates between rational and irrational 
desire.. The practical reason as the union of desire and in-
tellect im a well functioning harmony is assigned the function 
of moral choice resulting in right action~ 
Reason knows the t:nnth1 practical. reason achieves it by 
calling upon desire to help. Practical reason in adding de-
. sire to·reason is moral choice .. 
(2) Respensibility .. --Responsibility for Aristotle is 
the ~est of the voluntariness of an action. A man is responsi~ 
ble for an act becausehe is the agent~ the originator of it., 
(3) Approval and disa:pproval .. --Testing an act in order 
to assign praise or blame indicates for Aristotle the state 
of the individual who has used free will or choice.. Praise 
184'. 
may be accompanied by rewards 1 blame 1 by punishment. 
(4) Exemptions from moral affections.--Compulsion ex-
empts the agent from liability. Ignorance also absolves 
the agent from moral consequence provided the conditions 
creatLng the ignorance were not chosen (for example, 
drunkenness)~ 
(5) The doctrine of the soul ....... -In Plato, the soul, as 
the agent 1 was responsible for doing right. Aristotle adds 
that the soul is also respon,sible .. for doing wrong. At the 
same time in both J?lato and Arist:otle man is appraised for 
what he does and :not for the fact that he could have done 
otherwi:se. ';['he unity of t;he soul in Plato means that the 
sou.J. as a whole performs all i.ts functions. In Aristotle 
the unity of the soul has three distinct meanings: In oppo-
sition to Plato•s doctrine of self-determination the unity 
means (a) an unmoved mover. As distinguished from the soul 
.functioning as a whole in Plato, the unity of the soul in 
Aristotle means (b) a soul composed of faculties whose func-
tions are in:separable from it. They cannot function while 
detached from the whole (sx~ept for Nous). Whereas in Plato 
the soul is imprisoned in the body and the cause of the body, 
in Aristotle the soul's unity is (c) the form of the body,. 
As an unmoved mover, the soul· does not move the body- In 
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fact the situation is reversed. Motion is the actualizing 
of the body in the direction of reason. The soul is a unity 
as the form of the body. 
The faculties of the soul are parts of the soul (although; 
at times~ Aristotle refers to each faculty as though it were a 
separate soul such as vegetative soul, appetitive soul, ra-
tional soul). · E.ach faculty is not the functioning of the soul 
as a whole. It is a separate function (like the functions of 
the parts of the body). Man functions to harmonize the fac-
ulties in accordance with the rational principle. But this 
is the function of the practical reason (choice). Thus 
Aristotle says that choice is what a man is. In the ordering of 
the faculties 1 man moves from matter to form, from body to 
soul (Nous) 1 from tne minimal soul to the maximal soul, The 
practical reason is :man moving from the lowest functions (of 
the body)~" as the cause of motion 1 to the highest functions 
(Nous) . 
The achieving of the highest state (Nous) is the action 
> 
of the practical reason. The result is t!'ucfo(y.tovt~ --Happiness. 
(6) Knowledge and virtue.--In Plato :&p_owledge a;E the good 
and virtue are one and the same. In Aristotle, however~ right 
action presupposes knowledge o£ the good 1 but knowledge of 
the good does not necessitate right action~ A man who does 
right cannot do so without knowing the good. But the man who 
•• ~. ~--- • - ~. - ·7"-
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knows the good does not necessarily do it. Right action 
(virtue) follows from many conditions (besides knowledge)~ 
all of whicn are included 1 for Aristotle, in the ~oncepts of 
character and habit. However 1 if compulsion and ignorance 
are the only grounds for exempting a man from liability for 
his actions, then, it follows that freedom and knowledge must 
be the key powers determining man 1 s actions. Therefoxe practi-
cal and theoretical reason are not only the gpounds for as-
~igning liability for failure, but they are the grounds for 
achieving success. When the practical reason orders the 
faculties in keeping with the rational principle each virtue 
is found to have intrinsic value. . Whereas in l?lato the su-
preme Good is the only real good, in aristotle all goods in-
trinsically. have their place in the well-ordered soul. Thus 
self-realization for l?lato means the achievement of the ulti-
mate good as perfection including separation from the body. 
In Aristotle self-realization means the ordering of the soul 
by the practical reason with each faculty doing its best. 
Conclusion 
It has been observed that the fulfilling of one's des-
tiny has been going through a series of changes. The earli-
est notion left human destiny to the gods. Subsequently the 
1:8'7 
doctrine emerged that man could achieve success if he under-
stood the gods or nature. The sophists had reduced the whole 
of the moral situation to solipsism. Plato and Socrates 
attempted to focus moral actions on goals which could be de-
tiermined by reason. Aristotle developed the question of ful-
filling human destiny into one of determining how rationally 
to choose between alternatives and the resultant assessing 
by one's fellowmen of consequences in terms of rewards or 
punishments for one's actions. 
Aristotle was not assigning responsibility and liability 
to the faculty· of choice. Approval or disapproualJ' praise or 
blame was b~sed on the quality of man•s actions. A man could 
not choose to play ~chaikovsky 1 s Concerto and then be blamed 
for making a mess of it, because choice as 11 deliberate de-
sire of things in our powern precludes such an eventuality. 
It is for this important fact that approval (or disapproval) 
in Aristotle is based not on the power of choice but on the 
acts which result from our choices .. 
In PlatoJ' self-determination meant that the individual 
was responsible for his own action and the reward was the 
doing of the good itself. In Aristotle not only is the indi-
Vidual responsible but the reward or punish.."nent was meted 
out by one's fellowmen. Free will or practical reasonJ' 
though a specialized :t:;acultyl involved the whole person in 
the consequences of ;its ,functions. It was this latter doc-
trine more than the :Platonic one.that Augustine used as the 
fpundation for his doctrine of:free will. 
CHAPTER IV 
AUGUSTINE'S EXPOSITION OF TEE WILL AND FREE CHOICE 
Augustine's Background 
Augustine (354-430) was born in Tagaste 1 a small town 
in Proconsular Numidia. The town is now called Souk-Ahras 
in eastern Algeria. His mother.~: Monica, was a Christian ap-
. parently from girlhood.. His father r Patricius 1 became a 
Chr~stian late in life. He was enrolled as a catechumen as 
an infant 1 and from his mother he learned in a small measure 
about Christianity. At the age of twelve he was sent to a 
grammar school at Madaura 1 where he became steeped in the 
Latin literature and only vaguely acquainted with Greek.-
After about four years he returned to Tagast~ and spent a 
year which he describes as filled with sinful pursuits. He 
went to Carthage in order to study rhetoric and qualify for 
the legal profession. His education was a liberal one and 
included literature and philosophy. When he was twenty, he 
took upon himself a mistress who bore him a son1 whom, he 
named Adeodatus. Shortly thereafter he came under the influ-
ence of the Manichaean teachers and spent nine years studying 
IB9 
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to become one. However he became seriously ill and while 
unconscious was baptized by Christian rite. He made fun of 
being baptized while unconscious~ and a friend who remains 
anonymous rebuked him. When his friend died, Augustine was 
deeply grieved and to escape the scene of his bereavement 
he returned to Carthage in the autumn of 374. He remained 
there as a teacher for- eight years until he was twenty-eight 
years old. Augustine took up the study of Manichaenism 
again, but 1 when he could not find the answer to the ques-
tion, Why did God not fightwith the evil principle? he 
started to break away from the doctrine. 
In 383 Augustine decided to go.to Rome, and, although 
his mother had planned to go with him, by means of a ruse, 
he managed to leave her behind to return to Tagaste while he 
went on to Rome. He spent a year teaChing rhetoric there. 
In his thirtieth year he went to the city of Milan where he 
was a successful teacher. 
Under the instruction of St. Ambrose Augustine became 
aware of the spiritual interpretation of Scripture, and was 
thus able to impart meaning to what had hitherto been incom-
prehensible. He was not yet prepared to embrace Christianity. 
In fact although his mother had proposed a suitable young 
woman in order for Augustine to marry and settle down, he 
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instead took ano·ther mistress and continued to teach rhetoric. 
In 385 Augustine became strongly influenced by certain 
neo-Platoni·c works which helped him to solve the problem of 
evil~ for the first time he became aware of a spiritual realm 
which he had not found in Manichaeistic mat~rialism. After 
becoming acquainted with the lives of several Christians 1 
and after studying the Bible 1 he soon became converted. 
Augustine was baptized by st. Ambrose on the night be-
fore Easter 1 April 25~ 387 along with his son and his friend 
Alypius. Augustine decided to return to Africa and become 
a lay monk in Tagaste. But because his mother died while he 
was preparing to go to Africa 1 he-decided to go to Rome where 
he composed his treatise De Libera Arbitrio" along with two 
other shorter works on The guantity of the Soul and Morals 
of the Catholic Church and the Manichaeans. 
In 388 Augustine returned to Carthage and then to Tagaste 
to become a semi-monastic, practicing· a·;moderate asceticism. 
He wrote several treatises.~ and in 391 was invited to visit 
Hippo to discuss the possibility of entering a monastery 
there. The church was not strong but was led by a bishop 
named Valerius. When Augustine visited the town, Valerius or-
dained him at once. Augustine asslli~ed his priestly duties with 
many questions on his mind, but he wa~ a successful preacher. 
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The monastery became a theological seminary. Augustine 
continued to write extensively, especially against the Man-
i..chae.an-.doctrines. For this and his preaching he became 
quite famous( and when Valerius died Augustine became bishop 
in his own right in 396. His work was marked by enormous 
scholarship and effort. He completed the confessions about 
the year 400 and continued to write many letters and impor-
tant treatises during the remainder of his life. He entered 
into a series of debates a~ainst the Donatists and sought 
political assistance in subjecting them to laws which were 
enacted against heretics. His attack on Manichaeism was at 
the same time an attack on Pelagianism. In both instances 
free will was involved. The Manichaeans denied free will. 
The Pelagians affirmed it ascribing to it the power whereby 
a man could achieve his salvation .• 
During the closing years of his life,. Augustine spent 
almost all of his time. defending and expoUn.ding Christian 
doctrine. He saw in the Roman Catholic faith the pure ex-
pression .of religion. On the other hand 1 his affirmation 
of the grace of God as the only means whereby man can achieve 
his salvation was much later to become an important principle 
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in the Protestant Reformation. 1 
But in expounding Christian doctrine~ Augustine viewed 
the problemsof philosophy and theology in terms of his own 
experience. He saw himself chained to his flesh and his 
mistresses. 2 Becoming freed from such bondage was one aspect 
of his problem. But how to account for his bondage in the 
£irst place seemed even more dif£icult to answer. That the 
Divine Nature was incorruptible·was unquestionable. To dis-
cover how man came to bondage could only be ascertained by 
considering man's free will in all its aspects. The importance 
of free will to his thought is observed in the fact that he 
continually returned to it throughout his writings. The first 
question 1 therefore 1 would seem to be 1 what was Augustine's 
interpretation of free will? To answer this question the na-
ture of will must be determined. 
lFor the bibliographical data pertaining to·Augustine•s 
life and teachings,. the sources are inmnnerable. Of sUbstan-
tial interest are w .. J. Sparrow Simpson, st •. Augustine 1 s Con-
version (New York: The..Mac:millan Company, 1930); T. A. Lacey, 
"Saint Augustine 1 11 Encyclopedia l3ritannica, Vol. IIi Benjamin 
B. Warfield.r 11Augustine, 11 Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics, 
ed. James Hastings, II (1958) 1 219~2247 the well-documented 
biographical note which appears in the introduction to Saint 
Augustine, The City of God 1 trans. George E~ McCracken (cam-
bridge: Harvard University Press, 1957) 1 I. An interesting 
summary of the life and religion of St. Augustine appears in 
the Basic Writings of St. Augustine 1 2 vols., ed. Whitney J. 
Cates {New York: Random House, 1948) • 
2Augustiner Confessions, 2 vols., trans. William Watts 
(Cambridge: Harvard University J?ress, 1951), viii, ll. 
Augustine 1 s Definition of Will 
Although Augustine deals with the nature of the will in 
a number of his writings his workr De Libero Arbitrio1 is. 
basic. However r it was written to answer the Manichaean 
objection to Christianity that 11 Since the presence of evil 
is undeniable, it is inconceivable that God can be both al-
mighty and infinitely good."2 Or, more precisely 1 he says 1 
if God is the source of all that exists, how can one alz'oid 
making Him responsible for evil?3 Pelagius protested against 
doctrines which looked to original sin or predestined grace 
to account for evil. Pelagius affirmed that grace is nothing 
else than the free will which man has received from God. 
------.... __ _....,.- ... - .. ~-·--~--- -··--~····· 
Pelagius denied that grace predestinesroan to be a child of 
God, and that children are involved in original sin. 3 
Augustine does not write in order to analyze the 
psychological circumstances in which choice is exercised. 4 
He is deeply concerned with the problem of evil, and by dis-
cussing the will 1 he attempts to shed light on concepts 
which will help to answer the problem of evil. 
1st. Augustine, The Problem of ;Free Choice (De Libero 
Arbitrio) 1 trans.Dom Mark Pontifaxr Vol. XXII of The Ancient 
Christian Writers 1 ed. Johannes Quaston and Joseph c. Plumpo 
(26 vols.i Westminster 1 Maryland: Newman Press 1 1955). 
2Ibid., p. 5. 3 Ibid.l p. s. 4 Ibid., p. 13. 
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Augustine 1 s discourse on will does not offer a clear 
statement~ as such~ which defines what he means by a wil~~ The 
term arbitrium is derived from ad plus bito (eo) which means 
literally 11 one who goes to.u Its basic meaning therefore is 
11 a being nearu or "a being present." This is refined to mean 
11 the judgment or decision of an arbitrator" and in some in-
stances.means merely "judgment 1 " "opinion1 " or "decision. 11 
With further refinement it came to mean umastery," "dominion 1 " 
"authority," "power,n "will 1 11 or even "free will." By rely-
ing on the verb 1 u arbi tror, " meaning "to make a decision 1 11 
narbitrium11 may with latitude be rendered as "choice. 11 Thus 
De Libero Arbitrio may properly be rendered on Free Choice or 
more precisely, On Free Decision. To remove the problem con-
fronted at the outset Sparrow entitles his translation of 
Augustine's treatise, De Libero Arbitrio Voluntatis, and trans-
lates it On Freedom of the Will. 1 However in the text it-
self there appei'irS 1 "Id facimus ex libero voluntat:I.s arbitrio" 2 
(we do it [wrong] from free choice of the will).. The use of 
ls. Aurelii Augustine, On Freedom of the Will, (De.Libero 
Arbitrio Voluntatis), trans. Carroll Mason Sparrow (Richmond: 
Dietz Press, Inc. 1 1947). · 
2sancti Aurelii Augustinii 1 Opera Omnia.Vols. 32-47 of 
Patrologia Latina (Paris; J. P. Migne, 1841•-<45) 1 XXXII, 1240. 
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Voluntas for "willn and with liber for even "free will" is 
so frequent in Augustine1 as to suggest that Sparrow1 s inclu-
sian of the term in the title in preference to the arbitrium. 
alone is wholly justified.. VoluntasJ' vo1o 1 nolo,are all used 
and have as their basic meaning the ideas of wishing 1 wi,lling 1 
liking 1 asserting, 
corresponds to the 
and preferring (to mention a few). Vola 
. / 
Greek pov}..ot-1oj c and carries the same 
. { ..... / 
meanings. Since the terms used bY Augustine merely provide 
him with working tools}' it was incumbent upon him to define 
his terms. Althoughhe did not specifically do this with 
Voluntas nor arbitriunt 1 what he had in :mind may be inferred 
with some accuracy. 
He says that 11 it ca:nnot.be.denied that we have a will." 2 
But his definib:bon of the.will must be deduced from what he 
says about a good will. A good will is one which seeks to 
. "live uprightly and honorably and to attain a supreme wisdom." 2 
A good will means o.p.e "seeking ea;('nestly" and 11Wishing" the 
good. To have a good will means to "earn and live" 3 a good· 
and happy life. Significantly, an evil will means to earn 
1 . Ibid., XXXIII 1267. 
2Augustine 1 11 0n Freedom of the Will 1 11 . i.~ 12,. 
3Ibid .. r ir 13. 
... _.,--.. 
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and live a base and wretched life. The will, therefore, for 
Augustine 1 means a kind of ambitiousness in a man whereby he 
wishes, di!sires 1 wants, seeks .r . earns 1 and lives. 
Now, therefore 1 when a person wishes or seeks the good, 
he thereby has a good will. The good in life pecomes avail-· 
able to a man by his wiJ.ling it. The good 11 needs only to be 
willed to be possessed."]. When the will,. therefore wills it-
self it is putting tha~ faculty to work which has the eager-
ness and power to attain a goal. In this sense, the will is 
that which is in the indiyidual's power. 2 Augustine presup .... 
-poses that the power of the will means the will itself. For, 
he asks, "What is so fully in the power of the will as the 
will itself?" 2 To possess a will one needs only to will it. 3 
In the scale of the goods which exist as a result of 
God's creation, virtues are the greatest goods, bodies are the 
least goods.4 However/ the powers of the soul are between the 
virtues and the bodies. Virtues cannot be used wrongly, 
whereas it is possible to use both the powers of the soul and 
the bodies wrongly. And just as we know_reason by using rea-
son, so also we use free will by the will. When the will 
cleaves to the immutable good, man gains the virtues. On the 
other hand, when the will is not oriented in this wayJ man 
libid., i, 12. 
4Ibid.:t ii~: 46. 
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sins. Neither the goods that are sought by wrong.....;doers, 
nor free will itself, are evil in any way. 1 
Evil is not to be found in the free will, for evil is 
the turning away from the immutable good and turning towards 
mutable goods. This turning is not compelled but is what 
the will does. Since all good is from God 1 there is no na-
ture which is not from Godr and the motion of turning away 
from God is sin and is .a defective motion in that every 
defect is from nothing, and hence it cannot belong to God~ 2 
The cause of sin is not positive but negative. lt is vol-
untary even though it is negative, because it is in our 
power 1 and if a person does not will it, ·it will not be. 2 
The fact that man is by an act of his will able to sin 
and that this is foreknown by God indicates that there is no 
conflict pertaining to the Creator as the source of good. 
For Augustine all this means is that the Creator knows that 
which must take place by the will even of sinners, and be-
cause God has created a creature who is thus free, He is to 
be praised. 3 The movement of the will is not a necessary 
movement of the soul when it is moving away from God1 it is 
rather voluntary 1 for the soul can stop its motion by the 
2Ibid., iii 54. 
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will. "If the movement by which the will turns in different 
directions were not voluntary and under our control~ a man 
would not deserve praise or blame.nl 
Later on.,. Augustine will use the principle of 11 in our 
power" to mean the will~s freedom, but within the present 
context "in our power" means agency and will as will. 
The will seen as t~e power which wills itsel£2 and also 
3 as the power which commands itself, begins to emerge in 
Augustine as a faculty of the soul. The soul (anima) is a 
whole and wills as a whole with an 11 entire will."4 Similarly 
"the mind (animus) commands mind to will." 3 The mind and will 
are the same- When one wills to act and has the power to 
act, the willing is the doing.s When Augustine thus describes 
the functions of the soult the relationship of the will to 
action is developed. For the motion of the soul is controlled 
by velle ( 11will 11 --also "life 11 ). 
TWo other aspects of the soul are esse (being--existence) 
and nosse (knowing). 6 In comparing these aspects of the soul 
libid. 1 iii, 31 • 2Ibid. 1 i, 12. 
3Augustine, Confessions, viii 1 9M 
4Ibid. 1 viii 1 10. 5Ibid. 1 viii, 8. 
6Augustine 1 On the Freedom of ±he Will, ii, 1-
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with the bodily senses it is discovered that there is an 
"interior sense" whereby the individual appropriates what 
·he likes and avoids and rejects what he does not. 1 Tho~gh 
discerned by reason it is not reason. And although left 
undefined by Augustine it would seem to be velle,. The fac-
ulties are apparently assumed )bo function as in Aristotle. 
The only difference seems to be that the faculties appear 
to be connected to the soul in the sense that they receive 
from the soul their fuel or power.. When they run out of 
power, the so~l takes the responsibility; for the soul was 
their source of energy in the first place. 
It may be seen from the above presentation that the will 
consists of the activity of the soul having a faculty to will 
as a whole and points more specifically to the aspiring of 
the soul which moves it towaid its goal. In order to refine 
some of the notions which·Augustine has presented in a rather 
general way, it will be helpful to consider the doctrine of 
will as free. 
The Description and Function of a Free Will 
Augustine began· his treatise on free will wi. th the idea 
in mind that by positing a free will satisfactorily it will 
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be possible to exempt God from responsibility for evil in 
the world. When the free will becomes the culprit for all 
of evil's crimes, the free will becomes, thereby 1 the dis-
loyal opposition to all that God is and wills. Although 
bmtg 6fthese consequences follow from Augustine 1 s starting 
place, he was more concerned with absolving God than with 
maligning the will. But once the sequence began, Augustine 
could not stop it nor did he attempt to. He did the only 
thing which seemed to him to be left. He compensated the 
will by making it the power which could become the source; 
of perfection in roan's experience. All of these aspects to 
the discussion may be seen throughout his works. They are 
more specifically discovered in the De Libero Arbitrio. 
Except for the first question,. Augustine's description of 
the fr·ee will and the moral situation· follows Aristotle very 
closely. 
Augustine asks, "ls not God the cause of evil?111 Evil 
may be interpreted as in Aristotle in two ways: (1) doing 
evil or (2) suffering evil. Augustine chooses to discuss 
evil-doing. Without the slightest deviation from Aristotle, 
he goes on to say that evil ....... doing is the result of the free 
1The Problem of Free.Choice 1 i, 1. 
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choice of the will. "Everyone who does wrong is the cause 
of his own wrong-doing. 111 Whenever an evil deed is done 1 
as explained by Aristotle i.t is because the mind is enslaved 
by desire. :Responsibility is. ;based on the idea that the free 
choice of the will establishes man as the author of his own 
evil deeds. The so~rce of evil is not in learning; it is 
rather in the man's act of choosing. 
Augustine 1 however/' is interested to· "avoid tracing 
sins back to God?"2 Tracing sins back to God would mean that 
God in creating souls which cause evil would be ultimately 
responsible for the situation unless some solution can be 
found. Augustine affirms God 1 s ahsoluteness and therefore 
must exempt God by investigating the nature of evil-doing. 
He continues to follow Aristotle: the source of evil is 
libido, which may be translated as desire. or passion. Thus, 
nDesire is the principle element in this whole matter of 
wrong-doing." 3 In this sense libido is established as a.de-
sire for things one can lose against his will. 4 
·In continuing to exempt God from responsibility he 
affirms two kinds of law in the world. There is the man-made 
2 . 
:r:bid. ,; i I' 4-
3 . " IbJ.d. I i I 8. 4 Ibid., i 1 10. 
• .
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law, and there is the law of divine providence or the eternal 
law of reason. 1 Even here, Augustine is completely dependent 
on Aristotle. All just temporal law or law of man is derived 
from the eternal law~ which ·is that· by which all things are 
. . 2 
most perfectly ordered. Furthermoi'e 1 man is distinguished 
£rom beas.ts in the fact .that he is able to reason and use the 
power of intelligence. This is the power that makes him aware 
of the fact that he lives. :Knowledge as the light of the 
mind derived from reason can only be good, since it 'is that 
Whe~eby man knows that he lives.3 Man reflects the eternal 
law when his life is well ordered, and this is brought about 
by setti~g reason in control. He says 1 nWhen reason.r or mind 1 
or spirit controls the irrational mot;ions of the. soul, then 
that element is ruling in man which ought to rule in virtue 
of that law we have found to be external."4 · '.I'his man S9 con-
trolled is called wise, and by the exercise of his mind, he 
discovers that it has more power than desirer because it can 
dominate desire. so also is soul superior to body. And. 
"there is nothing more excellent than a rational and wise mind.n 5 
At the same time Hit is possible for the mind not to be 
in control. 115 Libido is capable of making the mind a slave. 
libid., i/ 14-15. 
4Ibid. 1 i, 18. 
2rl:>id. 
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However, it wi~l never do so 1 for "no other things .... can 
cause a mind to consort with desire than its own will and 
free choice." 1 
Therefore the prelude to the J?roblem of free will is 
the problem of evil. The doctrine Augustine wishes most to 
protect is that of the absolute power of God in every direc-
~ion and in every way. Ere is the most high and true God, 
supreme power and presciance. 2 He is omnipresent, omnipo-
tentt3 eternalr unchangeable, 4 as well as the supreme good 
and the fountain of light. 5 ;Because this kind of a God can-
not be the source of evil in the world~ that source must be 
found somewhere else. But there is also the problem of 
God's foreknowledge which 1 ,in the minds of some (the Mani-
chaeans), rules out the possibi~ity of attributing a free 
will to man. Augustine has thus to contend with the question 
of the existence of ftee will as presupposed 1 otherwise the 
whole of the structure he has built will tumble into the 
·foundation. To establish man's responsibility either free 
libid.l i, .21. 2Augustine 1 Cityof God, v~ 9 .. 
3Augustine 1 Confessions~ v, 2,. 
4Ibid. I i, 3. 
Sibid. 1 iVt 15. 
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will in man is to be affirmed and blamed1 or foreknowledge 
must be~denied. The cause of evil must be either in God·or 
in some~aspect of his creation1 and the only suitable candi-
date in creation is 1 of courset man (although the devil is 
made a party to the responsi~ility late in the discussion). 
If the responsibility can be placed on man 1 s sinful will¥ 
the question then will be that of d,etermining how a will 
which is created by God comes to arrive at a sinful state. 
Its freedom will make it possible for man to be blamed for 
evil consequences and at the same time the righteous may be 
rewarded. 
The question of the relation of foreknowledge to free 
will is summarily solved by Augustine~ The free will is a 
good created by God1 for, without it man cannot achieve 
righteousness. Foreknowledge 1 Augustine warnst is not to be 
confused with predestination, since there. is a difference 
between knowing t);lat tomorrow a man will use his free will 
to commit a specific get and being the determining cause of 
his doing so. Both these principles are grounded in the re-
ligiously minded in the "faith of piety." 2 
lAs suggested in De Libera Arbitriot i 1 10, and also 
The City of God 1 V 1 9. 
.. 
.•. : .. 
The problem of evil is to be seen entirely from man•s 
side, since from God 1 s side the only statements which prop-
erly apply are those in keeping with His perfection and grace. 
Thus a. sin is an act of willing evil and in a strict sense 
is "not caused1' but is. ndue to the absence of rational 
causation." 1 
In order to possess a good will it is only necessary to 
will it. However, "the defect from which'a wicked man suf-
fers is. due to his own fault. "2 When he thus averts the good 1 
he receives the just punishment of his evil deeds 1 which is 
m~sery. 3 The achievement of the good is the summum bonum 
as Amor Pei.4 It is pondus meum amor ln'Qll~~·.5 
When Adam sinned the first time he created the state of 
BQ£ posse ~ peccare. Just as the truth makes -man free 1 
Adam's sin makes man a slave to the consequences of that 
1see David E. Roberts, nThe Earliest Writings," A Com-
panio~" to the Study of Augustine 1 ed. Roy w. Battenhouse 
(New York:. Oxford University Press, 1955) 1 pp. 118-120. 
2 Ibid. 1 p. 118. 
3Augustine, City of God, xxii 1 xxiv1 see also Simpson, 
p. 215. 
4Augustine 1 Confessions, X1 6 .. 
5cf. M~ C. P'Arcy 1 "The Philosophy of St. Augustine," 
st. Augustine, comp. T. F. B. (New York: Meridian Books, Inc., 
1957) • 
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original sinr which is variously defined as libidor or the 
will directed toward itself rather than God, and cupiditas, 
to mention a few.l ~t the same time, man inherits the sin-
ful nature as well which is disobedience, pride, and separaH 
tion from God. 2 Of course, God redeems man by extending to 
him his grace 1 whereby through his love, which man may re-
spond to in prayer, his sinful nature is overcome, just as 
.original sin was wiped away by Jesus Christ. 3 
The grace of God, therefore 1 tends to preserve God's 
absolute causality especially since his grace includes as a 
presupposition a difficult interpretation of a doctrine of 
predestination: Praeparatur Voluntas a Deo. The consequence 
of this proposition is inconsistently maintained in that, al-
though he holds that some men are free only to sin from the 
beginning and others to do good under grace from the begin-
ning, nevertheless, God works in men•s hearts to make them 
willing. God, therefore, energizes the man who is in turn 
the source of energy for the will:.. 
The freedom so referred to is defined in accordance with 
lcf. Augustine, City of God., xiv 1 10. 
2Augustine, De Libera Arbitriot iii 1 76. 
3siropson, p. 217. 
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two concepts which are stated as Libertas--the power which 
man 1 S fallen nature does not possessr namely, to choose and 
accomplish goodr and Libertas indifferentiae--the absolute 
power of choice between alternatives. 
Now, when God inclines his heart toward man, his ultimate 
goal is to have man "surrender his will,n which means that 
those who lose themselves shall find themselves,. This is done 
in praiset which means that man will be silent in the presence 
of the highest good and with the ancient proJ;>het will hear 
the voice of God say, "Be still and know that I am God. 11 
Although the free will functions to establish responsi-
bility in the moral scheme o£ things by being the power to 
consent to or refuse the calling of God, nevertheless 1 the 
. "loss of will" (perfect freedom) is the highest state for roan. 
For, when moral choice is exercised 1 the choice is between 
aroor Dei and conteroptus Dei. .If roan refuses to obey and love , 
the result is servitude (the loss of perfect freedom). When 
he chooses to love and obey God, the result is mastery (the 
achievement of perfect freedom) • .In one case man serves the 
"flesh." In the other he serves God .. Freedom as obedience 
to the love of God is found in the principle, L:itertas en:im del.e:±at. 
These two kinds of freedom may be seen in another frame 
of reference. When a man has freedom under the law as Paul 
20.9. 
so eloquently described in the New Testament~ his freedom 
means that his actions are his very own. But when man has 
freedom under grace 1 he gro~s in that true freedom or liberty 
which is the complete love of God. Mari cannot earn this gift 
of grace even by an act of,·faith.1 : ;rt is unmerited. The 
will operating without merit means the will freed by the gift 
of God to do good work. 2 Furthermore, a will lacking merit 
means that a good will is not rewarded by God. 3 McCabe points 
out that in the works on the Predestination of the Saints and 
·On the Gift of· Perseverance Augustine was driven by Cassion 
to reduce the will to a mere automaton worked solely by 
grace. nAhsolutely without regard to the merit of the indi-
vidual (in the way of cooperation or rejection) God has decreed 
His distribution of grace on which eternal life or eternal 
damnation depends.n4 
1Augustine, On Grace and Free Will 1 Vol. V: A Select 
Library of the Nicene and Post. ;Nicene Fathers, ed. Philip 
Schaff and others (28 vols-1 New York: The Christian Litera-
ture company 1 1888) 1 xvii-xxi. 
2Hugh Pope 1 Saint Augustine of Hippo (Wes·tminster 1 Mary-
land: The Newman Press .. 1949)t pp. 184-185. 
3Rebecca West 1 St. Augustine (London: Peter Davies, Ltd.~ 
1933), p. 124. 
4Joseph McCahe 1 st. Augustine and His Age (New York: 
The Knickerbocker Press 1 1903) 1 pp. 448-449. 
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Augustine speaks as an introspective psychologistl when . 
he says that sin is the perverse use of free will,. 2 that in 
relation to God.man moves from woeful alienation to happy 
reconciliation,3 and that his own experience proves these 
principles because~ A:g.g:us.tiner himself, was freed from pas-
. sions.to love ... 4 Thu.s conversion to God or aversion to Him 
_ is rooted in the power o£ free will. The experience of l?aul 
·corroborates this when he asks his followers to "make not 
·provision for the flesh in concupiscence,11 but nput ye on 
the Lord Jesus Christ.~n And whereas in other places Augustine 
. . 
has been seen as advocating a good will--a will capable of 
choosing what is morally goods the~e is also the factor 
that the will 1 by taking pleasure in its own power 1 leads 
inan to the state of massa damnationis and massa ,Eerditionis. 
. . 
There is no. question that AugU,stine 1 .s coirlp1exi ty and 
natural disregard for system as such ma.y lead to a ;misunder-
standing of his viewpoint. For 1 there are times when the will 
1 . 
·West, p. 107. · 2rbid.,, p. 1os. 
4 ;sertrand carefully points this oU,t.; 
Saint Augustine, trans. Vincent O'Sullivan 
D. Appleton Company 1 1914)., p. 342.. · 
3 . 
.Ibid. I P- 109. 
touis Bertrand,· 
{New_York: 
5vernon ~. Bourke 1 Augustine • s Quest of. Wisdom (.Mi1wau- . 
kee: The Bruce PUblishing Company, __ 1944), · p:. 266 ~-. 
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becomes the responsible cause o± evil and good. EVil results 
from one's own sin or inherited sin. In either case the will 
is functioning as power either for good.or evil. The human 
will c..'looses moral goodness1 with all the good that results 
therefrom. And when Osmun sees Augustine's weakness to be 
his doctrine of original s.in, he observes with approval that 
Augustine's great service was in his stern and unyielding 
reprobation of·all that is sin~2 He"shows that for Augustine 
accountability is not based on ·the di,sposi tion with ~N"hich man 
is born, but with which he dies. 2 Born with a free will to 
sin, he should die in eternal glory~ 
A free will, therefore~ for Augustine is a faculty of 
the soul which as master of itself is nall-powern: the will 
moves only by will and all the other faculties depend on the 
will in order to function. The will gains its power from its 
function as will. Its energy (fuel) is received from the 
soul from which it can be distinguished only with difficulty 
(as the man is indistinguishable-from free choice in Aristotle). 
The free will is the power to say yes or no to every 
2George w. Osmun, Augustine: the Thinker (New York: 
Eaton and Mains, ·1906) 1 p. 248. 
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alternativeincluding the acceptance or rejection o£ divine 
love. In his most philosophical moments Augustine has sug-
gested that £ree will is the moral choice £or right living 
which makes possible the ··completing of the un£inished uni-
verse.l In the same mood Augustine describes the situation 
. 
o£ the soul with desire controlled by reason as the highest 
state. The control however is not the authority of power but 
the will 1 s recognition o£ reason's truth. 
The free will as capable o£ winning £or man his eternal 
damnation is the logical consequence of the presupposition 
that the free will is the only fact of li£e_capable o£.ex-
e~pting God (as the omnipotent creator) £rom responsibility 
for the existence o£ evil. The will as "all-pow.er to will it ..... 
self" is the only way of explaining that the omnipotence of 
God may be thwarted by a £ree will. 
Augustine, however, vacillates between affirming the 
free will which does evil as one which £inds itself in a moral 
vacuum (as in Plato and elaborated by Plotinus),. and the free 
will which does evil by asserting itsel£ as the object o£ 
its activity (pride). The assumption o£ the moral vacuum 
and the stubborn will both have their place. The moral vac-
uum is presupposed to explain that evil is the effect o£ what 
God is not rather than what he is as related to causing man 
lThe Problem o£ Free Choice, 32. 
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and his Will- This principle tended to serve the same ¥i'i:u!ta-
tion in .Plato and Plotinus. on t:h.e·jother hand the pride or 
stu.bborness of the will was retainedas the cause of evil in 
order to account for the fact that the free will was able to 
thwart the power of God. The will to. sin was created by God 
as the will to love but it :became the on;J.y defect in all cre--
ation because of its power to will itsel:t as will.1 For God 
to have forced necessity to obedience on ;man would be to 
destroy free will and th:e source o£ evil in the universe. 
When the mind (as rational. faculty) .relates to desire, 
the mind is. innocent. It is the ·.free will or cho.ic e which 
sins by ba-cgain;ing with desire. For the ;mind cannot be sub-
dued.· ·The mind enters into a relationship with desire through 
the J?ower of the will. ·In so ·doing the will ;bring..s to man 
the penalty for sin, becai.l.se.man by his own will fell sub-
servient to desire. nwe 'believe that mali was.so perfectly 
formed by God and established i.n a life of happiness that 
only of hi$· own will did he come down thence to the trouble 
of mortal life. 11 2 
The existence of the will is first o;bserved in the desire 
1Augustine, The Problem of Free Choice, iii, 35. 
2Ibid., i, 23 •· 
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or will to k~ow.l :rt becomes a- :good will when man seeks to 
live rightly and honorably and to attain to the highest wis-
dom. 2 This good will ·is. a priceless possession, and1 in 
order to be had 1 it only needs to be willed. It i·s not ngood 
intentionn but perfect wili. A ;man who has good will n cannot 
wish evil on anyone.n 3 For a good will 'is one which "wishes 
to live rightly and virtuouslX:-"4 That a good will is a per-
feet will is seen in the attainment of happiness. :rn order 
to attain a happy life men need only to will that which is 
I 
ordained by eternal law.as right. But nNot all men wish to 
live rightly, which is the only state of will that deserves 
a happy life.n5 Because happine~s is based on the fact that 
a person lives by the eternal law and exercises his good will 
to adhere to it,a good will may be seen as a perfect will. 
Those who live by temporal th.:Lngs and love them. are unhappy, 
and they must still recognize that they are subservient to 
the eternal law. However, those who act on the basis of good 
will and serve the eternal law d9 not need the temporal law. 
The temporal law can be just and.provide such things as health 1 
human liberty~ relatives, friends, the state, money 1 aild·honor. 
1 Ibid. t i, 25. 2:rbid., i, . 25-26. 3 Ibid .. , i~ 27 • 
4Ibid., i~ 26. ' 5:rb'd 1 --~-·., i, 30. 
The temporal law o;perates through fear 1 and can be enforced .. 
Thus when Augustine asserts_, that desire is posited as a d·e-
sire for things one can·lose.unwillinglyl he means simply 
that temporq.l things are th:hngswhich can be taken away from 
a person against his wiil1 whE?re~sJ 'the .eternal values can 
;never be taken from a person..: 1 
Sin as the free choice of evil means turning away from 
godly things toward things changeable and insecure. 1 By di-
vine disposition and rightJ the,soul is given power to con.:.. 
·trol the godly things by its. wiil.l ·Thus what the mind does 
in terms of choosing the eternal or the.temporal depends only 
upon the will 1 and if .a person misuses it he must be charged 
with its misuse.l This problem brings into question three 
· other poin·ts;: (1} the existence of God, (2) ~hether all goods 
come from Godl and (3) is free will to be considered among 
goods?l 
If God had not given man a :0:-ee will 1 man could not have 
sinned. But Augustine points out that if man was. given a 
free will~ i:t is because he ought to be given such 1 for "all 
good is from God."2 Since all good is from God, and since 
all tnat is just is good, for sinners to pay the penalty and 
1 . Ibid. I il 35.' 
2 . 
. Ibi<i• 1 ii, 1. 
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for the righteous to be rewarded is just~ and, therefore~ 
God has seen to it that Sinners are wretched and the right-
eous are happy. 1 
God is good 1 and all that God creates is good. God ere-
ated man. Man as man is good because he can live rightly 
when he wills. Man 1 s free will is justified though capable 
of sin because without it he would be incapable of right ac-
tion.2 God did not give roan free will in order for hLm to 
sin. God gave man free will~ because without it man could 
not live rightly. 2 .To choose good man must be free. But 
being free does not mean man must choo9e evil. Why, then 
does roan pervert his free will. 3 
Would that roan distort his nature who also reasons the 
existence of God,.4 establishes the existence of immutable 
truth superior and more excellent than roan's roind?5 Manrs 
happiness and joy are to be found in such truth. In truth 
the highest good is known, and since this truth is wisdom it 
6 is to be beheld and in it is grasped the highest good. A 
man may thus use his freedom .to obey the truth: '10ur freedom 
consists in submission to the truth:r and it is our God himself 
-
1 Ibid. t ii/' 2. 2 Ibid. t ii/' 3. 3Ibid. r ii, 4. 
4rbid. ,( iir 14 .. 5Ibid. r ii, 33-34. 6Ibid- t ii, 36-37. 
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who frees us.fro:m deat:.h.nl The death from which weare freed 
is the sta,te of sin. This principle is found in the Gospel 
of Johp.. Jesus addressing his disciples says, 11 If you have 
abided by my worfa, then truly you are my disciples and you 
will know the truth and the truth will make you free.n 2 Why 
woUld a man surrender all that just· to .sin? 
The case for righteousness is even stronger. For no 
. . . ·~ 
-· - . ' 
one can ever lose truth and wisdom against-his will. 3 Augus-
tinets reasoning is -indirect: . nNo thing can form itself, 
because no thing' can give itself that which it has not, and 
assuredly a- thing is formed that.it may have form.n 4 But all 
things are governed b:y providence whence they derive their 
form from that Form which always exists, which is God. 5 Now 1 
free will is among the goods which have been formed by God. 
It .is given only by the Giver of all goods and among the many 
goods which exist there are some that man can misuse •. For 
example~ a man can-m.isusehis body, his hands, his feet,. his 
eyes, and so also his free will. 
The will is a £ree will, because it is nwithin our power ... n 
1-r'l.-... d .. ,;:;:;..L..U::;.::..:;:~::...=? l ~ ~ I 37. 
3Augustine 7 Free Choice, .i.i., 37. 4Ibid., ii, 45. 
5Ib'd '' ==~=•I ~~~ 46. 6 Ib'd . ' . ~ .. I ~~~ 128-132. 
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God also foreknows all. · ese propositions are tnue.: 
that we will what we will.t and .hat God foreknows all that 
is future. 1 Godls foreknowledg of sin does not contradict 
free choice in sinning •.. 
knowledge that someone is 
pel him to sini for God's 
ly means that he has a fore-
to sint but he does not com-
dge is unlimited. He knows 
that certain individuals are go'ng to sin~ but when they sin 1 
they do so through their own 
and has foreknowledge of 
Therefore, "God is just 
of which he is author,· 
but nevertheless He is not the· uthor ot' all things of which 
he has foreknowledge. " 2 were not so~ he would not 
be in a position to puni::;h sinn rs·nor give'rewards ~f fore-
knowledge meant foreordination. 
A person sins }Jecause he w '11 not be master of himself. 
Someone stronger or weaker will get him under his power. 
This is another aspect demonstr ting that free will determines 
whether a person does right or ins. souls are unhappy be-
cause they have willed to sin. But sin and unhappiness are 
. not necessary to the perfection of. the. universe~ althou·;rh 
souls are. Souls may sin if th y will to. 4 . •· The disgrace ·of 
libid.t iii, 6-8. 
4Ibid. i ii.i 1 29-3.2. 
2.Ibid t iii, 9. 
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a sin is corrected by punishment 1 ·so that when a sinning soul 
·is punished, it contributes to the order and perfectionof 
the universe. Therefore, the firstman brought sin into the 
world and the adornment of the penalty suited to.sin, whereas( 
Christ brought the adornment ofmercy to grant freedom from 
sin. 1 
The reason man sins:is that sin originates -from t-v1b 
sources. one is one 1 s own thinking 1 and the other is the 
persuasion of another. The worse ·sin is to sin of one r s own 
volition and to persuade another. than to .yield to another's 
persuasion. In this l.atterrespect the prince of this world 
. who is the prince of all sinners and the one who presides 
over death also is the temptor who persuades men to sin.2 
:Sy striving to understand the invisible things nthe Word 
among menrr man may overcome the devil. 
:Sut the original source of mants sinning is found in 
the cause of man 1 s present suffering. Men suffer as a result 
o;E the original sin ofAdam·and Eve. For vague andmysterious 
reasons a single sin is evil enough no'c Ol.'lly to establish 
responsibility in the free will of the agent (Adam) who did 
it 1 but the responsibility is passed on to every member of 
1Ibid., iiiJ 32 •. 
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the human race. The sin consisted in the act ot Adam and 
:Eve (as narrated) in disobeying the exprf~SS command of God: 
11 You shall not eat of the fruit of the tree which is in the 
garden lest you die.nl 
Not only does.moral responsibility devolve from this 
original sin, but a punishment of such immense proportions 
as to stagger the whole human ra,ce. 
The story itself merits comment;., and the interpretation 
given of it by Augustine is laden withdiff;iculties. 2 They 
may best be treated systematically as follows: 
(1) The story of Adam and :Eve consists of two pha::;esi 
(a) God issued a c6n11-nand which was dLear ly under stood and 
yet not performeq as·commanded. Nothing is said in the story 
to the effect that the disobedience was a sin nor the reason 
for the punishment later meted out. 
(b) The command ·pertainedto the acquiring of the knowledge 
of good and evil, upon eating of the fruit of the tree bear-
ing such knowledge as its fruit. Therefore 1 Adam and Eve did 
1Genesis 3: 3. 
2see Augustine, On the Freedom of the Wi11 1 iii, 56-77. 
Also Faith, Hope,.·and Charity, trans. Rev. Louis A. Arand, 
Vol. III, of The Ancient Christian Writers, ed. Johannes puas-
ton and Joseph l?lumpo (26 vo.ls. ·i Westminster 1 Maryland: The 
Newman l?ress, 1947),· Passim hut especially 90-121. 
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not know the difference between good and evil before they ate 
the fruit of ·the tree (v. 22). It is thus obvious that ah 
the time of the issuing of the command Adam and Eve were not 
free as Augustine claimed. Furthermore 1 it was not nthe will 
taking pleasure in its own power 11 by producing a false imita-
tion.of God which motivated Adam and Eve~> but (1) the obser_. 
vation that the tree was good for foodr (ii) the similar ob-
servation that the fruit was a delight to the eyes; (iii) 
the desire to be made wise. 
The danger of extracting a careful theology or philosophy 
from the story is seen in the story's status as a legendl 
based on mythological fragments.2 The defects in the legend 
become important only if the story is taken too seriously. 
For example 1 after eating the fruit 1 their eyes opened for 
the first time. Yet before eating it they saw it as "a de-
light to their eyes." This defect is of little or no conse-
quence except to indicate the nature of the story which 
Augustine used to explain basic problems in life. 
There is no way of stretching the story into a doctrine 
of original sin 1 moral responsibility or of free will. The 
story is a legend about disobedience. 
(2) According to the account the punishment of Adam and 
lJulius A. Bewer 1 The Literature of the Old Testament 
(New York: Columbia University Press~ 1922)r pp. 60-61. 
2walter Russell Bowie 1 "The Book of Genesis: Exposition~" 
The Interpreter 1 s Bible,ed. Nolan B. Harmo~ I (19521 pp. 501-507. 
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Eve and the whole human race follows the discovery by God of 
what happened. Among other things, the serpent is cursedi 
woman is made to suffer more intently in childbearing; and 
man is destined to a life of toil on cursed ground. To keep 
man from eating from the tree of life whiCh would permit him 
to live forever, God banished him from the garden of Eden, 
the reason being that God wished to keep man from becoming 
like Himi this, in spite of the fact that God had made him 
in His own image to start with. 
Thus Augustine proceeds from Aristotlets simple and self-
contained doctrine of free will, involving responsibility 
and fair and just punishment for evil, and fair and just re-
ward for good1 . to the doctrine of original sin. The story is 
not the whole foundation of Augustiner.s theory of the will. 
He rather used the story as a basis to account for a fact in 
human life. 
That fact pertained to what Augustine regarded as a de-
fect in the relationship of the will to the mind. Are the 
will to do and the power to do the same? 
If the nature of the will is to will itselfr Augustine 
asks, Why is it that when the will commands itself to will 
the will 11 obeys not?nl When the mind co:mmands the body~ the 
body 11obeys forthwith.nl But when the mind conunands the will. 
the results are 11monstrous." The will 1 whose nature is to be 
1Augustine, Confessions,. viii, 9. 
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itself1 does not obey itself. "IJ:Ihe mind commands itself:,-
and is resisted."l If a will is that which wills itself, 
then what a will wills is done, and what a will does not will 
is not done. But such is not the case. The mind "commands 
itself to will, and would not give the command unless it 
willed; yet is not done that which it corornands. 111 
Although the doctrine of original sin exemplifies the 
status of man's will, the problem of the unwilling will in-
dicates that there is an infirmity of the mind.. The mind 
does not 11wholly rise, sustained by truth.nl The mind neither 
wills nor commands entirely. Were the mind entire, the mind 
would not command, becausa what was commanded would already be. 
The effect of -the mind's infirmity results in a doctrine 
of eternal damnation and eternal reward on the same kind of 
evidence used to explain the status of the mind. When, how-
ever, Augustine declares the mind•s infirmity as the explanation 
for the disobedient will, he is not far from Plato•s doctrine 
of virtue based om knowledge. 
A4gustine has also added the factor of meum peccaturn, 
which is a significant concept for systematic thought. Aris~ 
totle•s view of punishment was pointless except as discipline 
for the wicked man or his fellows. Augustine fills the void 
lAugustine; Confessions,. viii, 9. 
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to overflowing by describing the feeling of guilt which man 
has when he. i.s alienated from God. '!'his feeling of guilt is 
the feeling which resmlts from the knowledge of the sin and 
its consequences after the commission of it and/' of course,. 
is not a truly new addition to the circumstances since the 
sinner had the same factors present before he sinned, other-
wise he could not have sinned. '!'he addition to sin of a 
11 guilty conscience" adds factors of vague meaning and pur-
pose to an already overloaded situation~ 
'I'o Will or Not? 
Augustine 1 s doctrine of free will raises many important 
questions. one of these questions results from the attempt 
Augustine made to harmonize the doctrine in Aristotle of a 
will which acts·as its own agent and the doctrine· in Paul1 
of a will which is obedient to God. On the Aristotelian side 
of the question a good will chooses good. An evil will chooses 
evil. on the Pauline side 1 as interpreted by Augustine, a 
will as will is a sinful will. A will ·which uses itself as 
its measure is one which thereby defies good. All else in 
the world is perfect. 
lRomans 6~ 
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The presentation o£ Augustine,s own arguments on whether 
or not the will shou;Ld be exerc.:Lzed indicates how he shuffled 
- . 
his no·tions regarding. a _doctrine of . the will among his pre- · 
suppositions o:E the Divine Nature .and the nature of man. 
-Augustine points out that the· w~ll in its freedom has a choice. 
But the choice becomes clogged by its own po~er. Augustine • s 
argument ·.follows: 
The onJ.y de:Eect in the whole o:t creation is the will to 
sin~ 1 However 1 God has given the sinful nature the power to 
act rightly if it. so will. He grants unhappiness if it does 
not act rightly a:ndhappiness i:t it. does.2. God lacks nothing, 
and therefore if a man does not turn to. him, it is not God 
who loses, but man. ··Therefore since man has a free will 1 he 
ought to give it proper use. 
Now 1 is .there something more basic than the will as the 
cause of the will~ Augustine affirms that to ask for such a 
cause is to be led into in infinite regression. The will it-
self is the :Eirst cause of sin. 3 Based on Paul•s experience 
related in Romans, Augustine asks whether or no·t compulsion 
against the will.may be the first cause. Paul had stated, 
"I do not understand my own actions. For I do no·t do what I 
lpree Choice, iii 1 35. 2Ibid~ ~ iii, 44. 3rbid. 1 iii, 49. 
226. 
want, but I. d.o the very thing I hate. I can will what is 
right but I cannot do it. ;E'or I do not do the good I want, 
but the evil I do not want i.swhat l do.n 1 Augustine declares 
that there is no sin in·such a situation 1 because the will 
as the first cause of sin has not. wiLLed evil but good in 
the experience described, even.though man has yiel~ed against 
his will. 2 As man determines his des.tiny, he chooses among 
the things.seen~ either those from God or from the devil. 
rrif the fsoul] goes out of its w:ay to produce a false i...rnita-
tion of God 1 and to will to take pleasure in its own power, 
then the greater it wishes to becomes the less it becomes in 
fact~ And ·that is pride 1 the beginning of all sin; and the 
beginning of the pride of man is to fall of£ from God."3 
The devil imitated pride 1 whereas, Jesus Christ imitated 
humility, and ~hrough the latter eternal life is promised if 
we cleave to him so that ·nothing can separate us from hirn. 3 
ln a "retractionn which Augustine published pertaining 
to the De Libero Arbitrio he says, 
Because all good things come froll}.God, it follows that 
from God comes the go6d use of free will 1 • which is vir-
tue and is counted among the goods~ Then I spoke of 
lRomans 7: 15~19. · 2Augustine 1 Fre.e Choice-~ iii., 52. 
3 rbid., iii, 76. 
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the misery~ justly inflicted on sinners, from which the 
grace of God frees them, because man could fall on his 
own accord, that is bl his free choice, but could not 
rise in the same way. · . . · 
A free will, therefore! mear;ts freedom to sin, but here he 
clearly affirms that man cannot rise by an act of his will. 
To exercise a ;free will for good is virtue, but virtue, it 
· would seem 1 ·cannot save a man. Salvation can come only by 
the grace of God. 
In Augustine 1 .s. treatise On Grace and Free Will, he shows 
. . 
that it is not necessary· to defend God•.s grace.by denying 
free will nor to defend free will by denying God 1 s grace. 2 
Augustine gives as the basis for positing the free choice of 
will the presupposition of scripture and 'the need to assign 
responsibility for one•s actions. There one discovers that 
free will and sin are not one and the ·same. ·. There are sins 
which.are the result of ignorance, and there c:tre other sins 
which are based on knowledge and ap. act o£ will. Grace means 
simply the nameapplied to God's gift or·help directed toward 
1st. Augustine 1 Retraction1 trans. Dom Mark Pon·tife::8:~ 
Vol. :XXII o£ The Ancient Christian Writers, ed. Johannes 
Quaston and Joseph c. :Plumpo (26. V'ols.; West}llinster, Maryland: 
Newman Press, l955)i i, 227-228. 
2st. Augustine, on Grace and Free Will in the Basic 
Writings of St. Augustine 1 ed. Whitney J ~ Oates · (2 vols <>i 
New York: :Random House, 1948) 1 I, 733. 
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man's benef;it/ and the relationsh;ip o£ grace to man 1 s free 
w;ill is a part of the problem only. because the que13tion ;is 
whether or not the grace of God presupposes that man is free 
or that he ;is captive. Man r s free will does not ;inteJ;fere 
I . . 
with the grace of God/ s;ince Gqd is able to bend man as it 
pleases him. Man's free will is not a limit~tion on the 
power of God. God does whatever he wills ... even to an evil 
or wicked.man. 1 
Augustine wants his doctr;i.ne of free will to include 
both willing,and_not willing. :Eia~h-se~ves aspects of his 
system. The act of God's gracedemands that man's will 
shquld be stilled. Foreknowledge waake.ns the will,1s freedom 
(in spite of Augustine • s denial) because sure foreknowiedge 
would presupp<?Se th~t the outcome of events involving choice 
were :fixed. And though it is true .that foreknowledge is not 
£oreo~d;ination 1 foreknowledge could not.be valid unless fore-
ordination were a fact. 
Fu.r-ther:moJ:"e .... when Augustine attempts to save the good ...... 
ness of God by p!:"oposing the free will as the source of ev;il, 
it is ;Lnconceivable'that he could have salvaged the will's 
, goodness • In the l;igh t o :t Augustine 1 s goods 1 the consequence 
l .. 
Ibid. 1 I.~ 767. 
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of attributing the moral quality t.o the act of choosing peii:J 
se unavoidably led to denying the will as a power~for good 1 
and to affirming sin as the wi'll which takes pleasure in its 
own power. The will as will is not only no longer a poten-
tial power for good but the V'tery: power which res.ists good.l 
But in Augustine free will is weakened not merely by 
the doctrine of predestination and grace. It is weakened 
in the psychological description' .of its natur.e and functions •. 
As' the power of the will functions, its product is aliena ..... 
tion from God. When Augustine forgets Aristotle and the 
early De Libero Arbi trio 1 he s·ays, that it is only when man's 
will becomes submissive~ even silent, that good is produced. 
It is little ~.;onder, therefore f that .Martin Luther should 
have made this a·spect of Augustine 1 s doctrine central: "Man 
wi thou·t ·grace can will nothing but evil. 112 
But no matt.er how far st. Augusti.ne may seem to stray 
from his original position that because God created all things f· 
including a free will, they are good:. 
lJohn J. O'Meara 1 The Young.Augustine (New York: Long-
mans, Green and Company, 1954).~ p. 179. 
2Martin Luther I De Servo Arbi trio,' :trans • J. I r Packer I 
o. R. Johnston (London: James Clark and Company, Ltd. 1 1957) 1 
p.'3l8. 
230 
Tamen si etiam ipsa peccaret¥ sufficeret Dei pot:.e.s-
tas ineffabilis potentiae.ad"regendam istam. universita-
temt ut ·~omnibus congrua et . condigna retribuens nihil ih 
to·to imperio sui turpe atque indecorum esse permi tteret. ~ 
Augustine qualifies his .position by asserting that al-
though the universe is all good, there are degrees in it: 
"Quid enim majus in creaturis q-u.am vita intelligens, aut quid 
minus po·t,est esse quam corpus_ n 2 
Free will is no·t destroyed by the doctrine of grace. 
Rather it is established by grace: 
Liberum ergo arhitrium evacuamus pergratiam? Absit: 
sedmagis liberum arhitrium statuimus. Sicut enim lex 
per fidem sic liberum arbitriu:m non evacuatur 1 sed 
statuitur.3 
The free will as the original power of choice has been dis-
placed by t_l),e perfect freedom granted by the product of God' s 
love whose only true freedom is a divinely ordained love of 
----------------------~----~~~--------~------~--------------·-----
].Augustine.,. De Libero Arbitrio, III.~ 35. (Even if it 
t:"a creature itself destined never to sin.] should sin, the 
inexpressible ability of God's power wou.Ld st'i.Ll su;ffice to 
govern the universe so thatr while rendering to all what is 
fitting and proper, ae would permit nothing base or unbecom-
ing in His whole reaim.) · 
2 . 
Ibid., II 1 46. (For what can be greater in creatures 
than an intelligent life, or what less than a body.) 
3Augustine, :be Spirito et Littera, 52. (Do we cancel 
free will by grace? On the contrary we establish greater 
free .·will. For just as the law is not cancelled but estab-
lished by faithr so also. free will.) 
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God. Man is free not when he does his own will but when he· 
obeys the will of God. 1 
The danger of Augustine's view is well reflected in 
Knudson•s criticism of the modern Barthians: 11 To argue, as 
the strict Barthians do, that our weakness and sinful~ess 
must be absolute~ and that the recognition of any independent 
strength of our own leads tp godless pride, is a piece of 
closet theologizing." 2 
The will as free choice has, for Augustine, only the 
ephemeral status of a rationalization for the existence of 
evil. And though in his more philosophical mood, Augustine 
affirms the will as functioning to choose good, his frequent 
tendency to ascribe opposition to God as the function of the 
will forces the will in its·error, figuratively speaking, to 
commit suicide. 
Augustine restores the will (without its freedom) only 
if it obeys God. When it does this, it is a perfection of 
perfection. 
I 
If man's free will had retained its original nature as 
free choice 1 the question of predestination would have become 
serious. Butl when a man does the will of God, he is not 
lw. cunningham! s. Austin {London: c. J. Clay and Sons, 
1887) ;- p. 95. 
2Albert C. Knudson, The Validity of Religious Experience 
(New York: The. Abingdon Press, 1937)~ p. 209. 
--~-~~~------~~~·-~~··:~~ ..~ .. -.~·~·-···~~~--~-~~ .• :}~~-_.-~--~• ... ~~~··:-1tw.I~ .. $W#~.-~~:~~~~-~-~~~~·· 
.. 
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free in the same sense as before he does it.l God sees how 
everything has been ord~inedr and because he has perfect 
knowledge and willr he has no questions to be answered. Aug-
ustine attempts to retain both predestination and free wil1.2 
His authority for his thinking is scriptural 1 but in 
the explication of free will resulting in perfect freedom 
the controversy disappears. For when man achieves that 
state o~ the good life where his life in the City of God is 
a perpetual Sabbath; his life will be one of perpetual praase. 
And whereas before Adamls sin the first freedom was the power 
to choose to be good or evil, in the last state he will be 
able to choose only not to sin. This will be the perfect ex-
pression of the people of 'the City of God. 3 Ipsi gloria in 
saecula saeculorum. 
Views of the Will Presupposed by Augustine 
Augustine interpreted the problem of free will in the 
light of several plf:esuppositions.. Plato1 Aristotle 1 
Plotinusi and Paul are basic. 
The Platonic Presuppositions to 
Augustine's Doctrine of Will 
Augustine used as the foundation of his theory of the 
will certain notions which he found in Greek philosophy 
lcunninghamr pp. 92-93. 2Ibid. 1 p. 127. 
3Augustine, The City of Godt xxii1 xxx. 
especially in Flato and Aristotle~ Augustine saw these no-
tions .. admittedly in some instances., through the eyes of l?lo-
tinus. He was very much impressed with the specialized 
treatment Plotinus gave to the subject of free will.l Aspects 
of Platonic conceptions found in Plotinuswhich became part 
of Augustine•s theory of the function of the will are (1) in 
order to do good man must know the good; (2) the will func-
tions to mediate between reason and·desire; (3) the body ia 
a source of evil to the soml1 (4) the .soul .is free to choose 
between alternatives (including moral choices)] (5) the soul 
which has achieved its perfection has that perfect freedom 
which comes from the doing of acts which.are perfectly vir-
tuous; and therefore (6) evil is deficiency (alienation from 
God., in Augustine)' measured by the distance the soul must go 
to achieve its perfection 1 (7) the s.oul r s actions are in its 
own power. 
The Aristotelian Presupposition.to. 
Augustinels Doctrine of Will 
Although Plato•s doctrines find their way into Aristotle•s 
lAs found in the Enneads., VI. The eighth chapter of this 
book is entitled: ''Free Will .. and the Will of the One." Plo-
tinus .~ Enneads 1 trans. Stephen MacKenna (2 vols. 1 Boston; 
Charles T. Branford Company/ n.d.). 
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conclusions~ Augustine leaned more to the Aristotelian per-
spective. Except £or the sixth point above 1 Aristotle adopted 1 
with some modification,., l?lato 1 s interpretation o£ those 
£unctions o£ the soul which may be related to a will. The 
notions in Aristotle wh,ich appealed to Augustine include (1) 
praise and blame (approval and disapproval) test whether the 
soulJs actions are "in its power 11 rather than compelled; (2) 
evil is willed as is good; (3) free choice arbitrates between 
reason and desire; (4) desire drags the soul to evili (5) the 
body is the lowest aspect o£ mani reason is the highest £unc-
tion o£ man; (6) the well-ordered life of free choice (good 
will in Augustine) is the rational control of desire moving 
the soul to its per£ection1 (7) evil and good acts are hJame-
worthy and praiseworthy and therefore include punishment or 
reward. 
Five Views of Free Will in PJ.otinus 
The fact that Augustine viewed Plato and Aristotle through 
Plotinus suggests the appropriatepess of axxirming several 
£actors Ln Plotinus which were important to Augustine. 
(J.) In order to release.the One from responsibility for 
the existence of evil 1 men (though actually not desiring to 
sin) are the doers (agents) of evil by their own choice.l 
lplotinus 1 Enneads, III, i, 4~ and IIIr ii 1 9-J.O. 
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(2) A free will is one in· which (a) "we are master to 
perform" 1 (the agential power :being in the individual) and 
in which (b) man is self-disposed .to do or not do any act 
nin ·ourselves.nl 
(3) A free will is choosing right or wrong ~cts with 
knowled~e but under .no cqmpulsion. · 
(4) In true knowledge the free will acts as right rea-
soning and thereby exerts its effort to do good in obedience 
t . t h. h t . . ht 2 o ~ s ~g es ~ns~g s. 
(5) Thus 1 freedom springs from the activity of Divine 
;Mind and functions in obedience to the proposals emanating 
therefrom. 2 
Plotinus has developed the doctrine of freedom from its 
most primitive elements to its highest and most complex func-
tions. They may be outlined as follows: 
(1) WiLL as self-causation1 the origimiting power (meta-
physical freedom)"= (2a) above 
(2) Will as the ability to choose {psychological freedom) 
= (2b) above 
{3) Will as the ability to choose right or wrong (moral 
freedom) = (3) above 
libid., VI, viiit 1 .. 2Ibid. 1 VI, viii, 4. 
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(4) Will as the choice of (obedience to) the right'when 
the opposite (choice of wrong) _would be spiritual slav-
ery (ethical freedom) == · (4) above 
· (5) Will as obedience to the proposals (Will) of the 
Divine Mind (Theological freedom) = (5) above 
Plotinus sees in the functions of the free will the 
growth of the soul from {1) its earliest power of blind caus-
ation by whim, to (2) arbitrary choice~ to (3) moral choice/" 
-to (4) the right choice 1 to (5). obedience to the One. The 
will moves from its own individuality into unity with the dne--
the flight of the ·alone to the Alone . 1 ;For ;E>lotinus~- .each 
of the five doctrines mf the will has its. proper place in 
the scale ofhuman achievement~· One doctrine does not exclude 
another i but, in facti .. in its proper· place.~ presupposes the 
others. The one at the beginning becomes perfect by unity 
with the one at the End~ 
The Pauline Pres.uppositions to· Augustine's 
Doctrine. of Will. (Romans 5-H) 
The task of deriving a doctrine of will from sacred writ-
ings is immense~ Rather than to assume the task of tracing 
such a doctrinel' it is more appropriate to point to the 
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aspects in Paul•s thought which may appear to be relevant. 
To what extent theology has strained the texts of scripture 
cannot be examined here. What can be examined are the fact,.... 
ors upon which Augustine depended in order to weave his sys-
'· 
tem using the categories he had understood in Plotinus. only 
the briefest consideration is possible to this study. 
There are many factors to which Augustine referred as 
foundation principles. ;Among the.se there are several deserv-
ing emphasis. 
(1) "In everything God works for good~nl Therefore the 
existence of evil in the world must be seen as the just wrath' 
of God worxing against the wickedness of men who have brought 
suffering .. 2. 
(2) A sinful will is one which has chosen iniquity (to 
live "according to the fl.esh"). 3 When that choice is made, 
nit is no longer I that do it, but sin which dwells within 
me."4 The .. philosophical definition of the will. is not ex-
plicit but apparentlypresupposed,. 
(3) The will is in every instance related to a moral 
judgment. The will is related to goods or evils already 
lRomans 8: 28. 
3Romans 6: 19; 8: 15. 
2;R.omans 1.: l8. 
4Romans 7: 17. 
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known or defined by scripture or experience. The will is 
therefore obedient to a standard. 1 It s-ets its mind on the 
Spirit which is ,li£e and peace."2 
(4) .A will which obeys the standards of right living is 
thereby no longer itself functioning. Christ .enters in and 
dwells there. This is the spirit of God in man which makes 
men His sons. Thus Christ had said 'the who loses his life 
. 3 
£or my sake will find it." . Or againr "whoever humbles him-
self will be exalted. n 4 And 1 finally 1'~ou will know the 
truth and the truth will make you, free. 1' 5 
(5) The obedient will is not measured by righteous acts. 
It is rather measured inwardly by nsearching_the hearts o£ 
men."6 Righteous acts are·the fruits o£ an obedient will--a 
man ·led by the Spirit of God. 
(6) Sin and suffering s~parate man from God in £act 
bringing death to man as their wages. 7 But ·this is man 1 s 
original stl!.ate. His complete or true state is to be made 
perfect by yielding to Godi for in mants final state 1 nothing 
can separatehim £rom the love of God in Christ. 8 
lRomans 6: 17. 2Romans 8: 6. 3Matthew 10: 39b. 
4Matthew 23: 12b. 5Jo~_8: 32. 6:aomans 8: 27. 
7Romans 6; 23. BRomans B: 39 .. 
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(7) M,an1 s rig-hteousness or sin is not his own affa.ir 
nor .even the affair of his fe.ll·owmen.l Man• s liability £or 
his fuoral life is not from men but from God.2 Therefore 
the consequences of sin are not. in man (l?lato) . nor o.ne t s 
fellowmen (Aristotle) but directly controlled by God. 
(8) God 1 s foreknowledge and predestination are identi-
. . 3 
fied in a single concept. · . Foreknowledge applies to God r s 
prior knowledge of the "people whom he foreknew." That:is, 
the Jews in particula.rr the prophets, the remnant 1 the 
"children of the promise 1 114 even·christ, were sent by God 
into the world to redeem it. .In .this sense he foreknew them .. 
But these men were predestined to perform what God co:mmanded 
them. They were eternally committed to the will of God. 
God called them to their task; he gave them a will to p(?rfect 
righteousness (he justified them) and rewarded them with 
eternal glory. Thus l?aul says'" 
We know that in everything God works for good with 
those who love himj who are called according to his pur-
pose. For those whom he· foreknew he also predestined 
to be conformed to the image of his Son,· in order that 
he might be :the first born among many' brethren. And 
those whom•he·predestined he also called; and those whom 
he called he also justified; and those whom he justified 
he also glorified.s 
lRomans 14: lOa. 
3Romans 8: 26. 
2Romans 2: 29b; 3: 19; and 14: lOb. 
4;a.omans 9: 8. 5;a.omans 8: 28-30. 
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Predestination thus does not apply to the whole human 
race but only to nthe elect"·wliose function it is to recon-
cile the whole world to God. 1 :It is only by distorting this 
passage pertaining to foreknow~edge and predestination in 
order to make it conform to the tales of the Last Judgment 
that a·doctrine of the predestination of sinners to eternal 
damnation can be ascribed to P~ul. But Paul had such utter 
i 
faith in God's power to reconc~le the whole world to himself 
that he urged men to the moral !principle of overcoming ''evil 
with good." 2 For a doctrine o:f; predestination to be extended 
' 
to include a realm of the ater:q.ally damned is not only not to 
overcome evil with good but to 'create an eternal realm of 
opposition to God who was worshipfully conceived as working 
for good in all things. 
(9) The feeling of guilt .Jts added to the act of sin. 
But so also is the feeling of ~alvation added to the right 
; 
actions of the will. The doct~ine that sin alienates man 
from God and that .a good will (right action) reconc~les man 
to God implies a doctrine of guilt and salvation which Paul 
makes explicit. For sin becomes a state not an act. In fact 
an evil act is a proof that the man is in a state of guilt. 
1Romans 11. 2Romans•l2: 21. 
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When he becomes aware of h.i~ evi.l act, his state of guilt 
i . 
becomes a ;feeling o£ guiit~rof accountability to God. 1 In 
I . 
feeling guilt the sinner al~o feels rejected by God,.2 When 
man has willed alienation £1om_God by sinning, his state of 
I . 
sin is the fact that the po"fer of his will has been dis-
1 placed by the power o£ his flesh. ;Reconciliation to God·. 
occurs when the power of the-flesh is displaced by the 
I . 
spirit of God . .Man•s firstlstate is one where he exercises 
. I . 
. I 
a primitive will to choose Jpetween alternatives. His second 
state is one where he sins. I During his second state he 
develops feelings of guilt. Man 1 s third state is one where 
I . . . . 
he has the perfect enjoyment of the glory o£ God. .Man's 
will is not involved in the third state. .Man achieves the 
third state by the grace o£1 God and ;not by his works •3 
. I . . (10) The. act of sin aslthe rule o£ the flesh is an act 
of self .... exaltation, of putt~ng one's self first •. This 1 there-
1 ' 
fore, leads to the conclusitn ofde;fining sin a$ pride. But 
such acts o£ sin as pride w~ich result in the feeling of 
I . guilt are given historical Toundat:Lon in the doctrine of 
. I . original sin. 
i 
.· I . 
(11) Paul posits the dtctrine of original sin based on 
l~omans 3: 19. 
the story of Adam and 





Eve. IAll men share the facto£ the 
and atso the feelings of guilt and re-
I 
jection. 1 But the grace o£ God acting through the gi£t o£ 
Jesus Christ brings justi£ication. God 1 s sense o£ justice 
~s pacif~ed, his wrath ~s s~othed and man can Pe reconc~led 
I 
Py Pelieving with his heartland confess~ng with his lips2 
t~reby making Jesus the LoJ;d-of his li£e and God the ruler 
I . 
o£ Jesus t li£e •. Man.t therefore~ must remove his will to 
sin (by nputting his . body to I de a th1t) and replace his will 
with the reign o£ Christ wh~ in turn is ruled by God. 
~o ~nds of Free lill in Augustine 
and Basic Questions Involved 
I 
There is some validitylto the view that A:ugustine 1 s 
unique £unction in the histdry o£ thought was to unite the 
I 
two streams of thought whi1 represented two movements in 
history (1) the Judeo-Chrisnian and (2) the Graeco-Roman. 
The ideas presupposed above were as was seen woven into a 
single system. Although th~ major aspects of Augustine's 
theory of the will have bee~ presented as a single unit, it 
is important to evaluate hiJ concepts by singling out those 
which need careful scrutiny .I 
I 






Can the Wi~l Bo Good? 
I 
As was noted ·there are\ two states of the will in Augus-
tine: {1) the first state hf the will which is Aristotelian 
free choice (moral and psyctological free will) and (2) the 
last state of the will whic~ is the Pauline love of God 
i (theological and ethical free will) . The will in the first 
sense may be called the frel will, in the second sense, the 
I 
I 
I That there is a good wTll in Augustine based on the 
freedom of the will. 
I 
Greek philosophy in his bacJt-ground is difficult to deny, but 
I 
that perfection means a los1 of will is even more difficult 
to deny. It is equally inc~nceivable that Augustine would 
I 
approve of his critics forc~ng both these ideas into congru-
ency. Happiness is not attJined by human effort. It may·be 
i 
I 
desired,. but is not nin our power. 11 Happiness is a gift of 
God. When a soul achieves ~appiness, it lacks nothing. 
In answer therefore to the question, Can the will do good? 
Augustine would say that ma:nr 1 s will is the cause both of 
i 
moral evil and of moral goo1. As the cause of moral evil 
mants will accounts for the frath of God and the natural evil 
I 
of the world. The good willl is not the source of perfect 
I 
happiness. God is the cause\ of everything and everything is 
I 
on the whole perfect. When ~he soul has achieved the beatific 
i 
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will of God and therefore are not only goodr but perfect. 
I Although Augustine speaks of a will which wishes to 
W~lll 1 follow truth and another ..... which ..is an '1unwilling wi.ll" 
I 
he is not di.viding the willlin two. The will is one faculty 
I 
which as sinful is unwillin~ to follow truth and yields to 
I 
• I 
desire 1 but,. as good,. yield$ to God. 'rhe willing will de-
l 







The Loss of ~~ee Will vs. 
The Loss of Pe:qfect Freedom 
I 
Free will, in Augustin~ 1 has been seen as the most ele-
' 
mental function of the will \as agent. When it i.s lost the 
I 
I 
result i.s that the will los~s its stubbornness and pride and 
achieves perfection. By as~erting free will to make it its 
own object, the result ~s t~e loss of perfect freedom. S~n, 
therefore is the act of will\ which separates man from God. 
! 
Sin does not resul·t in a losls of free will, but i.n the loss 
I 
i 
of that perfect knowledge wh\ic'h was the gift of God to an 
I . 
I 
obedient will. To an obedieft wi.ll, free choice is not lost. 
It would be irrelevant to ~nl obedient will that there was a. 
I 







bad alternative in the choi~e. 
i 
When a man has perfect/ freedom 1 his soul is in perfect 
I 
I 
order. To ask that he have/ the power to choose evil in such 
i 
a situation is irrelevant. I 
!. 
Free Will and Predestinati~n 
Augustine has affirme~ a doctrine of foreknowledge but 
! 
he has denied the doctrine! of predestination. It would seem 
I 
I 
that the only way of sust~ining such a dichotomy would be if 
! 
God were not the cause of./all things. Foreknowledge in 
I 
I 
Augustine•s usage means t~at theevents of the future are 
I 
fixed. If God did not fi~ them, how did they get fixed? 
I 
I 
Augustine mer.ely answers !dispassionately that to know the 
. . . I 
future is different from/determining it .. 
I 
It is of importance to note that Augustine has strayed 
from Paul in asserting a doctrine of eternal damnation for 
. ' 
the evil doers. Paul had asserted that only the elect were 
i 
predestined to reconcil~ng the world to God. 
Augustine is not d1sturbed by this difference. He 
.I 
acc.epts the vision of God in l?aul and notes that when the 
' . 
will is ignited by love), it is bound to God and all the I . ·. 











The Measure of the Power o¥ Free Will 
I 
The exemptions on lia~ility for the. acts of a free will 
i . 
are in Plato, Aristotle an9- Augustine (l) ignorance and (2) j .. 
compulsion. Though AugustJt,ne asserts free will to be a. 
. I 
kind of omnipotence thwarting· even God, ignorance and compul .... 
I 
sion are limitations both 4n liability for actions and on 
I 
the will. The cosmic cons~quences of sin are based on the 
cosmic power of sin. But ~gnora:nce and compul.sion are both 
capable of relieving the w~ll of its liability because they 
have relieved it of its poJ~r. · Augustine adds that the will 
i 
may also do what it knows i\s· wrong by an act of sinful will. 
This {sinful) will is ensla~ed by desire--a desire strong 
I 
enough to turn the will awa~ £rom godly pursuits to its de-
! 
gradation. The willts true\ freedom cannot be gained by know-
ledge, nor by exchanging corpelling powers, but as a gigt of 
the grace of God. I 
I 
The feeling of guilt \ 
Although the doctrine ~f original sin has already been 
evaluated, one aspect of it\de~erves brief comment. The 
I . 
state of alienation from Go1 caused by Adam's sin is repeated 
. I 
I 
in every sin of man. The sense of alienation from God in sin 
I 





that man is a sinner becoies the source of a feeling pervad-
ing man•s soul. which may ~est be described as a feeling of 
I 
guilt. I 
In rectifying the fa1tors rel.~ting to sin man must deal. 
{l) With the act of sin, (r) With his fellowmen WhO hold him 
responsibl.e 1 (3) with God ~ho has been offended and must 
avenge Himselfr and (4) wi~h himself arid his feelings of guilt.l 
conclusion 
I 
It is clear from the lnterpretation of the data that 
there appears to be an obslurity in Augustine's thought which 1 I 
if clarifiedt could resolvt several important problems. The 
! 
free will as ual.l power to\will itself" is the power to choose 
I 
to be good or evil in the ~ense of being the first freedom 
(as, for example, in Adam) 1 In this respect the power of the 
will to choose between al.t~rnatives seems to be free only be-
fore it has made its choic~. Once the will has chosenl it is 
f 1 .. 'h "h 1. no longer ree. It has 1 b~ ~ts cho~ce, e~t er ~ecome a s ave 
I . 
I 
to sin or obedient to God. 1 Again, a free will is free only 
before it chooses. After ,ts choice, depen~ing on what it 
chooses 1 it becomes either \sinful or perfect 1 and there is no 
lsacramentally he doesl this by baptism and conversion. 
,. p·, .,. ,,, ""' ' . :·j· 








free will involvedr but only 
a state or condition. Ma cannot escape from this state or 
condition by his own power for the very'reafion that he has 
lost his power of choice. Only God can interfere and re-
deem man in his helplessners·by an act of grace. 
Before it commits itsklf, the will is free to choose be-
tween sin as exerting itself toward itself and salvation as 
yielding in obedience to Gld. A good will is the state which 
follows from the choice of righteousness and virtue. But the 
will which has chosen temprral things is unhappy. It sees 
the value of·the eternal law but lacking a free will is unable 
I . 
to do anything to become sUbject to that eternal law. In a 
' I 
. I 
sense the free will of cho~ce can only be exercised once 1 
! 
after which it is no longet free. Its choice will be either 
of itself as will or of thl will of God as its perfect peace. 
I 
· 1 I db That the free'wi l caj only act once is expresse y 
Augustine most clearly witl regard to the doctrine of original 
sin as pertaining to Adam 1nd Evels disobedience. In the same 
way~ however, during his 1Jfet£me man has the opportunity to 
exercise free will 1 himselJ 1 and thereby decide his destiny. 
ft h k h . d . . I h ·. 1 f Th f A er e rna es ~s ec~s~o:q, e ~s no onger ree. ere ore1 
I 
the will is within its pow9r and free once. The will will have 
I 
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no other opportunity to c~oose either to be obedient to God 
or obedient to itself alo 
It is possible ce from this that, in willing/ a 
free will loses its freedor either to God or the devil. 
When the will chooses God,\ and obeys him~ it is stilled and 
recepti~e. The will, exerfing itselX, is evil because its 
proper object can only be rod and not itself. Prior to 
choosing between good or eril, there is free will. A choice 
of evil, which brings condemnation, would be a choice of 
bodily desires or ~X puttitg oneselX Xirst. A redeeming 
choice would be the putting of the body to death and becoming 
I 
obedient to Christ and Godl Again, a free will which chooses 
to sin thereby alienates i self from God, whereas the will 
that yields to God achievei perfect freedom. The singular 
act of original free choicl is between conversion and pride-
ful sin. l 
This interpretation o Augustine is not( howeverr without 
problems. At times Augustlne seems to say that man as man is 
capable of free will, 
However, the view that. free choice is exercised only 
once is more consistent wiJh (1) Augustine•s doctrine of 




state of sin and sufferin ~ and (3) his view that the man 
who has achieved perfect eedom is in a state of eternal 
peace and joy. There is course of life an alter-
nation of good and evil s. Damnation is eternal because 
an originally free will chosen disobedience. Similarly 1 
eternal reward follows fror choosing to obey God. 
Prior to the will's w'lling the alternative, free will 
is capable of choosing ei er obedience or disobedience. 
lf the will is disobedient only the grace of God can save 
man because he has lost the very power of choice whid.h could 
have saved him if originally used properly. 
ln the same way, from this conclusion 1 an explanation 
can be given to the problem that when the mind commands the 
I 
. I 
will to will, the will does not obey. Augustine attempts to 
explain this on the basis, first 1 that there is an infirmity 
of the mind. However, when the mind 1 s infirmity is inter-
preted 1 it is seen that it results in a doctrine of eternal 
damnation or eternal rewar This is explained by the fact 
that the mind 1 s infirmity s the result of an originally de-
fective free choice after hich it is no longer £ree. Thus 1 
if the will wills defectiv ly (wills to sin) at the only time 
when i·t is capable of funcJioning freely 1 the result obviously 
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is that the will can not follow its own commands. Rather 
it is a slave to itself but, even more, to evil. But the 
evil will apparently conceives itself as free and capable of 
commanding itself. Thus it commands itself without success 
because in reality its original choice condemned itself to 
a state of eternal damnation awaiting the redemptive power 
of the grace of God. If the cho'ice which results in the 
human state of sinfulness destroys the power of the will to 
determine itself, then the mind in its slavery to its sinful 
state can do nothing except sin. Therefore no matter how 
much the mind commands the will to will, nothing comes of 
it because having chosen sin the will can only thereafter sin. 
One difficulty remains. Augustine claims that sin does 
not result in a loss of free will but only in a loss of per-
fect knowledge. That man can fall on his own accord by free 
choice, but cannot rise in the same way increases the diffi-
culty. If man is allowed only one choice for good or evil in 
his lifetime then the statement that man does not lose his 
free will when he chooses sin is clarified. Free will in this 
sense on the part of the sinner means (1) that the will is 
capable of defying God with a resulting alienation from God; 
and (2) because the will is free to defy God it is therefore 
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responsible for human suffering and exempts God from re-
sponsibility. 
Free will, in Augustine, conceived as an act which brings 
salvation or damnation in its original choice can thereby 
explain problems (such as those cited) which on other presup-
positions become obscured. With this interpretation and the 
distinction between free will and freedom, the discussion of 
Augustine's doctrine of free will may well, for the time be-
ing, come to a close. 
CHAPTER V 
FREE WILL IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF IMMANUEL KANT 
Background Data 
Immanuel Kant was born at ~onigsberg, Germany 1 on 
April 221 1724. His 15.a.Jtents werePiaiilst:s;=~tt~~th-~WoPkedasa 
master saddler in Konigsberg. From his earliest youth Kant 
showed great promise and was especially interested in the 
Latin classics and mathematics and physics. He was a tutor 
in private families in the area until 1755, when he became 
a privat dozent at the University of ;Konigsberg where he 
lectured on such varied subjects as mathematics 1 physics, 
anthropology 1 logic, ethics, metaphysics, and natural theol-
ogy. He was also the assistant librarian at the Royal 
Library. In 1770 he became professor of logic and metaphy-
sics at ;Konigsberg and eleven years later, in 1781, his 
Cri tigue of Pure Reason in its first edi tior.; .. was published 
(the second edition, in 1787). · Kantrs Critique of Practical 
Reason appeared in 1788. The preliminary work done in The 
Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals which appeared in 
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1785 cannot be ignored. Because of the fact that his phil-
osophy did not adhere to the strict doctrines of the Lutheran 
Church 1 he was subject to attack. He tended toward a moral 
rationalism contrary to the current theology. His popularity 
whi.ch had grown immensely from the time of the publication 
of the Critique in 1781~ reached the point where some even 
hailed him as the.second Messiah. He was a man of extreme 
and rigid regularity in his personal habits and his thought 
shows painstaking labor and rigid complexi.ty.1 
The evolution of his thought can be traced from the early 
period when he followed the philosophical thinking of Leibniz 
and Wolff to the influence of the ~glish empiricism of John 
Locke. These thinkers had merely speculative influence on 
Kant. He was not completely brought to life philosophically 
until he was awakened by the work of David Hume. As a result 
of this latter influence Kant developed the problem of his 
critical philosophy: How is experience possible for the 
lBiographies of Kant are legion.· Of considerable value 
are F. :Paulsen, Immanuel Kant, His Life and Doctrine.t t:J:::a.ns. 
J. E. Creighton and A. Lefevre (New York: Charles Scribner•s 
sons, l902)i K. Vorlander, Xmmanuel Kant1 der Mann und das 
Werk~ (2 vols.i Leipzig: Meiner, 1924); and the article under 
"Kant, ;Immanuel 1 11 in the 'Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics, 
ed. J. Haa~ngsi and the Encyclopedia Britannica. 
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conscious subject? 
This question was the starting point for Kant. To answer 
the question reason must undertake the task of self-knowledge 
in order to discover its lawful claims. 1 
Kant•s Fundamental Problem 
Kant's basic problem is to formulate a critique of 11 rea-
son in general~ in respect of all knowledge after which it 
may strive independently of all experience." 1 In another 
sense the question is rrhow much we can hope to achieve by 
reason, when all the material and assistance of experience 
are taken away." 2 To answer these problems means to explore 
the faculty of understanding in order to determine its rules 
and limits. 3 Kant is impressed with the results reason has 
achieved in the fields of mathematics and physics. -e~on 
used in this way he calls theoretical reae~. Kant observes 
that when the theoretical reason functions~ it brings with 
itself a priori principles by which it determines what it 
finds in experience~ the world of sense or phenomena. The 
1 rrnmanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Norman 
Kemp Smith (London: Macmillan and Co. Ltd., 1958), A~ xi. 
2Ibid., A, xiv. 
3Ibid. t Ar xvi. 
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theoretical reason uses its own laws or categories to 
measure e~perience. But its laws or categories can only 
measure objects of actual or possible experience. Objects, 
such as Godr freedom, and immortalityr are not possible to 
experience and thereforer theoretical reason cannot apply 
to them because it has nothing to use as a measure. Specu-
lative reason may pretend "transcendent insight" but its 
principles cannot apply to "what cannot be an object of ex-
peri.ence. 111 Thus the prac:E.ical extension of pure reason is 
impossible. 2 The theoretical reason has e~cellent success 
in the sciences and mathematics. 
Kant suggests that knowledge can be related to its object 
in another way than that of the theoretical reason whichr in 
the broadest senser measures its object. The knowledge of 
its object may be that of T!making it actua1.n 3 This is the 
practical knowledge of reason. Both kinds of reason must be 
dealt with separately. 
In dealing with the a priori knowledge of the theoretical 
reason it is found that the knowledge derived therefrom nhas 
4 
to do only with appearances." The theoretical reason may be 
2As speculative. 
4Ibid.,_ B 1 XX~ 
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a~plied to the world of experience (appearances) but cannot 
transcend the 11 limits of experience and of all appearances."l 
When it attempts to do so 1 it reports failure and confesses 
that the thing-in-itself 1 the real per se, is "unknown by us." 1 
But man is not satisfied with this answer and is forced by 
the unconditioned to go beyond the appearances in order to 
posit things-in-themselves which reason demands for the com-
pletion of the series of conditions. 1 
But when theoretical reason attempts to treat the uncon-
ditioned 1 the thing-in-itself~· in the same way that it does 
objects of empirical knowledge the result is hopeless contra-
dictions. The contradictions vanish when the theoretical rea-
son recognize$ that its mode of representation of its objects 
applies to the appearance of its objects but not to the 
thing-in-itself. 
Therefore 1 when the supersensible is declared off limits 
to the theoretical or speculative reason, man still insists 
on getting beyond the appearances to the thing-in-itself. 
The answer to this problem may be found in the practical data 
of reason. 2 From a practical point of view and in the 
llbid. I B xx. 
2Ibid. 1 Br xxi-xxii; these data are the moral acts of a 
free will discussed later on pp. 259- 263 of this study. 
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practical knowledge of reason, the data may be found to give 
reason a transcendent concept of the unconditioned, the 
The Critique of Pure Reason therefore gives the limits 
to the speculative reason so that the practical reason may 
do its work assured: that reason will not be 11brought into 
conflict with itself." 2 But there are two presuppositions 
basic to the functioning of the theoretical reason: (1) 
"Nothing in a priori knowledge can be ascribed to objects 
save what the thinking subject derives from itself. '' 3 (2) 
Pure reason is a wholly separate "self ..... subsistent unity~' 3 
Metaphysics is the complete explication of these two principles. 
When the principles of the thinking subject are defined 
and their limitations apeertained, because of the unity of 
pure reason 1 the result will be a complete description of 
the possible employment-of pure reason in its speculative 
functions in experience and also in its practical applications 
in the supersensible. Thus, for example, a free will taken 
as appearance is subject to the J.aws of nature and therefore 
not free, but as belonging to the thing-in-itself, a free 
will is not subject to the J:.aws of nature and therefore is 
•2 Ibid., B, xxvi .. 
., 
free~ 1 The soul, as free, cannot be known by the speculative 
reason but only by the practical or moral employment of pure 
reason. 
Kant 1 therefore,has limited the speculative reason in 
order to make possible the 11 inner experiencen2-~the practical 
extension of pure reason--faith. 3 
Karit 1 s Method 
Kant calls his method transcendental or critical.4 In 
the examination of reason a priori rules are discovered in 
persons 11 to which all objects.of experience necessarily con-
form."5 The nature of these rules or principlesr their rela-
tion to all other rules and principles and their universal 
and necessary application to the obj.ects of experience are 
all part of the procedure involved in transcendental or 
critical philosophy. The method is applied to the question 
"How are synthetic a priori j"tl.dgments possible'?116 Based on 
the proposition that "we can know a priori of things only 
what we ourselves put into themn 7 Kant's method "consists in 
looking for the elements of pure reason in what admits of 
confirmation or refutation by experiroent~ 7 The elements or 
lrbid. r B, xxviii. 2Ibid., B, xi. 3Ibid. 1 B 1 xxx. 
4Ibid. r Bt 27. 5Ibid., B, :&:viii. 6Ibid • .r B,. 73 .. 
7 Ibid. 1 Bf xviii. 
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principles-are tested for applic.a-t;.ion (1) to objects of the 
senses and the understandingi (2) to objects of mere thought. 
The outcome of the discussion of the problem of the 
principles which reason applies to the realm of appearances 
is that those aspects of life which·are not appearance are 
left to-be considered in another way~ The speculative rea-
son (scientific cognition) is limited to the realm of nature 
and can. in no sense provid~ information pertaining to the 
realm of self-consciousness as such, or what is more inclu-
sive, the concepts of ¢l.uty and morality. The aim, therefore, 
of the practical reason, which in a measure is like the 
practical reason in Aristotle, is to determine the meaning 
of a free sel;f-<cons~iousness andhow it is to be understood 
in the_light of the practical reason. The Critique of Pure 
Reason made the point that ·the conceptions of God 1 freedom, 
immortality, morality, and all of t;b.e experiences of self-
consciousness or self-detE:rmination .cannot be found as objects 
q~ · '·" the scientific cognition which interprets nature. The 
use of the critical method reveals the divisions of knowledge. 
In the Fundamental·Principles of the Metaphysics of 
Morals, ~ant proposes three studies into which philosophy has 
been divided: Physics 1 Ethics, and Logic .. Rational knowledge 
is divided into what is material and what is formal. The 
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for.mal aspect is the concern of logic. The formal philosophy 
discusses the form of the understanding and of the reason in 
order to establish the universal laws of thought. The mater-
ial phiJ.osophy 1 however 1 is concerned with an object. In the 
study of the determinate objects and the laws to which they 
are subj-ect it is affirmed that they are either the laws of 
nature or of freedom.. The science which studies the laws of 
nature is physics (natural philosophy) and that which studies 
the laws of freedom is ethics (moral philosophy). 1 
Logi~ in establishing the universal and necessary laws 
of thought, can not have an empirical part. However, natural 
and moral philosophy each have an empirical part since natural 
philosophy is concerned with the laws of nature as an object 
of experience, whereas moral philosophy deals with the laws 
of the human will in so far as it is affected by nature. 
The laws of nature describe things as they -happen 1 whereas 
-----·-~-·------ -·--------·~· ----~----·----~-------·-···--... --.. -~--··--·· ---- .. -~...---"'----··---
-the laws of moral philosophy are "the laws according to which 
'--•··----,----'"""'••--• .. ·---,., •. •·· ·•-· ,._._ - _..' '"'·'' ~- ......... ,.,.., _ __, •. , .. - ···-· -•·· •• •" • -•--•- -.- .. ,,,.,~"•·•-....... --·~·,j., .• ,. ... ., ........ • • ·-• •'· , .. ,-,.,,_..,.. ... ,_........,,,"<4 
everything ought to happen. 111 When the study of ethics bases 
~ ... _..---~--......... _ •. ,._, ···----- ... -·~--..~--~<e-<> ............. ,_.,_.,. ... _,.._ -------
its doctrines on a priori principles alone, it is referred 
------~ ---~- .... ~-----.................. -~-----
- I 
1Kant 1 Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of 
Morals 1 trans. T. l<- Abbott 6 (New York: The Liberal Arts 
Press, 1949) 1 3. This work will hereafter be referred to 
as Morals. 
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to as pure philosophy-and because it is restricted to the 
objects of the understanding it is called metaphysics. Thus 
Kant's subject is a metaphysic of morals. 1 
--~"to:.!..-."c;._ ..... ., ...... ;.,...._,....._,__......---~._.,._,-~.,·<tor.:..-:.'·~·-: .. ~~.....-""""·...,.,_ .... , ....... ~.·-.. :.>·;;.:, •• c.... -;·-·:~" --:.:-· .... 
Such a study is not based on the knowledge· of man him-
self (anthropology). It is rather a study which gives man 
laws a priori as a rationalbeing. 2 
The Pistinction Between a priori 
and Empirical Judgments 
Kant describes a judgment as rrnothing but the manner in 
which given modes of knowledge are brought to the objective 
unity of apperception." 3 Judgmentis the nmediate knowledge 
of an object. "4 A judgment is a priori if it is universal 
and necessary.S A judgment "borrowed solely from expe;riencen6 
is an empirical (a posteriori) judgment. 
Analytic and Synthetic Judgments 
Kant makes a ftirther distinction between judgments. 
Analytic judgments are ·those in which the connection between 
the subject and the predicate is thought through identity. 
The predicate adds nothing to the subject. Synthetic judgments 
1Ibid. 1 4. 
4Ibid., Br 93. 
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are those in which the connection between subject and predi-
cate is thought without identity. The predicate adds to the 
subject what was not in the subject. 1 
Speculative and Practical Reason 
These preliminary statements of Kant's method indicate 
his interest in investigating the function of reason and the 
procedure he uses in that investigation. The methodological 
considerations were aimed by Kant at building a high wall 
a~ound the world of appearances (phenomena) which could be 
exploited by science without restraint. Beyond that wall was 
the realm of the unconditioned, the inner self 1 God 1 freedom, 
and immortality and the highest good. The restrictions placed 
on speculative reason were put there in order to give room to 
· the practical reason. 
It must be clearly understood that there are not two 
reasons, one functioning in experience and the other function-
ing in the supersensible. The pure practical reason and the 
pure speculative reason are ultimately one and the same reason 
distinguished merely in reason's application. 2 The specula-
tive reason has its a priori principles by which it judges its 
empirical objects. These were fully discussed in the Critique 
of Pure Reason. ~n the Critique of Practical Reason Kant pro-
poses to explore the principles which reason applies to the 
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thing-in-itself. The most important of these involves the 
Highest Good. 
The Highest Good 
The Highest Good belongs to the realm of the thing~in-
itself. Kant reasons that two characteristics make an action 
morally good~ First, it must-conform to the moral lawi sec-
on~ 1 and more important, it must be done for the sake of the 
law.l A will based on such actions is found to be a pure 
will :if it is rrdetermined solely from a priori principles 
without any empirical motives. 112 The ascertaining of such a 
will involves beginning with a •tgood will. 11 Thus, 11 Nothing 
can possibly be conceived in the world 1 or even out of it, 
·which can be called good without qualification except a 
good will.n 3 A good will is not the only good. It is the 
only absolute good, i.e., a good called good without quali-
fication. 4 
Now a good will means a will determined by rational 
principles. on the one hand, Kant observes that 11 everything 
----···.--~...._ _____________ ~---··----~--
5 in nature wo~:J$:s __ a.cQording to laws . " On the other hand he 
-----· ------·- . ··-·' .... ·-- . 
libid., 6. 2Ibid. I 7. 3Ibid., 11. 
4cf. A. D. Lindsay, Kant (London: Ernest Benn Ltd., 
1934)1- p. 211. 
5Kant, Morals, 36. 
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notes that "rationa~ beings alone have the faculty of acting 
according to the conception of ~aws--that is,. according to 
principles/ that is 1 have a will. Since the deduction of 
actions from principl~s requires reason~ the will is nothing 
but practical reason."1 When thereason imparts laws which 
are aimed at determining the willr the will from its nature 
is not required of necessity to ;follow these determinations 
of reason. The laws 1 therefore,. are not laws of necessity 
but of obligation. 
The conception of an objective principle, in so far 
as it is obligatory for awill,. is called a command (of 
reason) 1 and the formula of the command is called an 
Imperative .. 
All imperatives are expressed by the word ought Eor 
shall]r and thereby indicate the relation of an objective 
law of reason to a will which from its subjective con-
stitution is not necessarily deter.mined by it (an obli-
gation) .. They say that something. would be good to do or 
forbear 1 but they say it to a will which does not always 
do a thing because it is conceived to be good to do it. 
That is practically goodr however 1 which determines the 
will by means of the conceptions of reason 1 and conse-
quently not from subjective causes.!' but objectivelyr that 
is, on principles which are valid for every rational 
being as such.2 
A holy or divine will is a volition which is already of 
-----------~--------~·"'~r··•-,.,,_.,,.,,-•-•"·~····•-·- ,._ •-•,• ,,_ ~~~· 0 •'' - -• •-• 
itself necessarily in uni.$0:0.. with the law, and, ::therefore 1 
---- -- ------ ------------~ ... ---------- -----·--- --------- ,..,._, ___ '"" <...'>·- .-..~-~-- ............ __ _,,._.,,_,. ,• 
the idea of obligation or oughtdoes not apply .. 
--------------~--..,,-~....__ ....... _,_r- --- ~-----··-.... --~ . --~- -·-- _ .. __________ ,_,.. __ -~ .... -. ........... -·· 
2rbid., 37. 
266 
A good will is 1 therefore 1 one which does good without 
limitations. It is the only absolute good. It consists of 
the "conceptipn of lawn !3lld is possible only 11 in a rational 
being,.nl ·lt must be emphasi.zed.that i.t is the conception of 
law and not the effect which determines the quality of the 
will. Such a law is a .:t-aw in g.eneral and does not assume 
particular laws applicable to certain functions. The prin-
ciple of such a law is a maxim and more specifical~y the 
maxim that '•I am never to act otherwise than so that I could 
also will that my maxim should become s(~~i.v:-~~~~-·"'i;_~~-~-·3 
----::._. _____ ------· 
A good will is good not because of.it.s utility nor. any in-
-clinations but because it is good in itself. The object of 
a good will is not the happiness or satis£action o:E life, 3 
but to produce a will good in • itself. And though this i.s 
not the only or complete good, it is the supreme g~od and 
the only unlimited or unqualified good and the condition of 
all other goods including the desi.re for happiness:. 
such a will is not only not tested by·utilityor by the 
' 
inclinations,. but is devoid of both.. Since it "exists already 
in the sound .natural understanding 1 'i it is a notio:h to be 
. ·. 4 
rrcleared up 11 rather than 11 to be taught.n· It is reason 1 s 
1Ibid.l 21. 3:rbid., 14. 4Ibid.t l6 .. 
-
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"highest practical destination to establish a good will." 1 
Such an achievement is the good will•s own satisfaction de-
rived from the attainment of an end determined by reason.~ 
A man l s goodness~ therefore-~ is measured __ p..,Y._j;:,h,e_de.gx.aa .•. to 
----------------··----·---···---·-···-'"-~···-··-··-·~··----
which ~is will is subject to reason. The attainment of the 
r-- ~---------- . 
----- ____ , __ . 
supreme good is not achieved~y effects or results; for-~ 
the supreme good 1 as the will of the rational being, is the 
conception of law nalready present in the person who acts 
n2 
accordingly. 
Man, howeverr is not governed at all times by reason. 
Sometimes his wants and inclinations (in the name of havpi-
ness) oppose his reason and attempt to corrupt and destroy 
the worth of the laws which reason proposes. But reason 
carries on with disregard and contempt for the opposing 
claims of the wants and inclinations. 3 Thus Kant attempts 
to give a philosophical explanation to Paul's experience 
prov~catively expressed in the book of Romans: ni do not 
do the good I want 1 but the evil I do not want is what I 
do. 114 To explain this moral fact of life, Kant turns to the 
notion of duty. 
Duty 
For Kant, the concept of duty involves three propositions: 
libid. 2Ibid. 1 21. 3Ibid. I 26. 4Romans 7: 15. 
,-
2;68·' 
. <· ,; .• J -~ 
(l) ~he genuine moral worth of an action requires that ithe 
done riot from inclination but-from ~uty.l For example~ hap-
pines,s may be defined by those who disregard-the concept of 
duty as the combination of all inclinations in one total. 
-But if a man acts to· satisfy an inclination in .order to se-
cure happiness, his action has no moral worth because he 
should ''promote hia ·happiness not from inclination but from 
duty. 112 A will tossed about by the incl~ations or wants is 
~ . .:: ...... ,.,............:..· .. · 
......... _... "·-···~· 
-· ~v. · c.-_,...,._..,,~_...._,,.__c..,...-...... -.o..., ., ~, '· •• ,. '"'~"-"..-~•··"•'' • ·• ~· . __ ,.._. ~-..,•· ·-•·•• •. - '" _.,. ,., . .,, ,., -·· ~,, ,. -·-- __.....,.,1 __ ..,._, __ _ 
not a moral will. Philanthropy per£or.med £rom sympathy or 
.. ---,. 
from self-intert:st may deserve pra;Lse and encouragement1 but 
~..:.."l--~_.. .... ...,....,.,.~or.-:;!.,..,z..,,o ... ••:e.~.~ ..... ,.."'.'·'>~--
J:lcit esteem whi·ch is -based on moral worth .. 
~he second proposition pertaining to· the concept of duty is 
{2) ~hat an action done from duty derives its worth 1 not 
from the· purpose which is tohe_ attained hy it_, but from 
the maxim by which it is determined1 and therefore does 
not depend on the reali.Zation of the object of the action)' 
but merely on the principle of volition by which the 
action has taken place 1 without regard to any object of 2 - -desire •. 
~husr the purpose or effect of· an act does not give the act 
moral worth. Assuming will. to mean p_urpose,G~t insists 
-~-
that the unconditional or moral W9x:th &f.~..an.-- act does not lie ~----- - --------- ---- ---------- . . - ..... ___ _.,,;o.----~--~---.... -~- - ~ 
in .the will or in the effect of the act._ .. Tha..:worth lies in 
- . -------···--------. .,_ ----~- - . . ,-.-< . .- -----~-------------- .. ----y-----·~'C' .- --·-- ·--. -
the "pri~cipl.e of the will withoU.~ !~<:3.'~;--~ .. --"t9 the ends which 
c- ________________________ , ---- .-- ->' --- •• ~-
·-· ...,., _________ . ·- --~·- .. 
~ant, Morals , 18 •. --
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can be attained by the action.n1 In this case the will 
stands between its formal a priori principle and its material 
'ta posteriori. sg~:gst. .. "l An action done from duty is so de-
ter.mined, after every material principle has been withdrawn, 
by the formal principle of volition. 
The third proposition is that (3) "duty is the necess-
ity of acting from res.pect for the law. 111 l<antts interpre-
tation of this proposition is more.fully expressed as follows: 
An action done from duty must wholly exclude the influ-
ence of inclination and every o}Jject of will, so that 
nothing remains which can deter.mine the will except ob-
jectively the law, and subjectively pure respect for 
this practical law, and consequently the maxim that I 
. should £ollow this law even to the thwarting of all my 
inclinations.2 
:Sy a maxim Kant means ''the subjective principle of vo-
lition.... The practical law is the objective principle which 
is that principle which would serve as "a practical principle 
to all rational beings if reason had £ull power over the 
faculty of desire." 3 
Therefore, Kant has defined duty as the.awareness and 
the commitment to one 1 s moral obligations regardless of the 
influence o;f the inclinations. Duty is motivated by nothing 
except itself, i.e.~ the co11ception of law it finds in itself. 
l Ibid • ., 20. 3Ibid .. 1 21. 
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In this respect duty and the good will are motivated in the 
same way, that is to say, each is self-motivated. To he 
motivated otherwise is to str;Lp all moral worth from both 
the good will and duty. 
Kant has here given a profoundJ.y significant answer to 
Aristotle 1 s criticism of Plato in which Aristotle made praise 
and blame the test of the moral significance of an aqtiol:l. 
This implication of the Kantian position is derived from 
~t's contrast between prudence and duty. Duty, as the 
'rnecessi ty of acting from pure respect for the practical law"1 
e::-.,____..,., ________ .._ ___ .. -~-~·~·'',.-""'•--~-~ .. - .... ~·, ... ...._ .. ___ ._,...._,..---·- .. -~,.,.,...~,~...- ... _: .. ,..u•'"''"-t·....,...C'<"r".._.v ....... , ........... ,..,..,.., .• , .. 
gives an action its moral worth for the very reason that its 
moral significance is its very own and not derived from; some 
--------~-- --------- -~ -- ---~---·--"'·-~, .. ------~-----·-·· 
.. -··-- ----. -~---~ ~-- .. 
'·._ ···------·· .... ..-......... . 
other aspect of the act .. 
~----.··-·--~-·-·-···· 
Moral worth is assigned to duty 
~ -.- ......... ···-- ...... -., ....... _ ............ - ,.-. -~ ...... . 
or••,•':••L<'o' 
·---···-·-···-···'""· 
for i.ts own sake. In the case of prudence, the actts worth 
is based or derived not from _:tlle .act_ .. as prudent but_ from 
the consequences. 
--._;__ ___ ....... 
Therefore, if a person perfo:ons a good act not for the 
sake of that act hut from fear of consequences or apprehensio 
of injury, the moral aspects of the act are lost. To he 
truthful for the truth1 s sake is morally significant, hut 
to be truthful because to be otherwise means receiving 




punishment is morally empty. Praise and blame may relate to 
matters of public utility, but they can never, for Kant, be 
the grounds for genuine moral worth. Prudence may suggest 
that a man teill. the truth in one instance and that he lie in 
another. To have a pr~ciple which leads to such contradic-
tions is to have a principle that "destroys itself .. 111 
Thus although societymay function on the bas±.s of re-
wards and punishments, there is no genuine moral worth in an 
action done ;for a reward or rejected because of punishment. 
In a truly moral act motivation must be intrinsic to the act 
and not to an external aspect or consequence of the act. 
What a good will or bad will is cannot be discerned by whether 
the will is praiseworthy or blameworthy, but by a condition 
in the will itself. By reasoning man discovers what he must 
do to be honest 1 good 1 wise 1 and virtuous.. "What a man is 
hound to do, and therefore also to know"2 is in the reach of 
, .. 
every man, including the commonest. Accordingly, in reveal-
ing to man what he is bound to do 1 reason is dealing with ob-
ligations which it issues as commands or imperatives. 








Reverence for the Law 
To disc~ose how the reason functions in rendering its 
commands~ Kant asserts that a command (of rep.spn) is 11 the 
conception of an objective principle, in SiP·. £ar as it is 
obligatory for a will."l An imperative is the formula o£ 
the command. More comprehensively, I<ant declares that 
11 Imperatives are only formulae to e;K.i?ress the relation of 
objective laws of all volition to the.subjective imperfection 
of the will of this or that rational being, for example, the 
human will.n2 Imperatives are either h~~~e::f::f::C@,.:l.,._.Q;c._.c.a:te-
r---------·--
. gorical. The hypothetical have to d~ with means; the cate-
--- ,r.' .... "• .. -------~ '• • • - -
gorical have to do with actions which are necessary in and 
The imperfection·. ;of the will is the w.ill 
.··~ . 
of themselves. 
dependent on subjective causes such as inclination and inter-
est. A desire dependent on sensation is called inclination, 
and gives rise to what Kant refers to as a wa.nt.. An interest, 
on the other hand 1 is ttthe dependence of a contingently de-
terminable will on the principles of reason." 2 
Although everything in nature works according to lawsr 
rational beings alone have .a will--11 the faculty of acting 
according ,:t£. the conception of laws. 111 But a will that is 




not thoroughly good is a rational will which is determined 
(obligated) by principles of reason which the will by nature 
does not of necessity follow. Hence the formula for the 
principle obligatory to the will is the Categorical Imperative: 
"Act only on that maxim whereby thou canst at the same time 
will that it should become a universal law.nl Kant couples 
this principle with the imperative of duty which reads: 
"Act as if the maxim of thy action were to become by thy will 
a universal ~law of nature~ "1. 
Kant's principle of reverence for law per ~is not only 
reflected in his definitions of a good will, duty, and the 
Categorical Imperative. He defines another instance of his 
principle in his conception of the kingdom of ends by which 
he means that "all rational beings come under the law that 
each of them must ±reat itself and all others never merely 
as means, but in every case at the same time as ends in them-
selves." 2 In the kingdom of ends everything has value or 
d . . 3 J.gnJ.ty. The law based on the principle of the kingdom of 
ends, when applied to the will 1 leads to the most important 
principle of all morality for Kant 1 namely, the principle.of 
the autonomy of the will. 
lrbid. I 47. 2Ibid. r 63 • 3 Ibid. r 64. 
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Doctrine of the Will 
The principle of the autonomy of the will presupposes 
a clear understanding of what Kant means by the will. He 
appears to be saying that the faculty which translates 
principles into action is the wil1. 1 Because the deduction 
of actions from principles requires reason·,. 11 the will is 
nothing but practical reason." 1 The principles which deal 
·with the means for attaining some possible purpose are called 
imperatives of skill. 2 When a person turns his skill in 
choosing means to the greatest well being for himself~ he is 
3· 
called prudent. · The will, accordingly, is conceived as "a 
faculty of dete;r.-mining oneself to. action in accordance with 
the conception of certain laws. 114 The end "serves the will 
as the objective ground of its self-determination.',4 'l'he 
means is the "ground of the possibility of the action." The 
spring is the subjective ground of the desire; the motive is 
the objective ground of the volition. 4 The autonomy of the 
will is that property of the will "by which it is a law to 
itself (independently of any property of the objects of vo-
lition) ."5 The principle of autonomy then is: 11Always so to 
libid./" 36. 
4Ibid. 1 55. 
2Ibid. 1- 39. 
5Ibid. r 71 
3 Ibid. r 40. 
choose that the same volition s~all comprehend the maxims 
of our choice .as a universallaw.nl ,In discussing the 
autonomy of the will,, l<ant says'" 
We cannot prove that this practical rule is an im- _ 
perative.~- that i-P:t that the will of every rational :being 
is necessarily bound to it as acondition" by a mere 
analysis_ of the conceptions which occur in it, since it 
is a synthetical J?roposition1 we must advance beyond the 
cognition o;f the objects to a critical examination of 
the subject, that is 1 o:E the pu;r'e practical reasont- ;for 
this synthetic · proposi t;Lo;n wh.ibli commands apodictically 
must be capable.of being cognized wholly a priori. This 
matter, however,r does not :belong to the present section. 
But that the principle of autonomy in question is the 
. . 
sole principle of morals can :be. readily shown by mere 
analysis of the concept:ions of morality. For by this 
analysis. we find that its principle must be a categori-
cal imperative"' and that what this co~ands is neither 
more nor less than this very autonomy. 1 
:r<ant ;thns\has affirmed that the whole purpose of the 
metaphysic of morals is to prove the autonomy of the will. 
He sayst. 
An absolutely good wilit then" the principle o.f which 
must be a categorical: imperative, will be indeterminate 
as regards all objects 1 and .will contain merely the 
form of volition generally, and that as autonomy, that 
is to say, the capability o;f the maxims of every good 
will to make themselves a universal J.awi is itself the 
only law which the will o£ every rational being imposes 
on itsel:£: 1 without needing to assume any .spring or in-
terest as a foundation .. · 2 
Having thti.s established that the autonomous will is the found-
ationof allmorality 1 :Kari.t says/ 
l• 
.. Ibid., 71-72. 
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The will is a kind of causalitybelonging to living be-
ings in so.fa:r." as they are :r."ational 1 and f:r."eedom would. 
be this property of such causality that it can be ef-
ficient, independelitly on foreign causes determining iti 
just as physical necessity is the property that the 
causality of all. i:r."rational beings .has :of being deter-
mined to activity by the influence of foreign causes.l 
trhe doctrine of freedom is therefore inevitably involved in 
the nature of the conception of causality. 
Since the conception o£ causality involves that of laws.t 
according to which 1 by something that we call cause, 
something else, namely1 the effect, must be produced 
tlaid down)i hence, although freed.om is not a property 
of the w~J.l depending on physical. laws,.. yet it is not 
for that reason lawlessi on the contrary:~ it must be a 
causality acting according to·iromutable laws, but of a 
peculiar kindi otherwise a free will would be an. 
al:>sur.di ty •1 . 
· IJ!he fact that Kant here has removed the realm of free will 
from its dependence on physical laws is of utmost significance. 
He says, 
Physical nedessity is a heteronomy of the efficient 
causes, for every effect is possible only according to 
this law--that something else determines the efficient 
cause to exert its causality. What.else then can free-
dom of the will be but autonomy, that is, the property 
of the will to be a law to i tself?:4 · · 
IJ!he will is free in such a way as to display its nature in 
terms of the categorical. imperative~ ~y freedom~ Kant means 
that the will is not dependent. It is self-determining,. not 
1 
.Ibid,. 1 78 • 2Ibid. I 78-79. 
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as a matter of chancet but as a law~ He says 1 nThe proposi-
tion: The will is in every action a law to itself1 only ex-
presses the principle to act on no other maxim than that which 
can also have as an object itself as a universal law."1 
Hence the categorical imperative is the very essence of 
the freedom of the will and as such it is the principle of 
·morality so that. "a free will and a will subject to moral 
laws are one and the same.•fl Kant urges that freedom must 
be presupposed as a property of th,.e. will of all rational be-
ings. For, he says, 
We cannot possibly conceive .a reason· consciously receiv-
ing a bias from any other quarter with respect to its 
judgments( for then the subject would ascribe the deter-
mination of its judgment not to its own reason, but to 
an impulse. It must. regard itself as the author of its 
principles independent on foreign influences. Consequently 1 
as practical reason or as the will of a rational being 
it must regard itself free 1 that is to say( the will o£ 
such a being cannot be a will of its own except under 
the idea of freedom. -This idea must therefore in a 
practical point of view be ascribed to ·every rational 
being.z· · 
;Reaso;n•s absolute independence must be affirmed. Reason can-
not be dependent on any other experiences or influences than 
itself for· to do so would put the 11 foreign influences 11 above 
reason. Reason is supreme.3 
1Ibid., 79. 
;K~t is usi:n,g freedom of the will to.mean (l) that the 
will belongs to the agent himself( (2) that the will deter-
mines itself to action, and (3) autonomous causality. The 
first two he describes as follows; 
We have finally reduced the definite conception of mar-
ali ty to the idea of freedom. . This la. tter,. however 1 we 
could not prove to be actually a property of ourselves 
or of human nature; only we saw that it must be presup!'"+ 
posed if we would conceive a. being as rational and con-
scious of its causality in.respect of its actions~ that 
is 1 endowed with a wil~T and so we find that on just 
the same grounds we must ascribe to every being endowed 
with reason and. will this attribute of determining it-
self to action under the idea. of its freedom. 1 
When the problem of causality is explored it is discov ... 
ered that the causal conception and the moral conception must 
be viewed accordi:ng·to the principle of equivalence: 
It must be freely admitted that there is a sort of 
circle here from which it seems impossible to escape. 
In the order of efficient causes we assume ourselves 
free, in order than in .the order of ends we may conceive 
ourselves as.suJ:>Ject to moral laws; and we afterwards 
conceive ourselves as .subject t6 these laws because we 
have attributed to ourselves freedom of willJ for free-
dom and self-legislation of will are both autonomy, and 
therefore are reciprocal conceptions, and .for this very 
reason .Qlne must not be used to explain the other or 
give the reason o;( it,., but at. most only for logical pur..., 
poses to reduce apparently different notions of the same. 
object to one single concept. (as we reduce different 
fractions of the .. same ··value to the lowest. terms) .. 2 
libid. Cf. Edward Caird, !}:le leritical Philosophy of 
Kant;'. {2 vols ; .. 1 2d ed. 1 Glasgow: James ,Maclehose and sons:~ 
1909); IX, 243 1 552. 
2J:bid w 1 83 ~ 
'\ 
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Imbedded.in this quotation is a conception which has 
caused extreme difficulty in Kantts system of thought. There 
is the autonomy of causation and the autonomy of the effect. 
The autonomy of causation has to do with the free will which 
explains the heteronomy of the efficient causes in which 
physical necessity is involved. Free will is also that which 
e:x;plains the kingdom of ends in order to make morality possi-
ble. on the one view he says, we think ourselves "as causes 
efficient a priori~" and on the.other view nwe form our con-
ception of ourselves from our actions as effects which we see 
before our eyes .. ~rl 
Before discussing the metaphysical aspects of the notion 
of the will in Kant., it is of vital importance to clarify 
two meanings of will in ;Kant: Wille as practical reason 
which includes the legislative function and WillkUr which is 
the executive faculty of man.. The freedom of Wille is auton-
omy and it gives 1 in its autonomy 1 a law to Willkfir. 2 This 
law is determined by its own nature and not by anything else 
in the world including human nature or the will of God. Beckt 
influenced considerably by the study of Kant made by Hartmann 
observes that1 for Kant 1 "the moral law is a synthetic a priori 
1Ibid.t 83-4. 
2Thomas :K • .Abbott in :Kant•s Practical Reason, 268 1 equates 
Wille" t9[)c...u.; as elective willT and WillkUr 1 lTc."- ..2 as rational· 
will. See also Kant 1 Metaphysics of Morals, 12. 
statement of what a Willk\!tr would necessarily do if it were 
exclusively rational; it is a law or imperative of duty for 
a Willk\lr which does not do by nature what the law requires .. nl 
The practical reason besides discovering and formulating moral 
laws has the logical function of deriving rules of action from 
th 1 la d f h d . d th 1 f t . 2 e mora ws an rom uman es::Lres an · e · aws o na ure. 
The freedom of Willk!ir is spontaneity, the.faculty of initia-
ting a causal series in nature. 
Willk-&r exercises its freedom by doing one of two things .. 
;rt can take the law of the pure practical reason as the limit-
ing condition on its maxims O\l.t of respect for the law of the 
rational personality which. decrees the law. In this respect 
· Willkllr is a good will and is .acting out of duty. If it does 
this merely by struggling against the sensuous impulses it is 
a. virtuous will. · ;rf it acts out of d~ty without any interna.l 
struggles but by its own inner nature it thereby is a holy 
will. on the other hand, the free Willkfir may take some other 
p,rinciJ?le than the law of the pure practical reason as its 
formal principle. If it does this and takes a 'principle which 
1Lewis White Beck,. .A Co:i:nmentary on Kant 1 s Critique of 
Practical Reason1 (Chicago: The University of Chicago.l?ress 1 
1960) l p. 202-203. 
2 . ;Ibid. 1 p. 203., 
is not opposed to the legislation of reason than it is a pru-
dent will, but if it takes a principle that is opposed to the 
law of the pure practical reason, it is an evil will. Although 
a Willkl.ir acting in accordance .,:w,-_i th the law of pure practical 
reason is a good will, the question of an evil will is not 
difficult to resolve. For an evil will is one in which the 
• II • W~llkur adopts pr~ncipleswhich are in opposition to the maxim 
of the pure practical reason. When the Willkur disobeys the 
11 
moral law its ;freedom is not destroyed 1 for the Willkur has 
always within itself.the absolute spontaneity which causes 
it to act according to the principles which it adopts. The 
disposition to evil or to good is always.· .freely chosen. l 
When WillkUr, in the exercise of its spontaneity acts on 
maxims which are incompatible with the moral law/ it does 
moral evil. J:t is only the ;freedom of the will as pure 
practical reason that is analytically connected with 
morality 1 but this will does nothing but issue orders 
which may or may not be obeyed. J:t neither sins nor does 
virtuous actions, 'because it does not act at all. Only 
because it was believed that there was one function of 
will and one kind of freedom was it erroneously thought 
that the Critique identified free and moral acts. When 
Kant spoke o;E moral evil therefore it was ·natural that he 
should be thought to have fallen into serious inconsis-
tency.2 
lKant 1 Critique of Practical Reason, trans. Lewis White 
Beck~ (New York: Liberal Arts ·J?ress 1 1956) 1 p .. l03. 
2Beck 1 Commentary 1 p. 205. 
In this respect there are distinguished two kinds of 
freedom of choice. 'l'here is the freedom of choice·of maxims 
of action {Wahl) and there is the freedom .in the choosing.of 
the lawful or the unlawful.. 1 Thus the freedom of choice of 
principles and the freedom of choi.ce o£, action constitutes a 
further dif.ferentiatio:n of what is meant by a free will in 
the Kantian philosophy. one final.distinction of the meaning 
o.f freedom in Kant i.s made with reference to freedom as a 
condition of the moral law and as a condition of the summum 
. bonum. Although freedom as . the condition of the moral law 
refers to· the will r. s spontaneity and autonomy~ freedom as a 
condition of the sttmmum bonum is an object of faith in that 
it is the faith "in the achievabil;L ty of the summum bonum., 
i.e., the belief·in virtue as adequate to achieve the highest 
; .·. 
good. In th4s·, s~nse it is 1autarchy of will.' u.2 
- There is a question as to whether or not :Kant would en .... 
joy having his doctrine of freedom segmented in the way in 
which the interpreters of his doctrine· have dtme. The inter-
.-:.-'"'\· ·.':>--..• ::.-:-.: '; 
~ .·. 
preters have been mo$tly inie~~,e~~ed in taking the l<antian 
1Kant 1 Opus )?ostumum, XXIr 470 1 cited in·Beck, Commentary, 
p. ,205,. 
.2Ibid. I p. 208. 
'js· ;c.;; 3 
doctrine which Kant used to solve specific problems of tre,..... 
mendous ~portance to philosophy as he understood it and 
applying it to other problems which make it a sojourner on 
foregr~n soil. It would seem that many of the difficulti.es 
in the problem of inT-erpreting freewill in Kant result from 
this approach. such has been the case ~ Kant 1 s doctrine of 
a free will defined in terms o;E spontaneity and autonomy 
thereby getting beyond the empirical facts of nature under-
stood in the narrowest possible sense. For as Jones has well 
stated the situation.t freedom "means that our recognition of 
the value which a certain kind of active will has as realiz-
ing personality is itself sufficient to move us to act in 
, that way.nl 
Kant• s Metaphysics of Will 
The act of free will as a realization of personality 
and as a noumenal cause has striking implications. The ~-
portance of freedom as an ethical concept in terms of human 
nature can hardly be overvalued as it applies to Kant's whole 
system of philosophy. That the ethical aspects of freedom 
lwilliam T. Jones 1 Morality and Freedom in the Philosophy 




deserve greater and more extensive interpretation is not to 
be denied. In the attempt to discover the proper .solution 
to the fundamental problems of life.t it is significant that 
Kant gave the highest status to a spontaneous and autonomous 
free will which at the same time became the ultimate principle 
. . 
of the most important,aspects of his whole philosophical and 
·' 
metaphysical system. Hence.·R.oyce contend/3 that Kant was 
held fast by the things in themselves whose existence he 
acknowledged although he .could know nothing about them. 
Nevertheless Royce tells us that Rant paused at the threshold 
of the show world andsaid 1 n:seyond dwells 1 as we must faith-
fully believe 1 a Godwhom.we serve but who is ;EoreVel:' the 
1 
u.nJcnown God .• n The fact that life .is deeper than knowledge 
is for Kant most clearly envisaged ili the Critique of practical 
Reason where the structure o;f the.freewill_is seen as the 
realization of personality and also as the ottly definition of 
noumenal reality capable of. account.ing for ):)o·th the causal 
sequence of the natUJ::"al·laws of necessity and the intelligence 1 
spontaneity~ independence, and self-causation found in the 
noum~nal world. 
1Josiah R.oyce,t The Spirit of Modern Philosop!ly~ (Boston: 
Houghton Mifflin Company, l992L,. pp. 143-4.-
'-~ 
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The Predicament of Uan in a World 
of Phenomena and Noumena 
The solution to the question of the nature of freedom 
of the will must in the final analysis depend on the nature 
of man and his predicament in a world of phenomena and nou-
mena. And there are few points more emphasized in Kant than 
the relationship of the faculty of reason'to ph~nomena and 
;J,iliOumena. The rational faculty 1 :S knowledge is limited to the 
phenomenal world .......... tlie world of sense. The data of the 
phenomenal world presented to the subject arrive involun-
tarily and all that can be done with these data is to unite 
them into one consciousness under rules. Consequentlyf 
All the "ideasn that. come to us involuntarily (as 
those of the senses) do not enable us to know objects 
otherwise than as they affect us; so that what they 
may be in themselves remains unknown to us, and conse-
quently that as regards 11 ideas11 of this kind even with 
the closest attention and clearness that the under-
standing can apply to them, we can by them only attain 
to" the knowledge of appearances, never to that of 
things in thems.el ves .1 
The world of sense, accordingly/ is represented to the 
rational · fiwul ty as knowable objects affec;t.ing man in their 
own way. What the objects of the natural world of sense 
1 Kant, Morals~ 84. 
show to man1 S reason is all that man can know about them .. 
This function o:E reason is brougll,t to man's attention as 
l 
an ~'obscure discernment of judgment which it calls feeling." 
The differentiation between what is known about objects. 
and what:.the objects in thems.elves are· is. thereby established 
,·•• r;.:·· . 
and by distinguishing between these two ;areas it begins to 
become apparent that the rational ;faculty cannot function. in 
the same way in :both areas .. ..As producing knowled9'.e,, the 
rational faculty can appLy only to the world of sense~ though 
aware that the;re are "things-:in.-.theinselves" which the 
rational faci~~FY can never know: 
As soon as this distinctioD:has oncebeen made 
(perhaps merely in consequence of the difference 
observed betwe.e.n the .. ideas givenus·from without.t 
and in which we are passi'V~r and those b~at we· 
produce simply from oursel V~,F! 1 and :Ln which .we show 
our own activity"), then· it -follow$ of itself that 
we must admit and ass~ behind t:..'le appearance 
something else .that is not aii·appearance~' ·namely/ 
the things in themse:lves1al£houghwe must admit 
that1 . as they never can be kp.oW:n to us except as 
they affect us 1 we. can. come no neare,r to themt- nor 
can we ever know what th.ey are in themselves •. This 
must furnish a: distinctionl howeyer crude~ between 
a world of sense and the world of understanding, of 
which the fonner may he-different according to the 
difference of the .sensu~us impressions in various 
obserY.ers, while the second which is its basis always 
remains the same .. 1 ' · 
However~ when man observes himself 1 he finds a clue to the 
way in which the f.aculty of reason must function when it 
applies to the things .... in~themselves. Kant observes that 
when reason applies to manl s ego (i.e .. 1 his own nature 
deeper than what he ::;ees of himself as. part of the world of 
sense)/ reason thereupon appears in consciousness as pure 
ac:lti v.ity 1 r.eaching consciousness iimrtediately and not mediated 
. through the senses ... This pure activL ty is man1 s u inner sense". 
;Even as to himsel£1 a man cannot pretend to know 
what he is in himself from the knowledge he has by 
intern.al sensa "Cion. For as· he does not as it were 
create himself, and does not come by the conception 
of himself e. priori 'but empiricalLy/: it naturally 
follows that he can obtain his knowledge even o;E him-
self only by the inner sense, a..n.p;consequently only 
throvgh the appeara:nce_s of his nature and the way 
in.'\~h.ich his ·consciousness is affected. ·At the same 
t~~ beyond these. characteristic:s of his· own subjectJ' 
made up of mere appearances, he must necessarily 
support something else ·a:.s ,their basis 1 namely, his 
ego,whatever its characteristics in itself may be .. 
Thus in resp:ct to mere perception and receptivity 
o£ sensations-he must reckon hiinself as belonging to 
the world of sense, but in ~espect of whatever there 
may be of .pure activity in-him {that which reaches 
consciousness immediately and not through affecting 
the sens.es) 1 he mu.St reckon -himself as belonging to the 
intellectual world, of which 1 however,. he has no further 
· knowledge .I 
When reflectingmen mve·r..ecogni:Zed the faculty of reason 
functioning as an inner senser they have (as~.;Lp. Plato) 
attempted to explain this fU)J.ction as:based on something 
.l 
"invisible 1 and acting of itself. 11 B~t they have 11 spoiled 11 
the value of What they observed by making the thing~in-itself. 
an object of intuition. But the intuition produces a blank 
and therefore man•s understanding of the faculty of reason 
as inner sense is not advanced. in the least. 
Nowt Kant has already clearly stated that th~ world of 
. ~·: }~.' ~'>''-;:·. . 
sense is a world of 1irrational b;e;!,ngsJ:'~.acting according 
2 
to laws of physical necessity. But the "inner ~:~ense'' does 
not only reveal the unity of consciousness s_een as the 
function of the understandinc;:tJ but/ what is more'importantj' 
·. . . - . 
reveals a spontaneity in man which is the independent 
causality of his own will, his :freedom.. ;Kant has, there-
fore 1 restated the Platonic notion_of self-causation as the· 
essence of man•s nature and_,. for Kant, this is a free will. 
The discussion of this factor' is so central to the entire 
study of the will that Kant 1 s own px-esentation of the argu-
ment in its entirety_ as it applies to :man• s nature must he:rre 
be stated; 
1Ibid./ 85. 
Now man really finds in himself a faculty by which 
he distinguishes himself from everything else, even 
from himself as affected ;by objects, and that is 
reason. This be.ing pure- spontaneity is even elated 
above the understanding. For although _the latter is a 
spontaneity and does not, like sense, mere:J.:y contain 
intuitions that arise when ·we are Ft.ffected by things 
(and are therefore passive)~-- yet it cannot produce from 
its .activity any other conceptions than those which 
merely serve·. to bring ~- intuitions of sense under 
rUleS l and therepy tO unite. the_m in. C)ne COnSCiOUSneSS 1 
and without this use of the sensi:bility it could not 
think at all; whe:ceas 1 on the contraryt .reason shows 
so pure a spontaneity' in the case o;f what J: call "ideaS'1 
[!deal Conceptions] that' it thereby fa.r tran$cends 
everyth±ng that the sensibility can give it, and exhibits 
its most impo.rtant function in distinguishing the world 
of sense £.rom that of understanding,-and thereby 
prescri:bing the l.:Lmits o£ the understanding itself .. 
Fo.r this reason a rationalbeing must regard him-
self qua intelligence (not from· the side of his 
lower faculties) as belonging not to the wo,;r;ld o;E . 
sense, but to that of understanding1 hence he has 
two points of. View from which he can regard himself, 
and ;r:;-ecognize laws. of the· exercise of his faculties, 
.and consequently of all his actionsifirst, so far as 
he belongs to the world of sense, he finds himself 
subject to laws of nature· (hetero:nomy)y secondly/- as 
belonging to the-intelligible world., under laws which 1 
being independent on nature1 have their fottndation 
not in experience but in reason alone .. 
;ts a reasonable being~ and consequently belong ..... 
ing to the Lntelligible world, man can never con-
ceive the causality of his own will othe.rwise than 
on condition of the idea of·freedom, fo.r independence 
on the determining causes of the sensible world (an 
··.independence which reason must always ascribe to it-
self) is freedom. Now the·idea of freedom is in .... 
separably connected with the conception of autonornyt 
and this·againwith the u.niversal principle o£ 
morality ~hich is:·_ideally the foundation of all 
actions of rational beings,~ just as the law of 
nature is of all phenomena. J. · 
T~ causalityof physical necessity is one which is 
determined by n forel.gn ca\.tl:les. 'l But the causall.ty of free 
will is independent of the_determination of foreign causes 1 
a law to itself {auto:nomo'I.:Ls) • Accordingly r ;Kant has found 
±n human nature what. he rE~JI:fq,~ds as the key to the deepest 
_. ._ · _ -Al)'M' 
problem of his metaphysics: cthe . deep chasm Sf?!J?arating phen-
· omena from noumena. 
Although it appeared that nature had l:>een bifurcated; 
the concept of freedom·in Kant gives. an account of causality 1 
' . ' . 
. . . 
provides the grou;n¢l.s for :mq:ft:all.ty, al:l.d'What is even more 
important_makes possible a bridge between the appearances 
and the things in themselves. :Kant. says': 
Now we see that when we conceive ourselves as free 
we transfer ourselves into the world of understand-
ing as members of it.; and,;r-ecognize the autonomy of 
the will with its consequence_, morality; whereas 1 
if we conceive ourselves as under obligation,~ we 
consider ourselves as helonging.to the_world .of sen2e 1 
and at the same time to the world of understanding. 
1 Ibid. 1 85-86. 
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Human consciousnessr within itself 1 reveals how it is 
possible to conceive of the world of phenomena and the 
world of nournena. In roants nature these two worlds are 
seen in the difference between reasoning as meaning to know 
the objects of sense .externally caused in accordance with 
the laws of nature, and reasoning as meaning to act as a 
free will self-caused in accordance with the laws of morality 
(specifically the Categorical Imperative). 
The application of the above factors revealed by a 
study of human nature is based on the consideration that there 
is more than human consciousness involved in the discovery 
of the meaning of free will. There is a world (of under-
standing) beyond the rregou (outside of roan) which corres-
ponds to the will of roan just as there is a world of nature 
corresponding to the sensations of roan: 
Since the world of understanding contains the founda-
tion of the world of sense, and consequently of its 
laws also, and accordingly gives the law to roy will 
(which belongs wholly to the world of understanding) 
directly~ and must be conceived as doing so, it 
follows that, although on the one side I must regard 
myself as a being belonging to the world of sense, yet, 
on the other side 1 I must recognize myself, as an in-
telligence, as subject to the law of the world of 
understanding, that is, to reason, which contains 
this law in the idea of freedom, and therefore as 
subject to the autonomy of the willi consequently I 
must regard the laws of the world of understanding as 
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Lmperatives for me, and the actions which conform 
to them as duties.l 
What Kant has found in man applies also to nature. ·In 
nature, as seen by speculative philosophy 1 there is a seeming 
contradiction between natural necessity and freedom. The 
conception of the system of nature or ,its necessity results 
in the view that everything which takes place is fixedly de-
termined according-to the laws of nature. Though reason, 
fc;:>r speculative purpos.es, must assert physical necessity 1 
nevertheless 1 for practical purposes 1 and 1 in order to 
apply to conduct 1 reason must assert freedom. The key to 
the problem of the world as··caused in accordance with laws 
and also as exhibiting.freedom is found in man's consciou13-
ness of himself as intelligence and free will 1 i .. e. 1 self-
causation. 2 
Philosophy must then assume that no real contradiction 
will be found between freedom and physical necessity of 
the .same human actions 1 for it cannot give up the con-
ception of nature any more than that of freedom.3 
Consequently 1 in the realm of the thing-in ..... itself (the 
noumenal realm) there is found a ca11sality which is the 
causality .of the inner nature of man as intellig.ence, free 
libid. l 87-88. 
2Ibid.r 92; See also Practical Reason, 105. 
3Ibid., 90; See also Practical Reason, 104-106. 
--
.. · .. _,;~· 
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will 1 and self-cau.satio;n. The natur.e of reality is patterned 
after the two-fold ;nature of man: the natu.ra1 se~f of in-
stincts 1 desires, and sensations and the proper self o£ in-
1. 
telligence 1 rational cause, and free will. Kant is eag.er 
to :make the distinction clear and unmistakable: 
Man considering himself ..... as an intelligence places 
himself thereby .in a different order.of thing~ and 
in a relation to· determining grounds of a wholly 
different kind when on the one hand he thi:nks o£ him,_· 
self as an intelligence endowed with a will~ and con-
sequently with causality.~ and when on the other he 
perceives himself as a phenomenon in the world of 
sense (as he ·reaLLy is also) 1 and affirms that his 
·causality is subject to external determination accor-
ding to laws of nature ... Now he soon becomes aware 
that both can hold good, nay, :must hold good at the 
same time. For tneie is not the smallest contra ..... 
diction in saying that a thing in appearance (belol"lg-
ing to the worl.d of'sense) is· subject to certain laws 
on.which the very .same·~.§:. thing or ;being in itself 
is independent, and that he .. must conceive and think 
of himself in this two-fold way,. rests as tothe first 
·on the consciousness of' himself as an object affected 
through the senses.~ and as to the second on the con-
sciousness of himself as an intelligence, that is1 
as independent on.sensible impressions in the employ..,. 
ment of his re~on(in other wo:r::ds as. belonging to the 
· . world of understanding) .. 2 · · 
Free Wil;l as Causaiity 
Free wiJJ., defined in .the aJ:>oVe sense1 is the pure 
practical reason.. It cannot be comprehended or understood 
1 . Ibid. t 93.-94,. 2~"'·d· J...PJ. • I 92. 
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empirically because only those explanations which can be 
11 determined according to the laws of nature" can be compre-
hended and understood. The free will holds good 
only as a necessary hypothesis of reason in a being 
that believes itself conscious of a will, that is, 
of a faculty distinct from mere desire (namely, a· 
faculty of determining itself to action as an in-
telligencE?, in other words, by laws of reason in-
dependently on natural instincts).l 
Hence, a causality of reason is an intelligent will: "A 
faculty of so acting that the principle of the actions 
shall conform to the essential character of a rational mo-
tive, that is, the condition that the maxim have universal 
validity as a law." 2 
Thus the causality of a free will is the practical 
reason. For ;Kant, reason" appearing in consciousness as 
an intelligent will {practical reason), thereby makes pos-
sible an interpretation of supersensuous nature: "Super-
sensuous nature, so far as we can form a concept of it, is 
nothing else than nature under the autonomy of the pure 
practical reason." 3 To understand this it is necessary to 
consider the difference between the will as subject to 
nature and nature as subject to the will. In the former, 
libid., 94. 2rbid., 93. 
3Kant, Practical Reason, 43. 
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the objects (of nature) cause the conceptions which determine 
the will. In the latter the will causes the objects. 1 In 
this respect the practical reason determines whether pure 
reason is a law of 11 a possible order of nature which is 
empirically unknowable. 112 To this :Kant replies that the 
practical reason determines that the pure reason is just 
such a law: 
The possibility of such a supersensuous nature~ the 
concept of which can be the ground of its reality 
through our free will, requires no a priori intuition 
of an intelligible world, which even in this case 
would be impossible to us, since it is supersensuous. 
For it is only a question of the determining ground 
of volition in its own maxims.3 
The question, therefore.~ becomes not whether nature deter-
mines the will, but whether and how reason determines the 
will.4 
Kant's answer is that the Critique of Practical Reason 
"begins with pure practical laws and their reality."5 The 
foundation of these laws is the concept of their existence 
in the intelligible world--their freedom. The consciousness 
of the moral laws (the consciousness of freedom) is postulated 
as such and 11 cannot ",be further explained. 116 Moral law j:s 
Irbid., 44. 
4rbid. ,. 46. 





ufirmly established of itself."l It is 
a law of causality through freedom and thus a law of 
the possibility of a supersensuous nature 1 just as 
the metaphysical law of events in the world of sense 
was a law of the causality of sensuous nature; the 
moral law thus defines that which speculative philo-
sophy had to leave undefined.2 
Free will 1 therefore 1 provides the answer to the problem of 
causation which speculative reason could not solve: 
The determination of the causality of 'beings in the 
world of sense as such can never 'be unconditioned 1 and 
yet for eve~y series of conditions there must 'be some-
thing unconditioned 1 and consequently a causality 
which is entirely self-determining.3 
Speculative reason has the "right" to describe causality· 
from conditioned to conditioned ad infinitum. 4 Butr specu-
lative reason leaves a vacuum at the end of the series of 
causal conditions. ~nt fills that vacuum with the uncon-
ditioned which is the "law of causality in an intelligible 
world {causality through freedom)."S 
The moral law thus defined is a causa noumenon. J:t is 
not theoretical 'but "exclusively practical 1 since the idea 
of the law of a causality (of the will) has causality itself 
or is its determining ground." 6 Theoretically1 the intel-
ligible world, m.e.r 11 unconditioned causality and its facultyr 




3Ibid. 1 48 · 
6Ibid. r 50 • 
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freedom and therewith a being (myself) which belongs to 
t4e world of sense and at the same time to the intelligible 
world," is transcendent and problematical, but for practical 
purposes the intelligible world is irornanent and ·,f\~eter­
minately and assertorically known. 111 Thus Kant has given 
an explanation for causality through the concept of freedom 
which is impossible for any other concept .. · "Only the con-
cept of freedom enables us to find the unconditioned for 
the conditioned 7 and the intelligible for the sensuous with-
out going outside ourselves. 1 When reason applies the 
"supreme and unconditioned practical .law" to the individual 
(i.e •. "our own person11 ) 1 reason sees itself and the indi-
vidual as Hbelonging to the.pure world of the understanding." 2 
When reason so functions, it 11 can lift us above the world 
of sense and furnish cognitions of a supersensuous order 
and connection. 112 
Causality as applying to a series of conditioned phe-
nomeaa does not require the concept of a free will. Things 
libid.:t 105. 
2Ibid. , 106. 
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as appearances do not require an "absolutely unconditional 
determination of causality,.n1 The supposition of a freely 
acting cause requires defense only when a being in the 
world of sense is 11 regarded also as noumenon."l :Kant de-
fines free will so conceived as l\.a' 1 faculty of absolute 
spontaneity .. 111 
But this conception of free will is not limited to 
the Critique of Practical Reason. 
Professor Beck points out that, in :Kant 1 freedom as 
spontaneity or the faculty of initiating a new causal 
series in time is the doctrine of freedom established in 
the Critique of Pure Reason. In the Metaphysic of Morals 
the concept of autonomy and lawgivingness was added to free-
dom and these were discussed under the one name of "willn.2 
Beck points out that Kant does not consistently distinguish 
between these two ·views of freedom although occasionally 
" he uses the word Willkur to mean spontaneity or causality 
and Wille to mean the lawgiving autonomy o£ freedom. 
At any rate, the factr for Kant:., is that the laws of 
nature cannot apply to human actions (the actions of the 
libid. t 48 • 
2Beck 1 Commentary, p. 177. 
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proper self). The laws of nature can only apply to man 
as an appearance and not as nintelligence· as a thing in 
itself."l The proper self is the thing in itself: the will 
as intelligence, 2 the pure practical reason. And although 
the speculative reason may not enter the domain of the 
thing-in-itself nor the world of understanding} the practical 
reason as causality of will as intelligence is not restricted 
to the nownenal realm hut may think itself into the "world 
of understanding."3 
For :Kant.r the practical reason is able to define what 
the speculative can never know, namely, causality as free 
will: "Practical reason itself 1 without any collusion with 
the speculative, provides reality to a supersensible object 
of the category of causality, i.e .. , to freedom." 4 And againr 
The strange hut i~controvertihle assertion of the 
speculative Critique that the thinking subject is only 
an appearance to itself in inner intuition, now finds 
its full confirmation in the Crit~que of Practical 
Reasoni the establishment of this thesis is here so 
cogent that one would be compelled to accept it even if 
the first had not already proved it.4 
2Ihid., 96. 
4Kant 1 Practical Reason, 6. 
Kant makes it difficult to split reason in two as some 
have attempted to do with his doctrine of the realm of·free 
wi.ll and the realm of nature.. He says: 
The union of freedom and causality as the mechanism of 
nature 1 the fi.rst being given through the moral law and 
the latter through the natural law, and both as related 
to the same subject, man 1 is impossible unless man i.s 
conceived by pure consciousness as a being in itself in 
relati.on to the former 1 but by empiri.cal reason as 
appearance in relation to the latter. Otheryise the 
· self-contradiction of reason is unavoidable. 
The practical reason uniteswhat the speculative separates; 
(1) the 'rreality of the .categories as applied to noumena which 
is denied in theoretical knowledge but affirmed in practical"i 
and (2) the "paradoxical demand.:!bo regard one 1 s self, as sub-
ject to freedom, as noumenoni and yet from .the point of view 
of nature to think of one• s self as a phenomenon in one• s own 
l 
empirical consciousness.'' For :Kant~ noumenal reality is a 
free will, a causa noumena~ 
The objective raalityof a pure Will or of a pure prac-
tical reason (they·being the same) is given i.n the moral 
law.§:. priori;. as it were by a fact 1 for the latter term 
can be applied to a determination·of the will which is 
inevitable, even though it does not rest on any empirical 
princi.ples,. In the concept of a will, however, the co:a-
cept of causality is already containedi thus in that of 
a p1,1re will there is the concept of causality which is 
freedom 1 i.e., of a causali.ty not determinable according 
.to natural laws and consequently. not susceptible to any 
empi.rical i.ntuition as proof of the reality of the free 
1J:bid~1 footnote. · 
'I 
·.§oi, 
will. Nevertheless, it completely justifies its 
subjective reality in the pure practical law ~ 
priori though it is easily seen that it is not £or the 
purpose of the theoretical but for that o£ the merely 
practical use o£ reason. Now the concept o£ a being 
which has a free will is that o£ a causa noumenony 
and we are assured that this concept does not contra-
dict itself because the concept of a cause originates 
exclusively in pure understanding and its objective 
reality with. reference to ol:>j .ects in general is guar-
anteed br the deducEion~n the Critique o£ Pure 
Reason]. 
That some of the interpreters of ~t have exaggerated 
the meaning of the spontaneity o£ the causa noumenon.to the 
point of distortion is brought to light by William T. Jones. 
Causa noumenon as free wil.l is both spontaneous and in 
accordance with law. It is without question recognized that 
n.Kant r~garded the will as a kind o£ cause. n 2 Furthermore, 
the will.as such is not to be differentiated in any distinc-
tive way from the proper understanding of freedom because 
n.Kant identifies freedom with noumenal causality .. n: 3 Free wil.J. 
concerns the acting of a being, for, "to. say that an act ••• 
2Jones 1 Morality and Freedom, pp. 22-3. 
is free is equivalent to saying that it is the product of 
1. 
noumenal causality.•• Thus freedom is a supersensible cause. 
It is a causality not su.'bject to empirical principles of 
determination. 
Relying to a degree om the principles expressed in the 
third antinomy of the Critique of. Pure Reason 1 it becomes 
clear that cause is non-temporal, that the kind of causality 
involved in freedom as a supersensible cause is transcendental 
freedom which is the power of beginning a state . s·pontaneously,. 
that is 1 without requiring to be determined to action by an 
antecedent cause in accordance with the law of causality. 2 
An act of will is~" in :Kant 1 a practi.cal thought (praktische 
Erkenntnis). 3 A practical thought is a thought which is a 
causez .. and 1 therefore 1 a free· will is a practical will as 
causal.. T:Q.erefore:;rt a good will is also causal and free. 4 
Hence a will is call~d practical because it is a faculty of 
ends ,5 and when the interpreters of Kant equate freedom of the 
will with noumenal causality as spontaneity only, they have 
1Ibid .. t p. 6 • 
2Ibid. See also Kant, Critique of Pnre Reason, A 1 533 1 
B 1 561. 
3 Ibid. I P· 29 .. 
5Kant, Practical Reason, 58-59. 
· >~o···3·'·· .. 
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ignored i<ant•s emphatic doctrine that rational creatures 
move by a plan 1 meaning that causality includes a plan or 
l law. 
Freedom of the will is thus expressed in terms of the 
concept or notion of causality hut.:Ereedom also includes the 
2 
concept of autonomy, as self-legislation which means that a 
free will is a law to itself~-that the will as itself is an 
3 
end. · 11When the will is s.elf-legislative, reason is no longer 
merely an instrument for obtaining some empir±Bal object of 
desirey it is itself actually the end the thought of whose 
4 
worth moves us .. " Kant clearly defines what he means by 
causation in almost every respect identical to Plato's defi-
nition of the soul.. "The will is a kind of cause, and what 
is 'originally meant by saying that.· it is free is. simply that 
its causality is independent of a:p.y external (fr.emd) factor. 
But this does not mean inde~endence of ~ determination, for 
this would be mere lawlessness and would contradict the very 
meaning of causality." 5 Kant therefore includes the principle 
1Ibid., pp. 32-3. see als9 Paulsen, Kant; p. 294: Free 
will is self-determination through the idea of the law .. 
3rbid., p. 103. 
Sibld. 1 p. 107. 
4Ibid., p. 105., Also 
Kant, Practical Reason, 59. 
of law in his view of causation as spontaneous and a noumenon. 
Although freedom means self-determination (eigene Gesetzgebung) 
it is important that the self-determination be understood in 
terms also of the principle of autonomy which includes 
the idea of law. 1 The nature of the law involved in his 
doctrine of noumenal cause as free will relates to the proper 
recognition of a theory of value in which personality derives. 
the highest significance. Thus when the faculty of a free 
will is interpreted as an act of the practical reason it means 
that "we are only free if what moves us is our recognition 
of the worth personality has in itself. 111 For :Kant, therefore,~ 
a free act is 11 a realization of personality. 2 
In order to establish a doctrine of free will, it is 
necessary to introduce ideas and concepts different from those 
which are available to the speculative thought of the pure 
reason. Ethics requires a concept of the practical reason in 
order to differentiate noumenal causality from the external 
functions describable by a natural law. 'The concepts of ethics 
require the internal self-determining aspects of the practical 
II 3 
reason as free will (Willkur) • The law of a free will is 
libid. 
2Ibid., p. 109; Kan~Practical Reason, 161-162. 
3Beck, Commentary 1 p. 179. 
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not a mere restrictiop. on freedom but is itself a product of 
freedom.l A free will is self-legislating. The advance in 
the practical reason over the pure reason is in a distinction 
between Willk~ and Wille. For the will of the practical 
reason is not purely legislative as that of the pure reason 
but includes the ability to act.2 Renee the will includes a 
kind of freedom in the positive rather than the negative sense. 
When the free will as autonomous is referred to as the property 
of the will to dete~ine itself according to a self-legislated 
principle and therefore not lawlessly, 3 this means "that our 
recognition of the value which a certain kind of act of will 
has as realizing personality is itself sufficient to move us 
to act in that way.n 3 The will 1 therefore, as the realization 
of personality involves the ultimate metaphysical meaning of 
causality in Kant. 4 Thus; 
pure practical reason spontaneously creates an ldea of 
a natura archetypa, and Willklir, taking this as its object, 
can become an efficient cause of giving to the world of 
nature the form of such an intelligible world.· In this 
respect therefore the concepts of freedom as a legislative 
Wille, and as an active Willkllr, are not contradictory 
in Kant but indicate the full spontaneity of efficient 
libid. 2Ibid., p. l80i Kant, Practical Reason., 48. 
3Jones, Morality and Freedom, p.·l08. 
4cf. Ward, A study of Kant~ 177. 
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causation which is •tgoverned by a rule given by the 
pure practical reason, which is its legislative office."l 
~ant•s doctrine of noumena has been greatly dispar-
aged because of his interpretation of the noumenal realm 
as consisting of transcendental objects which are unk.now-
abl.e.2 The difficulty which is created by the idea of the 
unknowability of the noumenal realm can hardly be e;xagger-
ated. Bowne is greatly concerned with the problem of the 
division of reality into phenomena and noumena. Bowne 
suggests that Ka.ntts definition of the noumenal realm and 
his restriction of the activities of pure reason to the 
phenomenal realm are self.-destructive. 3 Bowne says of 
~antls noumenal realm that it 11 Vanishes, leaving only verbal 
phrases in its place. ,A· He interprets ~ant as positing the 
noumenal world of reality apart from mind and antithetical 
to it: 11 The static worl.d of unclear speculative thought, or 
that world of things in themselves which thought can never 
lBeCk, Commentary, p. 180. 
2Theodore M. Greene.t "The Historical Context and 
Religious Significance of :Kant•s Religion,n in Immanuel 
.Kant, Religion Within the Limits·of Reason Aloner trans. 
Theodore .M.. Greene and Hoyt H. Hudson (New York: Harper 
and Brothers, 1960), p. lv. 
3Bowne, Kant and Spencer, pp. 124-137. 
4rbid., p. 137 
---c-o, ;;;--.--,.-· -=--~­
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reach, is unknowable for the sufficient reason that it does 
·.· 1 
not exist." on the othe:4 hand Bowne wishes to make it per-
fectly clear that Kantts contribution to speculative thou~ht 
lies in his conc.ept of the activity of the mi:nd in knowing. 
:rn thus summarizing the results o£ the Critique of Pure Reason 1 
Bowne respects its. value. But Bowne cannot accept Kant 1 s 
rejection of the speculative_reason as applying to the know-
ledge of Godt freedom 1 and inunortality as developed in the 
Critique of Practical :Reason. He accepts one aspect of what 
he interprets :r<ant•s View to :be.i namelyt that conviction in 
the areas of God 1 freedom 1 :and i:mmo:4tality must be reached 
in li;t~ but he is not favoral:>ly impressed with Kant• s limita-
tions on reason. 
That a fair interpretation of J<ant has been given by such 
an analysis is seriously to be questioned, since Kant does 
not li:ridt human effort in everi respect pertaining to the 
noumena but onlY the unknowability of .the ~oumenal realm when 
·knowledge is the result o£ the same ·type of speculative reason 
involved in the interpretation of natural phenomena. Becaus.e 
the interpretation of natural phenomena by speculative reason 
l Ibid. r p. 159 ... 
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depends upon the establishment o£ necessary causal connections 
and reiations~ Kant tends to avoid the resultant staticising 
impact of such an interpretation a£ the ultimate reality. 
Concepts o£ dependence and connection~ for ~nt, cannot account 
for intelligence, spontaneity, morality~ and self-determination. 
Accordingly 1 Kant looks for something which can explain such 
factors. He~ there£ore 1 rejects the.aspect of consciousness 
which is limited to relation and connection 1 namely, specula-
tive reason 1 and turns to the more acceptable Willk.-llr which 
includes a free will as spontaneity and intelligence. For 
Kant a free will is one which is not only causal, but one 
which umust recognize as necessary ~ priori .a law according 
to which its freedom is restricted to conditions which 
render it consistent with itsel£_nl The interpretation of 
free will as possiply a kind of Bergsonian elan vital is 
precluded because a free will is not the product of an impulse. 2 
It is in a sense the self-causation of Plato 1 s soul. 
Two factors stand out.. Pure speculative reason gives 
statements about things. Practical reason gives statements 
lA. E. Teale, Kantian Ethics~ (London: The Oxford Univer-
sity Press 1 1951), pp. 261 ..... 262. 
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about the moral personality. Greene stresses these two 
factors as resulting in a dualism in Kant which makes Kant 
unable to render his co~cept of freedom intelligible.l 
Greene points out that ~ant gives a purely mechanistic in-
terpretation of determinism and then instead of enlarging 
determinism into an idealistic system in which self-deter-
mination can take place 1 Kant cuts man 11 o&f from all in-
fluences, divine" human and physical alike."1 'l'hus" in 
the end" Kant is unable to explain how the same man can be 
both free and yet not free 11 in one and the same act.nl 
Ultimately" according to Greene-~' Kant is left with a mystery 
not to be fathomed by the human mind. 
It seems almost impossible that Kant could have left 
himself open to the weakness of such a gaping dualism as 
Bowne, Greene and others have attributed to him. Kant" in 
fact, denies that there is a contradiction between the world 
of phenomena and the world of noumena which cannot be re-
solved. A being acting in the world of 1:1.errs.el.::as conditioned 
and at the same time in the world of noumena (understanding) 
as absolutely unconditioned is 11 not self-contradictory .. n2 
Kant,!"'s reasoning is not too different from Plato 1 _s at this-
lnKantxs Religion, 11 p. lv. 
2Kant 7 Practical Reason, 48; See also Ibid. 1 104. 
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point. As may be recalled~ Plato observed the different 
kinds of motion and concluded that the motion which is 
capable of explaining all other motion is "that which is 
moved by itself," i.eA, a soul. Kant similarly observed 
the same situation. -However, ;Kant called what he observed 
a series of conditioned causes. But conditioned causes 
lead to more conditioned causes ad infinitum~ Kant con-
cluded that nthere must be something unconditioned, and 
consequently a causality which is entirely self-determining.nl 
Kant finds such a being in a self ~r person) which at the 
sarne time belongs both to the world of sense and to the 
world of intelligence.2 Therefore.t freedom or free will (in 
the sense of a moral personality) is not in conflict with 
natural necessity because, in the first place, as Jones 
appropriately points out "the understa;n:ding has been ~limited' 
precisely in order to make a place for the non-spatial, non-
temporal reality of which freedom in this· sense is now seen 
to be an instance." 3 The understanding becomes aware of 
its limitations when it attempts to interpret the world of 
intelligence with concepts which apply only to the world of 
lrbid., 104. 2rbid., 105. 
3Jones~ Morality and Freedom, p. 175. 
. t 
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sense. As a result, the understanding does not posit a 
contradiction between the acts of a person in the world of 
sense and the acts of the same person in the world of in-
telligence1 for concepts appropriate to natural necessity 
cannot be made to apply to unconditioned causality. 
In the second place, the concepts which a person de-
rives inwardly in the world of intelligence are sufficient 
to explain both the world of intelligence and the world of 
sense. These concepts apply to noumenal reality (whence 
they are derived) and to phenomenal reality. Concepts de-
rived from phenomenal reality do not apply to any reality 
except phenomenal reality. 
In the third place, the inner personality, the invisible 
self, free will 1 or self-determining causality are incgm-
prehensible to the understanding limited to the phenomenal 
world. There is no contradiction, however, unless the 
understanding attempts to use .its cognitions, applicable to 
the world of sense 1 in order to explain such concepts as the 
moral law, free will 1 and unconditioned causality. 
Furthermore Beck has. attempted to show that even in the 
Critique of Pure Reason Kant avoids a dualism. There he 
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defines the principle that 11 if the conditioned is given, 
the entire anm of its conditions must also be given, and 
therefore the absolutely unconditioned,. which is either 
this sum or some member of it 1 must be given."l Kant then 
applies this principle to causality. Thus, 
in respect to the causal dependence of one thing upon 
another 1 we apply the principle just enunciated, that 
if the conditioned is given the unconditioned must 
likewise be given,~ else the conditioned, which can only 
occur when the totality of its conditions is given, 
would not occur.2 · 
The problem of causality in the Critique of .J?ure Reason 
suggests two alternatives: (l) That the series is as a 
whole infinite and therefore unconditioned; or (2) That the 
series of causes is finite an~ has its first member uncondi-
tioned. In the latter alternative the first member of the 
finite series is what .Kant refers to as an absolutely SJ?on-
taneous causality of freedom whereby the cause proceeds in 
accordance with the laws of nature and begins of itself. 
Freedom thereby refers to the power to effect absolute begin-
nings.3 Norman ,Kemp Smith calls this freedom in Kant 
lBeck, Commentary, p. 183. 
2Ibid.r pp. 183-184. 
3Norman Julian Bend~, ,Kant (New York: Longmans Green and 
Company, 1940), p. 33. 
313 
"transcendental freedom" which he describes as the power of 
making a new beginning. 1 This freedom is also called a free 
cause.2 The spontaneity of causality of will is not ps:vcho-
logical choice. 3 
Phenomena and nournen~ suggest 1 .. for :Kant 1 a doctrine of 
causality which can comprehend both realms in a unity. 
Unity comes about in self-consciou.snes13 where there is both 
the necessary causality in nature and self-causality which 
is a free wi).l. Beck brilliantly demonstrates that 1 for 
:Kant 1 freedom does not contradict natural causation. It 
rather makes natural causation comprehensible: 
:&veiy appearan.ce is the appearanc.e of a reality; its 
appearance is connected with other appearances under 
the causal law of nature and is predictable with cer-
tainty. But in its relation to that which is not 
appearance 1 i.e.r -Ghe noumenon, and not a merol:>er of 
the temporal seriesr it is an effect of a freely act-
ing cause 1 where freedom is defined as the power of 
being a cause without being an effect. Hence 1 in 
principle 1 every event in the world is a product of 
both natural and free causation. We do not understand 
it in its latter relation] all our knowledge is know-
l·egge of the connections of phenomena among themselves. 
We cannot apply the category by analogy to the rela-
tion of noumena to phenomena and think of the form~r 
lNorroan Kemp Smith 1 A Commentary on Kant 1 s Critique of 
Pure ;Reason (London: Macmillan and Company 1 Ltd. 1 1918) 1 p. 570. 
2xbid. t pp. 512-513. 
3Harald H8ffdi:p.g 1 A History of Modern Philosophy, trans. 
B. E. Meyer (2 vols41 London: Macmillan and Company/ Ltd.r 
1900),. 573. 
. - ·------ --- ---------------
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as a free cause of the latter w~thout ~nfr~ng~ng on 
the pr~nc~ple of mechan~cal causat~on so far as our 
poss~ble ~nowledge ~s concerned.l 
In order to resolve the conflict between phenomenal 
causal~ty ~n space and t~me and the noumenal causal~ty of 
unchanging.substance, 2 Bee~ suggests that it may be done by 
hold~ng not to a trtwo ...... world theoryn but rather to a theory 
of one world w~th two aspects. This is done by contrasting 
the observ~ng, theoretical att~tude and the act~ng 1 practical 
att~tude with the result that "supersensuous nature ~s 
nothing else than nature under the autonomy of pure practical 
3 
reason." In the Cr~t~que of Judgment Kant suggests that 
the d~stinction between natural and moral law is dependent 
upon the peculiar nature of our understanding., 4 l<a.nt appl~es 
the conclus~ons of the Cr~t~que of Judgment to the Crit~gue 
of Pure Reason so that the third antinomy is seen as a maxim 
for procedure and not a constitutive princ~ple of nature. 5 
IJ!hus the realm of experience is seen in one perspect~ve as 
the moral or practical realm and in another perspect~ve 
2Ibid. I p. 191. 
3Kant 1 Critique of J?ure Reason, A. 550, B. 578 1 quoted 
in Bec~ 1 Commentary/ P~ 192. 
4Bec~ 1 Commentary 1 p. 192~ 
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(the categories) as the realm of nature. Theoretical freedom 
distinguished from causation refers merely to two aspects 
of the one reality. In this way .Kant assumes that he has 
solved the problem of the gap between noumenal and phenomenal 
reality on the grounds that what seemed to be a gap was not 
a gap in fact. Free will in man ·expresses itself both as 
a free will and as empirical consciousness, and a noumenal 
causality in the universe expresses itself both as noumenal 
cause and as natural necessity. 
A Su.rorriary of the Meaning of Will in Kant 
In order to give a more distinctive description of the 
will in l<ant 1 it may be help£ul to recognize that :Kant has 
used the doctrine of will and freedom as the most versatile 
and important of his conceptions. To show the fact that 
Kant has used the doctrine of will and freedom extensively 
and to describe the functions the doctrine has performed, 
the full list of the meanings and uses of the will are as 
follows: 
(1) as a good will (acting for the good in itself) 
(2) as a holy will (a completed will in harmony with law) 
(3) as the Categorical Imperative 
(4) as the power to translate principles into actiO:a 
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(5) as noumenal causality (intelligence--Aristotle's Nous) 
(6) as thing-in-itself 
(7) as action according to the conception of law (Wille) 
(8) as pure practical reason 
(9) as self-determination 
(10) as the agent's own power 
(11) as autonomous causality· 
(12) as choice of maxims of action ~ahl) 
(13) as spontaneous causality (capable of making an abso .... 
luter ~.e.t new 1 beginning~-(Willk~r) 
(14) as self-legislation 
(15) as faith in the achievabi1ity of the sununum bonum 
(autarchy of will) 
(~6) as practical thought 
(17) as self-consciousness 
(18) as the supersensible .(transcendental--independent 
from everything empirical) 
(19) as the timeless, spacelessr unchanging substance 
(20) as the faculty of ends 
(21) as the unconditioned. 
With so many different shades of meaning, it may seem 
that Kant has created more problems than he has solved. 
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However 1 it may be more accurately stated that the achieve ...... 
ment of his central purpose did not require him rigidly to 
restrict the definition of free will. lt should be stressed" 
ratherJ' that for Kant the human personality is active and 
brings to nature the concepts it finds within itself. In so 
doing.~ the human personality posits laws and concepts which 
it applies to nature as the world of sense. In the same way, 
the human personality finds moral principles and is conscious 
of free will as absolutely spontaneous causality. In ap-
plying these principles and practicalactivities to nature 1 
the human personality affirms moral laws and posits a self-
determining causality as the noumenal side of nature. That 
this view of the free will.in man and the self..-.determining 
cause in nature is.~ for ;Kant., closely parallel to the doctrine 
o£ the soul in Plato and of Nous in Ari13totle is apparent. 
In the same sense 1 the definition of will as nin one's power" 
in Augustine finds its way into Kant 1 s doctrine o£ self-
determining causality as free will. 
More speci£ically1 for Kantr the central reality of the 
noumenal world is the power which creates absolute beginnings. 
Any world view which claims to account £or the £acts of life 
and the universe should not discount the self-determining 
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cause capab,le of creating such b.egin.nings. Kant arrives at 
the conclusion that the power which creates absolute begin-
nings is none other than the consciousness of self-deter-
mining causality which is another name for a free will. 
He discovers this principle by observing the consciousness 
of man 1 the self-personality. On the one hand, the mechanism 
of nature can ;be interpreted in terms of a series of condi-
tioned causes. On the other hand, the proper self is the 
will--intelligence as a thing in itself. Only the proper 
self can give an account of itself. In so doing it can also 
give an account o;E the conditioned causes o;E nature. 
Thus for ;Kant free will is to be classified neither as 
psychological 1 moral~- ethical, nor theological freedom, but 
as metaphysical freedom in the sense of will as self-causation 
(ori@:inating power). As il[etaphysical freedom 1 the free will, 
for ;Kant, is capable of adequately interpreting not only all 
the causes which are dependent on other causes, but those 
causes which cause themselves (acts of ;Eree will). :Kant's 
view, on this pointr is essentially l?latonic in the sense 
that the unconditioned cause is a self determining itself, 
and not Aristotelian in the sense of an uncaused cause. 
In raising the doctrine of free will to the level of 
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metaphysical freedom,~ Kant has not only given an account of 
moralityl self-consciousness, and causality, but he has 
emphasized the point that only a free will is capable of 
creating .absolutely new beginnings.. Absolute spontaneity 
can ;be explained only if conceived as an act of consciousness 
functioning as the self-causation of a free will. 
CHAPTER VI 
The Free Will in Retrospect 
From Embryo to Skepticism 
The notion of free will has developed from its slight 
beginnings as an embryo in Greek thought to include the 
vastness of God and the universe. In its earliest form 
the notion of free will meant the consideration of the 
factors which determined human destiny. Since those factors 
were found outside of man in the aaprice of the gods or the 
elements of nature~· there was little to be said for a doc-
trine of the will. How t.o determine human destiny concerned 
how to·cope with the gods or nature. 
The Sophists created a revolution in thought because 
of their denial of the objectivity of truth. The result 
was to make man the measure of all things so that his destiny 
was completely in his own hands. There was no doctrine of 
will, free or otherwiser because man had not defined nor 
counted his functions. But the denial of objectivity had 
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left truth in a shambles and man 1 s destiny in confusion 
and chaos. Though man•s freedom was yet undefined, he was, 
in fact;o in spite of the shambles of his thought, left to 
build in any direction he could. He_ w~-~-~§_g:t:~~,;J,;tl~_S!:_ ~:J:ld it 
became the task of philosophers to build both the foundation 
<'"" 
------- ··---~- ···-· 





Plato (and to a lesser degreer Socrates) attempted to 
correct Sophism by giving his attention to the struggle to 
discover objective truth. .Man as the master of his destiny 
---------
- --- ··-·· .. -
would utterly fail.if he did not know his true destiny--
the highest goc:>9-~-- If he failed, his evil state was his 
punishment. If he succeeded,_b.is good condition was his 
-.--- -- . . . .· .. -- ·- . 
reward. His responsibility _'!fa_s . measured by his own actions. 
-::... --~-----·- .... -
... - -- ~-------
Regardless of praise or blame, success or failure~ the 
individual determined his own destiny and took the conse-
quences of his actions upon himself. Man's will was one 
function (among many) of his whole nature. When man 
willed 1 he willed as a whole. He also chose between alter-
natives 1 reasoned 1 desired 1 imagined 1 and purposed in the 
same way. The doctrine of the will was born~ but it had no 
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name, no sight, and had as yet been given no specialized 
attention. For, the pursuit o£ moral worth in Greek phil-
- -
osophy overshadowed the problems o£ moral £r~edom... The 
----~ .. ---·--- -~----~"" --- '-
maxim, "Virtue is knowledger n was not an expression o£ 
£reedom but rather o£ moral worth. 1 
Plato and Aristotle understood well that this maxim 
could not be accepted without quali£ication. It did 
not accord altogether with experience. For very o£ten 
we seem, at any rate 1 to choose the worse course know-
ing the better. For this Plato £ound an answer 1 satis-
£actory to him in the distinction between genuine know-
ledge and opinion.l 
For Plato, educating and tending the soul would result in 
true knowledge--the knowledge o£ the Good. 
The soul was the only £actor in all reality which was 
capable o£ moral worth. The soul, also,. was £ound to be 
the only reality which did not need something else to move 
or determine it. The soul, in £act, not only moved itsel£ 
but was the source o£ all other motion. This aspect or 
function of the soul came to be called a £ree will. 
Aristotle 
Aristotle was concerned with the £act that man not only 
-------- •···-- ·--------Lo••---'-••··-.----~---' ··-·· -• 
impelled himsel£ to a good destiny, but with more £requency 
-~- ·--~-- ~--- -- . - ......... _... __________ __,_ ·--~' . "' 
lsee H. D. Lewis, "Moral Freedom in Recent Ethics" and 
nGuilt and Freedom 1 11 Readings in Ethical Theory, ed. Wil£red 
Sellars and John Hospers (New York: Appleton-Century-CroftsJ' 
Inc., 1952), p.599. 
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impelled himself to an evil des. :tiny. Aristotle objected 
~-~-----·-- ·-· --- -----·-··~·- ----- ---~--· ·-
to a doctrine which limited man's liability to himself 
because he was interested in making a man also liable to 
his fellow men~ for both his good and evil acts. Because of 
the seriousness of the liability for actions which could in-
elude severe punishmentr Aristotle concerned himself with how 
men chose their destinies and the grounds for assessing lia-
bil~ty. By permitting only ignorance and compuls~on to ex-
,. .. -_.,....._. ------~---~--,.-- -------------·-----~ .. -------------.-..----"-·--- . 
empt man from liabilityr Aristotle made it possible to pro-
:'. 
c~13.im ~noW'~edge and free will as king and queen of the realm 
o£ human destiny. Free will was made a separate faculty so 
that its errors would not reflect on the bas·ic goodness of 
the h~ soul. When he decided to give free will a name 
he gave it at least a dozen, the most important of which were 
free choicer practical reason, and the union of reason and 
desire. 
In proving his case, Aristotle showed that persons 
often hold on to their fallible beliefs with the same tenacity 
as to certain knowledge. Even more important, there are 
times when a person will calmly and deliberately do what he 
knows i,s wrong. In eithe:r:: case the problem for Aristotle 
(as for Plato;),. centered in the pursuit of moral worth 1 which 
was more in terms of devotion to the good than a study o£ 
the inner workings of the nature of the man pursuing it. 
'rhus ideals such a:S justice and courage were more appropriate 
because they made possible the attainment-of a good which 
in turn revealed to the pursuer his true self~ 
But Aristotle/ though recognizing the value of the 
pursuit of knowledge 1 turned to the investigation of the 
problem of why man refuses to pursue the good especially 
when he knows better.. 'L'he result of this investigation 
was to note that when men rejected the good, they did so 
by free choice and therefore could be held responsible. 
This made it possible to assign praise or blame and to 
mete out rewards or punishments. 
Because the quality of an act arises from free choice 1 
Aristotle studied the power of choice and its results. A 
free will was seen to be a part of the-soul which functions 
in the 11middle area" between the extremes of reason and 
appetite. 'L'he free will is the practical reason whose 
function it is to put the soul in order. Ultimately the 
soul moves from its lowest faculties, appetites, to its high-
est faculty 1 mind. This is accomplished by the practical 
reason functioning as a free will. 
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Augustine 
Augustine attempted to interpret and unite two currents 
. of thought by basing his answer on the struggles of his own 
soul. He looked at Plato and Aristotle more through Plotinus 
than through themselves. He saw Christianity through the 
eyes of Ambrose and the Church more than through the simpler 
experiences of the Jesus of history. He, therefore, attempted 
to harmonize Greek philosophy with Christian faith: ~niting 
the summum bonum with the submission of the will1 the 
··~----------~---.... -~--~~-----·- -- .. --
wickedness of evil with the sin of alienation from God1 the 
--~ --- ---~ --~~ ... ________ .. -~ - .. 
.. __ ----------· -- . -
weakness of an imprisoned will with the sin of pride; and the 
. ----------~---- . ... ------------------~-- .. ···-. .....------------....-~ --·--
goodness of the soul with the doctrine of eternal Salvation. 
----- ----------------- ·- ---- -~--
For Augustine, man, therefore, was not only to surrender 
his will, but he was to be held accountable to his fellow men 
and liable to God.. What man did was not the product of his· 
own action answerable to himself for the consequences. What 
man did reflected on the character of God and determined his 
acceptance or alienation from God and his eternal reward or 
eternal punishment by God. 
The intensity of impa~t of such a principle on the in-
terpretation of the powers in man which determine his destiny 
can hardly be overrated. The addition of the feeling of guilt 
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to the doctrines of original sin1 sin, and eternal damnation 
shows the seriousness of man•s lot. Augustine took Aristotle's 
doctrine of free will as a unit and by adding Christian 
thought and his own biographical experience to it made ±.t 
responsible for man's status and his precarious destiny. But 
Augustine saw in l?lotinus '· mysticism a doctrine of the will 
which could undo all the damage man had done himself: the 
free will of perfection. ';rhe harmony of perfect freedom with 
the doctrine of nthe truth making man free 11 made the doctrine 
of perfect freedom the more acceptable and gave man a destiny 
of eternal happiness in the love of God.' 
To achieve the state of perfect freedom meant a new 
definition of moral worth. The standards 1 principles, idealsr 
values and truths were not clearly discernible in self-exami-
nation but issued as commands or revelations from God and 
readily available in holy writ. Moral worth is so clearly 
defined that the interpretation of the moral problem was not 
in finding objectively true ideals worth striving after, but 
rather in discovering why man refused to obey God. And, al-
though Augustine nodded to the "good will 11 in passing, his 
talents were more easily and vividly portrayed in the discus-
sion of man 1 s internal make-up which alienated him from God. 
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The ev~l s~de of human nature ~nterfered w~th the myst~cal 
expression of man•s total subm~ssion to the w~ll of God. 
August~ne looked at human nature to convert ~t. But 
th~s was an ~mposs~ble task, first, because of the stubborn 
pr~de of the will, and, second, because God set the whole 
of creat~on go~ng all at once in h~s own way. A study of 
man's ~nner soul showed that when man looked to God he felt 
elation, but when he saw h~mself he felt remorse and gu~lt~ 
It was in the feel~ngs of elat~on or remorse that man could 
see the barometer of his -~'puitual state. And where, for 
-others, such goods as just~ce 1 beautyr goodness 1 and truth 
were sought as the solut~on to man's pred~cament, August~ne 
turned rather to the quest~on of how convers~on took place. 
Conversion meant the recogmt~on of sin as an evil w~ll, the 
resultant feel~ng of guilt in the aCknowledgment of the sin, 
and the experience of alienation from God dr~ving man to his 
final state in the service and love of God. 
l<ant 
As in the case of August~ne, Kant also could not turn 
away from Aristotle. Kant took the practical reason, the 
doctr~ne of causal agency {spontaneity) 1 the notion of 
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faculties~ and the laws of reason from Aristotle and bound 
---·-·-·-,··-·~-·•• --• --·w-'- •• 
them together _:_<:_~'?.9_'?u~:t for man• s mora:I. _nature and _destiny 
and to give the key to_:t::.he deepest problems of metaphysics ...... -
----·----- . - ---- - -------------------·· . 
free will as Sl2_0_J?::'::~l1:~~"1::¥ _ anC!- law. Not only is the practical 
reason a description of the nature of man 1 it is the key to 
the noumenal reality of the universe. The same experiences 1 
-- -----------·--
concepts, and laws apply both to man and the universe. The 
implication in Augustine that man operated by one set of 
principles and God by another could not satisfy the mind of 
;Kant. Kant•s moral principles answered the problem for him. 
He did not reject the Platonic view of directing the soul 
toward the Good 1 Aristotle's praise and blame of the free 
wi-llt --~nd Augustine 1 s interest in conversion. He added t:he -11 
conception of a categorical ;Imperative in the nature of 
reality to which not only man but even God must comply. 1 
Just as natural science consists of a healthy respect for 
natura;L law, so the spiritual life must include a devotion 
to moral law. And though on the surface the spiritual life 
appears to be defined as a search for principles outside one's 
self, nevertheless, when the principle is held up for obser-
vationr it turns out to be 11 the very essence of a free willn 
lsee F. E. England, Kant's Conception of God (London: 
George Allen and Unwin Ltd. 1 1929)t P 1 179. 
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as a highly philosophical rephrasing of the Golden Rule. 
That such a rephrasing improv~s upon the principle is debat-
ableL but at least the philosophical form of the Golden Rule 
is not so easily attackedJ" sirice it is barricaded with a high 
wall of systematically phrased ideas of the most inscrutable 
comple~i ty,. The cri ti.cs, however 1 were not overly impressed 
by the barrage and at times r~diculed the maxim of the Cate-
gorical Imperative by pointing out that the excellence and 
mediocrity could become identicalJ" if they were performed with 
the. will that they both should be universally practiced. 1 
In Kant( the doctrine moved from free will as uninten-
tional guilt (culpa) 2 to free will as the power to effect 
absolute beginnings 1
3 but through it all there ran the con-
cept that a man's goodness was a question of cha:E:acter.~ and 
this was founded on the moral'will~ Man achieved his complete-
ness when his action was motivated by the ratio cognoscendi 
1 Ibid. 1 pp. 601-602. 
2 Immanuel Kant 1 Religion 'Within the Limi.ts of Reason 
Alone, trans. Theodore M. Greene and Hoyt H. Hudson 
.{eh±cago: The Open Court Publishing Company), p. 17. 
3Julien BendaJ" Kant (New Yorkx Long,mansJ" Green and Com-
pany, 1940) 1 p. 33i see also Harold Hoffding, A History of 
Modern Philosophy.~ trans. B .. E- Meyer (London: Macmillan and 
Company Ltd., 1900)J II, 87. ' 
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of free wil~.l 
Conclusion 
As a result of the oonside~ation of the f'o~ thinkers 
involved in this study, severB.l factors stand. out as needing 
emphasis and corrEik¢ion. By_giving consideration to these 
/ 
.faeto~s some of the basic elements may be clarified~ and the 
:relationship between:thes~ t~nkers may be made more expli-
cit. In order to accomplish this :t'esult, three aspects o~ 
the problemwill be given: (i) the psychology ot free-.Will, (2) 
the morality of free. will,. and ( 3) the ·metaphys:f.cs of free 
will. 
· ~he · Psychology of Free Will 
The relationship of the d;octrine of· free Will to the 
soul is most significant. In :seeking ultimate reality 
. . . 
Plato finds it in the.· soul which he defines as 0 that which 
is moved by itself'." Thelia is· nothing more basic than the 
. . ' 
soul's ability to will itself .as a unity· of' self-directing 
consciousness. When the soul aci;s, it is a_cti:p.g as a whol-e. 
Its f'aeul ties Ol' powers are not related to 1 t as the parts 
to a whole but l'ather as the functions· of' the sot1l as a 
. whol:e. When the soul functions as a unity of self-directing 
consciousness, it is exercising its function of willing. 
lNorman Kemp Smith, A Col!llllentary on Kant's Critique of 
Pure Reason (London:: Macm!Ilan;; and Company, 1913), p. b•7i. 
The fact that the sou~ direct~ itself means that it is 
psycho~ogical~y free~ 
The validity· of this· definition of the soul is strongly 
cha~~enged by Aristotle on psycho~ogical, moral, and meta-
physical grounds. Aristotle.asserts the psycho~ogical 
aspect of the argument on the: gro-qnd that Plato's defini-
tion of the soul is not adequ~te. In the .first place, if 
the soul is an ultimate reality as ·a. first cause, it cannot 
be moved. By definition a fi~st cause, for Aristotle, cannot 
. be moved. If the soul nannot 'be moved, it cannot be moved 
by itsel4 and therefore the soul is· an unmoved movent. 
In the second place; the isoul does not function as a 
whmle, as claimed by Plato, because the:J:le are functions 
o:f the soul which are opposed ·to each other. In order, 
. . 
therefore, to account f.'or this opposition, the. soul must be 
defined as possessing :t'ae\Uti$s which are parts of the soul 
and which function separately :though not separable. The 
faculties, therefore, account ·for the variety o£ the soul. 
They are d ef'ined either as pa~ts .. of the souL or as inter-
penetrating entireties. For .Aristotle, .the definition of 
the soul in terms of its faculties can more readi~y account 
f'cr movement by the f.'aculty of appetite than by the soul as 
sel1'-1il0Ving. A f"ree will becomes a :faculty rather than a 
function of.' th$ Whole soul. Ip. the fina~ a:pa~ysis the soul 
is ob.served as disp'l.a7ing life in te:rms of local movement 
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and thinking,. These two aspects of the soul. describe the· 
tWo· faeu.lties with which the faculty ·ot fr.ee will must 
bargain in the performance of 'its function.. The notion of 
the soul as described by Plato appears to have been largel.y 
discarded except when Aristotle is found describing the 
., 
facul.ty' of thinking (mind) as >thinking itself.· ·That thought 
thinking itselt Jbay be su.p:reme d·oes not prevent it from 
being enfeebled by desire ·or appetite. The f.acul.ty of free 
will.· as the praetj.cal. reason $.rbi trating between the other 
facul.ties whil.e the soul 1 ts~lf r.&l118.ins umnoved is invol.ved 
in still. greater contrast whezt considered morally and meta-
physically. This discu.ssi~, however, must wait. 
When .Augustine defines thE:) \'till as that which is in 
the individual.'s power, he gives the impression that his 
. . . 
. definition of a free will. psy~hologically will be Pl$.tonic. 
However, though the power of t:n~ w111 is. the Will itself, 
. ' .. . 
it soon becomes defined as t~t faculty which has the power 
to a.tta:i.n a goal. As a ta.eul:tiy the will . can voluntarily 
turn in different .directions. : F'ltttthermore ~ the will. is the 
1'aeul.ty- upon which all. other tacu.lti~s depend. ' The will, 
in turn, recei:ves 1 ts energy- t):'om the sou1. That the will 
is not the sel.f-directing unity of the soul i~;~ clearl.y- indi-
cated for Augustine, as iD. the :ease of Aristotle, by- the fact 
that ihe will does not alway-s ;will. -suecessful.l.y, nor does 
it obey- its own connnands. Furthermor'e~ when the mind commands 
;_-
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the Will, the Will does not neeess~ily obey. In mediating 
between reason and desire there is no clear way for the will 
itself to control the outcome! of its decisions functioning 
merely as a will. 
Itant applies the faculty :of reason in order to dis-
tinguish between the noum.enal • and phenomenal worlds.. When 
reason applies to man1 s own nature seen to be deeper than 
what is observable in the "WOrld of sense, reason appears 
as a pure activity: x-eveal1ng nian as belong~g to the intellect-
'. ' 
Ua.l wo:r:tld. The inner sense of reasoning functioning as 
described reveals the unity of ~onsciousness and man's free-
dom or free will as·. the spont$neous and. independent causal-
ity of' his own wil.l •. Thus the: psychology of' :t'ree will began 
in Plato as self-directing eoliJ!soiou·sness, becam.e in Aristotle 
a :racul.ty bargaining with ·ox- warring aga:Jnst the othe:tt 
faculties, developed in August!ine to a self'--:-d.ef'eating fa.cuJ.ty 
which cannot obey itsel.f' and which also neither obeys n~ 
! 
commands the other f'acult~es c'onsistently, and f'inallT in 
Kant returned to the Platonic ~octrine defining the soul in 
precisely the same way as did Plato and referred to as Kantfs 
dootr~e of f'ree Will. 
The MoPality of Free Will 
The moral and ethical aspects of the doctrine of' free 
will seem to have more serious consequences than the psy-
chological •. The f'aet is, however, that the moral and ethical 
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aspects of the doetx-ine o:f :free will are rooted in the 
psychological definition. ' 
For Plato the soul as a whole is free to choose between 
alternati"Ves. Since the ehoi~e is not the function of a 
faculty but the soul as ·a who~e, the factors which make for 
a right choice must apply to t~e whole soul and not to a 
faealty. Since the Whole soul is a self-directing unity o:t' 
consciousness, its tende:n.ce or education aimed at assisting 
the soul to make right choices Will be concerned-with know-
' ledge of the good. lf the cho:iee were the function of 
desire, then the measures to b~ taken to make for the right 
choice would ha. ve · to be aimed at the me arting and the action 
of desire. Therefore, to say that virtue is knowledge is 
. met-ely another way of saying that the choiee of the good is 
brought about by healing the whole soul and not by the train-
ing or strengthening or a faeulty •.. When the whole soul 
' 
·functions freely to choose the: highest good, it must do so 
on the grounds of what it knoWJS• The soul Will choose the 
good because it is functioning: ~ationally. To say that 
virtue is found by free choice, would be an e.I"bitrary capri-
eious:ness in whieh.the soul islruiming hithe!' and thither 
trying to find vi:rtue .by guesswork ratheJ:' than bY knowledge. 
Thus, for Plato, responsibility does not apply to the power 
of self-d!hrection. Respo:p.sibility foP an evil. act requires 
tendence of the Whole soul in the fol'm of education or dis-
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cipline. Discipline or punishment aimed at a faculty to 
strengthen or weaken it cannot appl.y to the Platonic 
doctrine ot tendahce in which the soul's self-motion is 
the soul's self-knowledge and sel.f-determined act of virtue. 
Khowledg~ commands ~he soul, and the soul cannot do any• 
:Dhing else q~t act. Again1 vi~tue is not found by a cap-
ricious act of tree will but by a knowledge which istaught. 
The resul~ is that the right ehoiee is based on the right 
inf'omnation. · Knowing the good but not doing it is an error 
both in knowledge and in action. A free will cannot choose 
the good unless it is the action of the whole .soul directed 
to the good by its ~owledge. 
Aristotle agrees with Plato that the mihd is always 
right but points out that the appetite can·zand does origi-
nate movement contrary to mind. The mind ms.y reveal the 
highest good1 but it is not the Whole SOUle It is a faculty 
of. the soul. The appetite, on the other hand, is also a 
:f'aettlty and is energized by the soul. In its blindness 
appetite does not see what the mind sees and therefore wars· 
against the mind. This combination of. the appetite and the 
reason is:\dei'ined by Aristotle as the practical l'eason. 
Aristotle a~ees with Plato that intell.igence is derived by 
instruction, but he applies it not to the soul but to the 
faculty of mtna. On the other hand, moral virtue applied 
to the :f'SB ul.ties is brought about by habit which in turn 
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produces character·. The i"actQ.ties~ therefore, are trained 
by habit to choose the mean between extremes. Knowledge 
of the good does not necessitate doing good f'or the very 
reason that the .. soul as. an unmoved mover includes its 
faculties which can subdue the faculty of knowledge. That 
ma.n is the author of his actions means for· Aristotle that 
man's salt-determination earns for him responsibility for 
the consequences of his actions. . Both vices and virtues 
are voluntary in the sens.e, ~hat the action~. originates in. 
the agent. This quality of the act makes it a will. It 
. is· v61untary because it is in one's own power to do it. 
Virtue is achiev~d by choice or by free will (the 
'practical reason) which is the habit of observing the mean 
determined by prudence.. Moral. freedom alone do.es not 
qualif1 as the basis f'or man.ls moral nature~ Th& choice 
must be educated by prudence in order that the mean 
between extremes may be deliberated on; selected, and desired. 
Augustine takes the same approach to Platpts doctrine 
of the soul and its self<;Od.&termination as did Aristotle. 
For Augustine, if' Plato's definition of the soul in terms 
of its self-motion wex-e adequate, when the s-oul willed itself 
·it would do what it Willed. Although Plato urged that when 
the soul does not do 'What 1 t ought to it :ts because it does 
not know the answer, Augustine asserts that the soul's 
self-determination is not ultimate but subject to the command 
337 
of other :forces. Evi~ action is not the result o~ ignorance · 
of compulsion .. Both of' these facto:bs are exemptions :for 
moral evil. Moral evil is the result o:f an act of choice• 
The act o:f choice is an act of :free will involving on~y two 
alternatives: amor ~ and contemptus dei. The free will 
may choose either conversion to God or aversion to God. By 
willing itself the will has all power to thwart the will of 
God. The faculty of desire enslaves the will ,and the mind 
therefore can o:nly achieve its salvation by an act o·f the 
grace of God .. 
Kant is keenl.y aware of the problem that the most 
respected e~iticism of the self ... determining power of self-
consciousness arises :from the fact that the mind commands 
but the will .does .not .obey.· That the mind commands the will .. 
in the P~atoni.c sense is the atarting po1jnt for Kant in the 
disou.ssion of the m:oroality of tree will. Kant accepts the 
proposition that reason reveals comm.S.nds, imparts laws ( im-
peratives) which are aimed at determining the wi~l. He 
repudiates both Aristotle and -Augustine at the point where_ 
the practical reason or free wil~ is. viewed as being tossed 
about by other fo~ces. A will rocked back and .forth by 
inclinations or wants is, for Kant, not a moral will. The 
worth of an act is-measured by the principle of volition. 
Thus a good will means the Will det~rmined by rational prin= 
ciples. When Kant says that the will is autonomous; he means 
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that the will is a law to i tsel.f. Re son, the:J:'efore, 
commands the will. This autonomous will is the foundation 
of all morality. To make the free will subject to anything 
but itself' is to make it dependent on he physical laws of 
nature or the capriciousness indeterminism. 
The soul finds within itself sense of 
duty is motivated. Praise and blame a not determined by 
the external consequences of an act bu by a condition in 
the will itself. The will as the.prao 
and autonomous. The will. determines 
choice of chance but in the absolute 
The will is free in that· it belongs 
determines itsel.f to ac~ion, and is 
reason is free 
not in ·the .free 
dependence o.f reason. 
the agent himself, 
onamous causality. 
The categorical imperative reaf.f~rms t e principle that the 
soul is a self-conscious unity .freely illing itself and is 
a denial that the practical reason ca ot do what it com-
mands itself to do. The executive pow !' o.f the will always 
has within itself the absol~te spontan ity which,causes it 
to act according to the principles whi h it adopts • 
. The Metaphysics of Free Will 
The m.etaphysieal eoncluaitms D~la the doct:t-me 
of free will al!''e the most important fa tors in the whole 
diseussiQE. •. The metaphysical aspects f the doctrine begin 
with the psychological. definitions. 
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For Plato the soul. is the source and cause of all 
physieal movement. Since no physical ovement is spon-
taneous, there is a ~ause which is th prime cause or prin-
ciple of chang~. This prime cause ~s a soul moved by its 
own impulse. It is the ordering and containing firat prin-
ciple of all things. It is sel:f'-eause and determined from 
w.ithiD: itself • In its' internal dete:t? nation it is the 
cause of itself and everything else not have a 
cause •. Evil as the a.bsenee ct good is not eau.sed• 
Aristotle atf1:Pm.s that th#iN~ must be a limit in the 
causa1 .·series* a first cause-. This :f'i 
. whi.eh moves as the cause or motion but 
., ..... ' 
cause is a whole 
its e.l:t' unmoved • 
EX.eept. for the nd.l:ld Which can be :eep~ ted from the soul, 
the soui•s unity oonsists.in the 
faculties. 
Movement is predicable and there:f' re does not belong 
to the ,pri.Jnaroy subs:fianee. The pri~ry substanea, or f'irst 
, principle is God as the self-dependent aetuali ty ot thought 
thinking itself. By this definition o the first principle 
the contradi·etion of en unmoved moveP s removed. The 
definition of' unmoved is thereby revis d to .mean not uncaused 
or causeless but rather to· be thought ink;Lng i tselt'•-the 
contemplation of perfection.· Under se circumstances there 
is nothing to move to. 
,·_;• •r 
Man functions as p~~ctical re~san hen reason and appe-
tite are joined as delibet:"ati.ve des.ii"e a . IJ:I]).is is fi"ee wi~~ 
or choiee. The appetitive facu~ty and the rational f'aeul.ty 
move the soul to the good. 
Whereas for :P~ato the soul is a self-determining unity 
of' consciousnes~ in .Axtistotle ·it is l!lnnlovedmover composed 
of faou.l.ties whose f'xmnt.:tdlns are Pab~e f'I"om it (except 
:ra.r mind) and the form of the bod~r.~ 
For AUgus'h:fihe tb. ere ·at' e two l.~ws in the universe (til~ 
r 
God's power is man made,. ( 2) the law of divine provide c e. 
absolute and perfect, energizing :man o in turn p~ovides 
the ene~gy for his will. The first c use is not self-motion 
but God. Everything is perfect with tural evil explained 
by the wrath of_God resulting from mo 
defines himself in t~rms of his oWii 
is fail.ing to recogn1z.e the .will of' 
When man 
he 
alienates himself f~om God. The pri 1 reality is not the 
self'-eonsci ousness of' man but. the $te al. wiU of' God. 
In Kant the autonomous bee will is not determined by 
foreign ~auses such as physica~ necessity but is free and 
self-determin~g. As supreme,I"eason s not biased but 
rather free ~d practical. The free will discovers its own 
laws on the one hand and is spontaneit as the power of 
initiating a causal series in nature the other. The free 
will as the inner sense not .only reve s the unity of' con-
sciousness seen as the function of the under·st-a.nd:t.ng but, 
what is more important, reveals a spontaneity in man whieh 
is the independent eau.sa..lity of his own free will. The 
concept of freedom, therefore, bridges the gap between the 
appeal'ances and the. things-in-themselves. Thus the world 
of understanding contains the foundation o:t' tb.e wo:rld of 
sense. The key to lihe pl-oblem Gf th_e world as Caused in 
accordance with laws is found in man's consciousness .o:t' 
himself as intelligence ·ana as f:ree will--the causality of 
tm inner nature of :man as intelligence. Noumenal reality 
appeal's in consciousness as an intelligent will. Applied 
to reality freedom is spontaneity or the :t'acult~ of initiating 
a new causal series in time. ~s in the ease of Plato, for 
Kant the self-determi~ing cause is sufficient to account 
for the facts of life and the universe and is the central 
reality of the noumenal world with the power to create 
absolute beginnings. Kant .arrives at the eonl:ll\lsion which 
has be en here attributed to Plato; nam.eJ:r, that the power 
which c:reates ab$olute beginnings is none other than the · 
consciousness. of self-d;eil~mining causality which is another 
name ~ a free will. 
' ; . 
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1. Problem. The problem of this dissertation is 
to examine the doctrines of the will in the thought of 
Plato; Aristotle, Augustine, and Kant and to relate their 
conceptions of freedom to their doctrines of the will~ 
2. Method. . The method consists in examining pl"i= 
mary so'Ul'ees which define and interpret the will. and its 
freedom. 
3. · St:nnma:ey. Plato definels the sonl. as that mich 
is moved by itself. There is not a will as a. selfc;deter= 
mining faculty whieh is free, but rather a self-determin-
ing soul which wills itself freely as a unity. 
In Aristotle the sou.l itself do$ s not move • What 
moves are the faculties. Free will ~s the faculty of 
moral <iloice is the "i!tiddle faculty", the practical rea= 
. . 
. son, between the extremes of theoreti~Jal reason (maximal 
· ~ioul-... Nous) and moving de sir~ ( miuima1 soul--body). 
In Aq.gustine the will is that which controls the 
motion of the soul from which, as a faculty, th~ will 
derives its power. _The will 1 selects among alterna-
tives. In man's fir.s:t. stat.e he .is .. free, but once he 
chooses he is no longer free.· He has. only two choices: 
to obey God. or to sin. Either choice costs.bim.bis free 
will. Salv.ation can come onl7 a.s .the. gift. af God's grace. 
Saivation is perfect freedom. 
For Kant,the will is a cause which functions as a 
law to itself--the pure practical reason. Free will as 
an'entirely ~elf-determining causality acts in the world 
of 'sense as conditioned, and~ at the same time, in the 
world of noumena as absolutely unconditioned. 
4. Conclusions. 'fhere are three aspects to the 
preblem of free will: the psy-chological, the moral., and 
the metaphysical aspects~ 
IE. relation to the psy-chological aspect of the prob-
le:m, Plato's view of the soul's ability- to will itself 
as a selt-direeting unity of eons.ciousness is the point 
of departure ·for subsequent doctrines of tree will.. 
Aristotle, however, claims tb.S.t the_ soul e.annot be moved 
as a first cause and that the varieties of functions of 
the soul are due to the parts of the soul aet~ng as faeul= 
ties for the soul. Augustine points out that the will. 
neither will.s suceessful.l7 no~:: <>beys its cwn commands. 
Kant-builds on the Platonic foundation. 
Morally, free will in Plato concerns making a right 
ehoice. Virtue is not found by a eaprici.ons act of free 
will. A free wi~l cannot choose the good unless it is 
the aetion of the· whole soul di1'eet·ed to the good by 
1'eason. A~ustine and APistotle point out that the soul's 
self-determination is not ultimate but subject to the 
commands of other fa~ulties and :t:orees. Kant reaffirms 
the view that the min<l comman.ds the will. 
Metaphysically~ f'ree will helps def'ine first prin-
cipl.es. For Plato, the first principle is self-motion. 
For Aristotle, free will applies .to the faculties the 
soul uses. For Augustine, the first principle is.the 
absolutely free will of God.. For Kant, f1'ee will.. is the 
central reality of the noumenaJ. worl.d with the power to 
create absolute beginnings. 
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